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Foreword
This book is the last in a series of seven collections of case studies over the past twelve 
years that have examined the institutional roles played by navies throughout history. 
The series has collected an impressive group of scholars who have examined a vari-
ety of topics from the history of blockades and commerce raiding, the role of navies in 
coalitions, and naval mutinies in the twentieth century. This final volume, edited by 
Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, expands the series to cover the use of navies as 
instruments of “soft power,” which includes a wide variety of missions.
The use of navies for purposes other than war is a phenomenon that goes back to 
antiquity and has continued ever since. For example, the great historian and keen 
observer of res navales Thucydides was well aware of the importance of ancient  
Greek antipiracy operations for promoting wealth and security. Perhaps one of the 
most interesting cases from antiquity is the humanitarian mission led by Pliny the 
Elder in ad 79, when, as commander of the Roman fleet at Misenum, he went to 
Pompeii to rescue civilians imperiled by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, losing his 
life in the process.
Navies have thus always carried out a variety of operations that went beyond those 
necessary for the fighting and winning of wars and they continue to do so. During 
the last two centuries the U.S. Navy has engaged in an ever-broader array of non-war-
fighting missions. For example, the Navy was famously involved protecting against 
piracy in the Mediterranean in the early nineteenth century and carried out equally 
important patrol missions, such as attempts to stop the illegal slave trade beginning in 
the mid-nineteenth century. After the end of the Cold War, many other nonmilitary 
missions came to the fore, in particular maritime humanitarian aid missions after 
natural or man-made disasters. One recent example of such a mission was the post-
tsunami Operation Unified Assistance in Southeast Asia during 2004–2005.
Beginning in 2006, the U.S. Naval War College was engaged in the process of writ-
ing the Navy’s latest strategy document, called A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower. This document was published in October 2007, and updated in March 2015. 
While the Cooperative Strategy has a strong focus on traditional missions, embedded in 
concepts such as deterrence, sea control, and power projection, it also discusses broader 
missions such as maritime security and humanitarian assistance / disaster relief. It is the 
latter two missions that form the focus of the current volume, which examines nine 
vi  the newport papers
case studies ranging from the nineteenth through the twenty-first century on a wide 
spectrum of non-war-fighting missions.
michael f. pavković
William Ledyard Rodgers Professor of  
Naval History 
Chair, Strategy and Policy Department 
Naval War College
Preface
For well over two centuries, the U.S. Navy has engaged in an ever broader array of 
nonmilitary missions. Although a fundamental raison d’être of navies concerns hard 
power, in the twentieth century an awareness of the uses of soft power developed. For 
example, since ancient times protecting against piracy has been a common naval prob-
lem, while since the mid-nineteenth century equally important patrol missions, such as 
attempts to stop the illegal slave trade, have been conducted by the U.S. Navy. After the 
Cold War, many other nonmilitary missions became important, in particular maritime 
humanitarian-aid missions like the post-tsunami Operation Unified Assistance in 
Southeast Asia during 2004–2005.
Beginning in 2006, the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, hosted a “blue-
team/red-team” process for writing the Navy’s latest strategy document, called A Co-
operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21, for short). These teams addressed 
a wide variety of naval missions, including offshore balancing versus high-end and 
low-end strategies, to consider how aggressive, forward-positioned naval forces could be 
used both for war-fighting and for “lesser and included” missions, such as humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. According to Adm. James Foggo III, former Commander, 
U.S. European Command, “You can be out there forward, totally isolationist, or do 
what we call offshore balancing. Or you can be reactive and go where you are needed 
or surged. Or you can do . . . a mixture: to be combat capable but also at the same time 
able, in a phase zero situation, . . . to provide humanitarian assistance for disasters.”1
In five different scenarios, named “Alpha” through “Echo,” writing teams discussed 
the goal of humanitarian missions, anticipating that global climate change might create 
an increased demand for them.2 Much of this thinking was reflected in CS-21, which 
was published in October 2007 and updated in March 2015. To supplement this effort, 
this volume presents nine historical case studies examining the use of navies in non-
military missions. 
Notes
1. Rear Adm. James Foggo III, telephone interview, 6 February 2013.
2. Bryan McGrath, “Maritime Strategy Option Echo,” spring 2007. 
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Introduction
Navies Are Not Just for Fighting
BRUCE A.  ELLEMAN AND S .  C .  M.  PAINE
Navies are most commonly thought of in terms of warfare. Naval blockades, commerce 
raiding, and expeditionary warfare are basic missions. However, since almost their very 
beginning, professional navies have conducted many operations that are not strictly war 
related; antipiracy patrols, dating back at least to the Roman Empire, if not before, are 
just one example. In more modern times, patrols against the transportation of African 
slaves—and more recently, refugees—have become common. In addition, navies can be 
tasked to respond to a wide range of both man-made and natural disasters, including oil 
spills, hurricanes, and tsunamis.
Previous related volumes by the editors of this publication and in this series have 
examined the many force-based maritime operations that are considered to be the 
norm for professional navies.1 This volume is different, however, in that it focuses 
primarily on the nonmilitary uses of naval forces—in other words, naval actions that 
are conducted outside of the normal actions associated with war and often (although 
not always) avoiding the firing of weapons or other uses of lethal force. With the end 
of the Cold War in 1990, the U.S. military created a special term, “military operations 
other than war,” or MOOTW, to describe such operations; not to be outdone, the United 
Kingdom created “Peace Support Operations,” or PSO. However, nonmilitary naval 
operations have existed longer than these terms and can include, but are not limited to, 
humanitarian-aid missions, civilian evacuation operations (often referred to as “non-
combatant evacuation operations,” or NEOs), and a wide variety of non-war-related 
patrol functions, including (during the nineteenth century) antislavery patrols and more 
recently (in the twenty-first century) antipiracy patrols.
In the modern era, navies can also be called on to respond to a wide range of natural 
or man-made threats that have little or nothing to do with questions of war or peace, 
including disasters at sea like the Deepwater Horizon fire and oil spill. They can also 
sponsor fundamental research on ecological or environmental problems, including 
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the possible impact of sonar on marine mammals. Finally, naval operations originally 
created in wartime, such as the intentional sinking of ships to block important chan-
nels, have in recent years borne fruit in more peaceable endeavors, such as the sink-
ing of decommissioned naval ships to form artificial reefs for recreational diving and 
sportfishing.
While the military use of navies during times of international tension or war is obvious 
and well reported by the press, these nonmilitary uses can be equally important, even 
when largely ignored by the media and public at large. As with the “negative space” in 
an abstract picture, so long as the global commercial system is functioning, internation-
al trade is conducted without interruption, and peacetime maritime activities—includ-
ing fishing, mining in or under the seas, and  recreational pursuits, such as yachting, 
sportfishing, and scuba diving—can be carried out safely, there is no need to highlight 
the usefulness of navies. It is often only when problems arise and catch maritime secu-
rity organs unawares that media organs report on them. Nobody appears very interested 
in reporting “business as usual.”
In the more than twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, global navies 
appear to have adopted many new nonmilitary responsibilities—including patrolling 
sea-lanes for pirates and assisting in oil-spill cleanups—that break the traditional mold 
regarding what most people think are navies’ primary duties. But as the first chapter 
will show, such operations are not new. Although the U.S. government outlawed the 
transatlantic slave trade in 1808, only after the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty with 
Britain did the U.S. Navy actively enforce this prohibition, by conducting antislav-
ery patrols off the coast of Africa. As John Pentangelo discusses in his contribution, 
the sloop of war USS Constellation served as flagship of the African Squadron from 
1859 to 1861. During Constellation’s two-year cruise, this squadron of eight sail- and 
steam-powered vessels captured fourteen slave ships and liberated almost four thousand 
Africans from involuntary servitude. Arguably, the most important capture during 
Constellation’s patrol occurred on 25 September 1860, when it stopped the slave ship 
Cora and discovered 705 African slaves—men, boys, women, young girls, and even 
babies—whom it subsequently freed.
Naval forces can play a very important role in diplomacy without ever firing a shot. As 
Henry “Jerry” Hendrix argues, by sending practically the entire U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet 
to conduct “winter exercises” in the Caribbean during 1902–1903, under the command 
of the famous Adm. George Dewey, President Theodore Roosevelt was able to pressure 
the German and British governments to back down from a threat to use military force 
against Venezuela and to seek arbitration instead. It is notable—although “war by alge-
bra” has been much criticized, especially in land warfare—that in this case fifty-three 
American ships opposed only twenty-nine British and German ships; while additional 
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ships could have been sent by each of these major European powers, to do so would have 
taken considerable time and left other parts of their respective empires undefended. 
Thus, an American “fleet-in-being,” backed up by U.S. Marines stationed strategically 
on island bases throughout the Caribbean, produced a diplomatic coup not only for 
President Roosevelt but also for a rising American sea power.
While blockades have always been considered an important naval operation during 
times of war, in the twentieth century the focus of “starvation blockades” could be 
fine-tuned by simultaneously conducting humanitarian relief operations. As shown by 
Bruce A. Elleman, one of the first large-scale humanitarian-aid missions by sea oc-
curred during World War I, with the creation of the nonprofit Commission for Relief 
in Belgium (CRB). This organization distributed $927,681,485.08 worth of foodstuffs 
and clothing to Belgium and to German-occupied areas of northern France. Before this 
aid could be delivered, however, its director, Herbert Hoover, had to persuade England 
and Germany to let ships carry it through the maritime blockade lines. From 1 Novem-
ber 1914 until the summer of 1919, over nine hundred CRB-leased ships successfully 
navigated not only the British naval blockade but also German minefields and swarms 
of U-boats conducting unrestricted submarine warfare. By delivering this essential food 
aid to helpless civilians in Belgium and northern France, the CRB helped the British 
focus the full impact of the starvation blockade against Germany and its allies.
An embargo is an important naval function that includes patrols but usually does not 
require force. During the years immediately prior to the U.S. entry into World War 
II, the American government tried to force Japan to pull out of China by imposing 
progressively more restrictive embargoes. As S. C. M. Paine discusses, following Japan’s 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the creation of Manchukuo in 1932, Washington 
adopted a nonrecognition policy toward Japanese territorial expansion in northern 
China. After the war escalated in July 1937, the United States imposed economic sanc-
tions on Japan, including an ever more restrictive naval embargo intended to halt deliv-
eries to Japan of war matériel and, most notably, U.S. petroleum. This chapter outlines 
the historical background of the imposition of sanctions and of the Japanese reaction, 
which proved to be not a withdrawal from China but a massive escalation on 7 Decem-
ber 1941, with an attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch interests 
throughout the Pacific.
Navies can assist refugees to relocate during crises and wartime. Jan K. Herman recalls 
a formerly secret U.S. Navy mission that occurred during April 1975, in the final days 
of the war in Indochina. Although most of the South Vietnamese army had already 
surrendered to the approaching North Vietnamese, senior South Vietnamese naval 
officers refused to surrender their ships. With time running short, Richard Armi-
tage, an agent for the Secretary of Defense, offered U.S. Navy assistance to rescue what 
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remained of their navy. As a result, thirty-two ships and approximately thirty thousand 
refugees were safely escorted by USS Kirk across the South China Sea to Subic Bay in the 
Philippines.
Decommissioned or stricken naval vessels can still make important and honorable 
contributions to the common good. Tom Williams shows that navy ships can continue 
to serve a military by being turned into naval museums or by being sunk—during war-
time as blockships, in peacetime in gunnery exercises. On 25 November 2003, President 
George W. Bush authorized, as a provision of the Defense Department budget, U.S. 
Navy ships to be donated for use as artificial reefs. Although ships have been made arti-
ficial reefs for years, the first to be sunk in the new program was the aircraft carrier USS 
Oriskany (CV 34) on 17 May 2006, south of Pensacola, Florida. Sinking naval vessels to 
form artificial reefs can offer important economic benefits for coastal communities, by 
increasing maritime tourism and fishing, even while playing a positive ecological role by 
boosting local marine life.
The U.S. Navy’s use of sonar has been blamed for numerous whale strandings and other 
damage to sea life. Darlene Ketten argues that the relatively small threat of sonar to the 
populations of whales compared with those posed by other anthropogenic dangers—
fisheries, ship strikes, indigenous hunts, etc.—puts these concerns into perspective. 
While acknowledging the coincidence of strandings with some U.S. Navy exercises, 
she believes there must be an attempt to find the boundaries of the problem, as well as 
a retrospective analysis of the events under investigation. This requires outside support 
for research on multiple fronts to address the mechanisms that can trigger strandings 
and methodologies to avoid them. Naval participation in federal panels to address pub-
lic concerns is also crucial, since the largest impediments to seeing these events clearly 
are widespread public misperception of the magnitude of the events per se and of their 
implications, and skepticism about why results sometimes appear to come slowly. To 
correct media errors would require better dissemination of these results plus constant 
explanation of the broader impacts of these results on other areas of marine science.
Navies can respond in nonmilitary ways to natural, and especially man-made, disasters. 
Rear Adm. Mary Landry, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), relates the background of the 20 April 
2010 fire on the offshore oil rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in 
the rig’s sinking and an oil spill. Not only did eleven of the 126 crew members perish, 
but from 20 April through 19 September 2010 about five million barrels of oil leaked 
out of the five-thousand-foot-deep well, creating the largest offshore spill in American 
history. In response, Coast Guard cutters and personnel became the first line of disaster 
response. Rear Admiral Landry, commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District, head-
quartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, was the top Coast Guard official coordinating, us-
ing the incident command system, what grew to be the largest fully integrated response 
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ever mounted in the United States, including approximately forty-seven thousand 
people from federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector entities.
Not just established navies but also emerging and reemerging ones can conduct non-
military operations. For the first time in its modern history, the People’s Republic of 
China has deployed naval forces operationally beyond its immediate maritime periph-
ery to protect merchant vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Andrew S. Erickson 
and Austin M. Strange show that beginning in December 2008, China has contributed 
more than ten thousand naval personnel in almost twenty successive task forces and 
has escorted nearly six thousand commercial vessels, approximately 70 percent of them 
foreign flagged, in seven hundred escort missions.2 The People’s Liberation Army Navy 
has carefully crafted its antipiracy operations to portray China’s blue-water operations 
abroad in a positive way. These Gulf of Aden deployments might increase the Chinese 
navy’s prospects for cooperation with other navies as well as impact China’s future naval 
development.
The conclusions examine the targets, audiences, objectives, effects, and outcomes of 
such operations. Long before the MOOTW and PSO were invented, navies were deeply 
involved in the conduct of nonmilitary operations. Given that peace is the norm and 
war the exception, such nonmilitary missions occur much more regularly and produce 
significantly greater effects than most people would think.
Notes
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this essay 
are those of the authors and are not necessar-
ily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy 
Department, or the Naval War College.
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Sailors and Slaves
USS Constellation and the Transatlantic Slave Trade
JOHN PENTANGELO
The United States outlawed the transatlantic slave trade in 1808 but provided for little 
in the way of enforcement to stop the slave ships at sea. In 1819 Congress authorized 
the president to use U.S. Navy ships to seize American-flagged slavers and the next year 
equated slave running with piracy, with death as the maximum penalty. During 1820 
the corvette Cyane was sent to western Africa, where it “captured a number of ships 
suspected of intent to carry slaves.” 1 Such efforts were haphazard, however, and Great 
Britain eventually convinced the U.S. government to establish its own permanent Afri-
can Squadron. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty, signed in 1842, declared that the two na-
tions would maintain separate naval squadrons on the West Coast of Africa to enforce 
their respective laws against the slave trade. A major reason in the United States behind 
the creation of the patrol was to avoid allowing British warships the right to search 
American-flagged vessels, a legal issue that had been at the heart of the War of 1812.
Although the American antislavery patrol lasted for almost two decades, up through the 
beginning of the Civil War in 1861, the sharp divisions on the legality of slavery between 
North and South meant that “it was never intended to be effective.” Between 1842 and 
1861 only thirty-six vessels were captured by the African Squadron, an embarrass-
ingly low figure when compared with the hundreds of slave ships captured by the Royal 
Navy’s antislavery patrols; in 1843 alone, the British seized forty-four slavers and “nearly 
double that in 1845.” 2 Only for a short period during the late 1850s was the antislavery 
patrol truly active, and this came about mainly because slave-ship owners appeared to 
thumb their noses at Washington when they “openly landed slaves in Georgia in 1858.” 3
From 1859 to 1861 the sloop of war USS Constellation, launched in 1854, served as flag-
ship of the U.S. Navy’s African Squadron. The squadron in those years was composed of 
eight sail and steam-powered vessels and had orders to protect American commerce and 
suppress the transatlantic slave trade off Africa’s western coastline. During Constella-
tion’s two-year cruise the squadron captured fourteen slave ships and liberated almost 
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four thousand Africans from lives of involuntary servitude. The crew endured the 
hardships of the station, worked with local Africans to suppress the trade, and experi-
enced on the fateful night of 25 September 1860 what is arguably the most important 
moment in Constellation’s century of service to the U.S. Navy, the capture of the slave 
ship Cora.
Early History of the African Squadron
While the first American antislavery patrols off the coast of Africa date to 1820, for over 
twenty years they were conducted only intermittently. Few slave ships were captured, 
since there were insufficient warships deployed to cover over three thousand miles of 
African coastline. As one critic of the Navy’s antislavery patrols openly acknowledged, 
“So great is the extent of coast from which slaves can be shipped, and so constantly 
do the traders change the places of embarkation, that the few vessels employed by the 
American government are easily deceived and avoided.” 4 After Congress ratified the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, signed on 10 August 1842, this situation began to change for 
the better. Commo. Matthew C. Perry was the first full-time commander of the perma-
nent African Squadron, and more ships were assigned.
In late June 1844, USS Truxtun, under Cdr. Henry Bruce, left the United States to join 
the African Squadron, off Tenerife in the Canary Islands. During its sixteen-month 
deployment, it captured only one small, hundred-ton slave ship, Spitfire, off the coast 
of Guinea. Truxtun freed 346 slaves as a result of this capture. Bruce reported that the 
captured ship was so cramped that “there was not room enough for a man to sit, unless 
inclining his head forward; their food was half a pint of rice per day, with one pint of 
water. No one can imagine the sufferings of slaves on their passage across, unless the 
conveyances in which they are taken are examined.” 5 Rather than being sold at auction, 
Spitfire was refitted for use in antislavery operations.
During September 1845, USS Yorktown, commanded by Capt. Charles H. Bell, captured 
two slave ships, one of them Pons, a 196-ton ship transporting between 850 and nine 
hundred slaves. When the ship was sold the following year it brought over five thousand 
dollars in shares for the crew, plus another nineteen thousand dollars for the 756 slaves 
landed safely in Liberia. Interestingly, during 1847 this same ship was seized again by 
American authorities, this time for transporting 110 Irishmen, which was thirty more 
than the registered limit of eighty (but only about one-eighth the number of African 
slaves it transported in 1845).6
In 1847, USS Perry, under the command of John A. Davis and attached to the Brazil 
Squadron, seized the American ship Ann D. Richardson, on its way to Africa bearing 
fake papers, and two days later a second ship, Independence. Both ships were shown to 
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be participating in the illegal slave trade and so were sent back to the United States as 
prizes. On 6 February 1849, Perry seized Susan, also off Brazil. Perry captured Martha 
on 6 June 1850 and Chatsworth on 11 September 1850, both off the coast of Africa. 
Martha was waiting to load 1,800 African slaves when Perry captured it. On 10 March 
1854 Perry captured Glamorgan, for a total of six captures—three off Brazil and three 
off Africa, more than any other U.S. Navy ship on antislavery patrol.
Both the British and American squadrons faced a significant problem in their inability 
to search all suspected vessels. The American fleet could board and search only vessels 
flying the American flag or no flag at all. The British had many more ships on station 
but could not search a vessel flying an American flag. Thus slavers greatly minimized 
the risk of capture by flying the Stars and Stripes. They knew there was a substantial 
chance of being spotted by a British vessel and almost none of being stopped by an 
American. Much of the American slave trade was in fact carried out not by U.S. citizens 
but by proxies. An American-flagged slave ship might sail to Africa with an American 
crew, but then a foreigner would purchase the ship and use a non-American crew, “com-
posed of Portuguese, Spaniards, or other non-U.S. citizens,” all measures designed to 
avoid being stopped by the U.S. Navy and to protect either crew from being accused of 
piracy, which could be punished by hanging.7 Unexpected as it might seem today, many 
slave ships hired Africans into their crews. Between 1794 and 1805, as “many as seventy-
seven Africans served on board Liverpool slavers.” 8
The American squadron did not have much success in directly combating the slave 
trade. The group was small, often about four vessels. Four vessels were far too few to 
cover the mouth of the Congo River, let alone the three thousand miles of coast. The 
types of vessels deployed also adversely affected the squadron’s capabilities. The depart-
ment often sent large oceangoing frigates and sloops of war instead of the schooners and 
gunboats more suitable for inshore patrols and pursuit of fast merchant clippers. There 
were steam-powered vessels in the Navy, but they had yet to be deployed to Africa. 
These vessels would have been much more effective in pursuing fleeing slave ships. 
Finally, the Secretary of the Navy’s order making the protection of American commerce 
the primary mission relegated the suppression of the slave trade to a secondary duty. 
From 1843 to 1859 the squadron captured only twenty-two vessels. During a similar 
time frame the British navy captured approximately six hundred. This was the climate 
in April 1859, when the U.S. Navy sent USS Constellation to the west coast of Africa 
with orders to become flagship of the African Squadron.
Constellation Outfits a Crew
Constellation, under the command of Capt. John S. Nicholas, weighed anchor in Boston 
Harbor and set sail for Africa on 19 July 1859. The all-sail, twenty-two-gun sloop of war 
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served as the headquarters of the African Squadron’s new flag officer, Commo. William 
Inman. Constellation arrived at the Portuguese island of Madeira in August to relieve 
USS Cumberland. In October it sailed south to Monrovia, Liberia, to augment its crew 
with African Kroomen, members of the Kroo tribe who came on board as paid crew 
members. According to crew member William Ambrose Leonard, vessels of the African 
Squadron were allowed to ship two Kroomen for every gun on board.9 Since Constella-
tion carried twenty guns, it was allowed to hire forty additional hands.10 These Kroomen 
served for the entire cruise and so were actively involved in freeing other, less fortunate 
Africans from enslavement.
While images of the slave trade are appropriately associated predominantly with the 
African slaves, who endured unspeakable horrors during the Middle Passage on their 
way to North and South America, very little has been written about the role that some 
West African seafarers played in combating the trade. For decades, commanders of the 
African Squadron employed Kroomen as auxiliary seamen and as lightermen and long-
shoremen, transporting men and supplies from ship to shore. Kroomen were recruited 
from shore often on a “first come, first served” basis. Renowned for their physical 
strength, they often worked nude or with just cloths wrapped around their waists.
The arrival of the Kroo on board Constellation in October 1859 made quite an impres-
sion on the American sailors. Leonard later recounted that “the ship is swarmed with 
them presenting their recommendations, . . . to our captain. They are a fine looking set 
of men. They now began to come a little faster than they were wanted and contrary to 
the orders of the 1st lieutenant they hung on to the ship’s side, and resisted all attempts 
to drive them off.”11 Kroomen relied on written testimonials from previous employ-
ers to prove their worth to naval officers. They carried these recommendation papers, 
called “books,” in wooden or tin boxes tied around their necks. Sailors who worked with 
them typically renamed their new shipmates after items of importance in the seamen’s 
world. Constellation’s Kroomen included men renamed Fresh Water, Bottle of Beer, 
Tom Rattlin, Jim Bobstay, and Jack Half Dollar. These often recycled names, perhaps 
considered insulting by modern standards, were powerful status symbols in the Kroo 
villages at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Monrovia.
As temperatures rose above 110 degrees Fahrenheit, the suffocating heat made ordinary 
shipboard routines almost unbearable. Leonard explained of the Kroo that “the object 
in having them is to man the boats so as to keep the white men from being exposed to 
the sun which is dreadful hot all along the Coast. They are a very hardy race of people 
and can stand a great deal of fatigue. They require no bedding; they sleep on deck.”12
Another description claimed the Kroo were “an easy tempered set of men, very re-
spectful in their manners, willing to work and withal very muscular and powerful.” In 
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addition to possessing physical prowess, the Kroo were excellent swimmers. On one 
occasion when a turtle happened to swim by, three of the Kroo “divested themselves of 
their clothing in a twinkling” and dove in after it; the turtle immediately dived deep, 
but “the chase did not end here, and a submarine pursuit took place which was aston-
ishing as well as amusing to witness; one would hardly suppose that men could acquire 
such perfection in swimming as they practice.”13
Resistance to Illness
In addition to their other fine qualities, squadron commanders recognized that 
Kroomen were more resistant than white crew members to tropical diseases. Since the 
beginning of the patrol it had always been disease, not belligerent slave runners, that 
had been the greatest threat to personnel. While the British view was that periodic visits 
onshore, for “seasoning,” would reveal who was best suited to survive African illnesses, 
the U.S. Navy adopted a rule “against anyone spending a night ashore in Africa.” This 
rule wisely sought to avoid the 20 percent mortality rate experienced by the first set of 
American slaves returned to Liberia.14
A good example of the dangers inherent in service in the African Squadron was shown 
during October 1844, when USS Preble joined Commodore Perry’s African Squad-
ron. Operating out of the Cape Verde Islands, the ships would cruise for five months 
at a time. Owing mainly to the chance of malaria, these missions were described as 
“dark and horrible cruising.”15 The actual carrier of the disease, mosquitoes, was as yet 
unknown; Perry’s sanitary regulations included smoking the ships with “smudges,” 
drying them out with coal stoves, and keeping them well ventilated. As for personal 
hygiene, the “men had to wear a flannel undershirt night and day, bathe every week, 
and not be on the African coast later than eight o’clock.” To ready a ship for service, it 
“was cleansed, ventilated, and purified with fire.” Without realizing it, Perry’s sanitary 
“precautions kept to a minimum his squadron’s contact with mosquitoes, the carri-
ers of both malaria and yellow fever.”16 Nevertheless, Preble, before even beginning its 
antislavery cruise, was struck by malaria. By early December the majority of its crew, 
ninety-three of 144, had the disease; eventually sixteen died.
Fifteen years later, medical science had still not made the link between mosquitoes and 
disease. Understandably, Constellation’s sailors dreaded the strains of malaria and yel-
low fever prevalent along the coast. Disease killed hundreds in the British and Ameri-
can squadrons during the nineteenth century, earning Africa the sobriquet “the White 
Man’s Grave.” Officers and seamen believed the fever was contracted from breathing 
“bad air” close to the coastline. These diseases directly interfered with the suppression 
of the slave trade, inasmuch as the U.S. Navy ships were frequently ordered not to linger 
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close to shore, which was exactly where they might have been able to observe and catch 
slavers loading their cargo.
During Constellation’s cruise, dozens of men in the squadron were infected with fever, 
and several died from it. In 1861, the sloop captured the brig Triton and discovered that 
its crew was sick with the fever. Captain Nicholas’s clerk, Stephen B. Wilson, a member 
of the prize crew detached to sail Triton to Norfolk, died of the fever and was buried on 
Ascension Island. One month later wardroom steward James George died of the same 
illness. A sailor recalled George’s ordeal the night before he expired: “All hands were 
kept awake by a young fellow that is sick with the coast fever; he is out of his head. His 
lungs must be in good condition, for he hollered like a bull.”17 Many slaves also died of 
the illness. For example, on 14 January 1861, USS Saratoga, commanded by Capt. Alfred 
Taylor, captured Nightingale with 961 slaves on board. The slaves were freed and eventu-
ally taken to Liberia, but not before 160 had died of malaria.18
Constellation’s officers employed the Kroomen in many different ways, including scout-
ing the shore for disease outbreaks. They also worked side by side with seamen in sail 
handling and lookout duty. The Kroo were also adept at navigating the difficult coastal 
surf zone where protected harbors were absent. As warships of the African Squadron 
required constant (if brief) contact with the shore for resupply and other operations 
conducted on land, these African mariners provided crucial support.
After embarking the Kroomen, Commodore Inman sailed south for a short cruise 
around the Congo River and spent the next four months around St. Paul de Loando, 
overseeing the completion of a new storehouse, replacing one at the distant port of Porto 
Praya. On 21 December 1859, while cruising off Cabinda Bay, Constellation captured its 
first prize, the brig Delicia, after a ten-hour chase. Delicia, Inman reported to Secre-
tary of the Navy Isaac Toucey, “was completely fitted in all respects for the immediate 
embarkation of slaves.”19 The boarding party discovered a slave deck and large copper 
cauldrons intended to feed a cargo of Africans. Questioning the mate, Captain Nicholas 
discovered that Delicia’s master had been on shore purchasing a cargo of Africans when 
Constellation discovered the brig. A prize crew sailed Delicia to Charleston, South Caro-
lina, for adjudication, but there having been no Americans on board and no papers, 
logbook, or colors, the American courts eventually declared the brig was beyond federal 
jurisdiction.
Satisfied with its success to date, Constellation sailed to Madeira for repairs and liberty 
in February 1860. Intensely displeased with this decision, however, Secretary of the 
Navy Toucey ordered Inman to return to the cruising ground immediately. Unlike 
many former secretaries, Toucey took the patrols seriously. He restricted the cruis-
ing ground to twenty degrees north latitude and directed that no vessel could leave it 
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without permission from the department. Several months after Constellation’s return to 
the coast, the African Squadron had the most successful day in its eighteen-year history: 
on 8 August 1860, USS Mohican captured the slave ship Erie, with 897 slaves, and 
USS San Jacinto seized Storm King, with over six hundred Africans crammed be-
lowdecks. The African Squadron was suddenly showing signs of life. Unbeknownst to its 
crew, the recently returned flagship, Constellation, was about to join the fray.
Constellation Captures Cora
On 27 June 1860 the bark Cora departed New York bound for the West African coast 
on what would prove to be an ill-fated slaving voyage. After a decade of legal merchant 
activity, the 431-ton Baltimore vessel was sold by E. D. Morgan & Co. to John Latham 
for fourteen thousand dollars. In May 1860 Latham took the bark to Pier 52 on the East 
River to refit its rigging and load cargo. The cargo, containing large quantities of lum-
ber, freshwater, and provisions, raised suspicion among local authorities that the owner 
intended to use Cora as a slave ship. A U.S. district attorney detained Cora for examina-
tion but later cleared the bark for its voyage.
All evidence that would have confirmed Cora was intended for a slaving voyage was hid-
den deep within the ship. Cora’s hold contained fifty cases of muskets (likely intended 
to purchase slaves), more than twenty cases of drugs (to treat disease outbreaks), and 
forty-seven tierces—barrels holding about forty gallons or six hundred pounds—of rice 
(to feed the captives). Other suspicious cargo might include large copper pots for cook-
ing food, hundreds of wooden spoons, swords, firearms, shackles, and chains.20
When Cora sailed for Africa, it carried over ten thousand feet of lumber—enough to 
build a slave deck. Slave ships were originally built for legal trade and needed sub-
stantial alterations to carry human cargoes. Thus a slave deck, a middle deck installed 
between the hold and upper deck, became the “smoking gun” for a vessel that had not 
yet loaded slaves.21
On 27 August Cora arrived at Punta da Lenha, a major slave-trading center thirty miles 
up the Congo River. Three weeks later, having made all the necessary arrangements, 
Latham sailed Cora to Manque Grande, where in the late hours of 24 September he 
supervised the hasty loading of African slaves from the shore to the waiting ship. Once 
the slaves were loaded, Cora sailed for Cuba to unload its cargo.
On 25 September 1860, Constellation parted company with San Jacinto and began a 
southerly cruise toward the Congo River. At seven bells in the second “dog watch” 
(7:30 pm), a lookout on the starboard cathead (where the anchor was made fast) spotted 
Cora about two miles away on the weather bow. The flagship changed course and began 
its pursuit. Midshipman Wilburn Hall remembered, “The Constellation was simply 
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superb in tacking, and round she came, raising her sharp bow from the sea like a racer 
ready for the signal.”22 In an attempt to escape, Cora hauled up sharp on the wind, set all 
its canvas, and began evasive maneuvers.
Sometime after 9:00 pm, as the moon lit up the night sky, Constellation’s starboard 
thirty-two-pounder long gun fired a shot across Cora’s bow to signal it to heave to and 
prepare to be boarded. Cora ignored the shot and raced along the coast. Constellation 
closed the gap to within a half-mile and fired several more warning shots, but to no 
avail. In a desperate attempt to gain speed, the slaver’s crew frantically began lightening 
the ship. They threw an empty boat, hatches, anchors, spars, and casks into the ocean. 
Despite all of their efforts, the flagship continued to draw closer. Cora cut across Con-
stellation’s bow in a final attempt to make it out to sea. Constellation’s next shot cut away 
a part of Cora’s rigging and forced the bark to give up.
A boarding party led by the first lieutenant, Donald M. Fairfax, boarded Cora and im-
mediately discovered a slave deck with 705 Africans crammed together—men, boys, 
women, young girls, and babies. According to Leonard:
This being the first slaver I ever saw with slaves in, my curiosity led me upon the slave deck. The 
scene which here presented itself to my eyes baffles description. It was a dreadful sight. They were 
all packed together like so many sheep—men, woman [sic], and children entirely naked, and suffer-
ing from hunger and thirst. They had nothing to eat or drink for over 30 hours. As soon as the poor 
negroes were aware that we were friends to them, they commenced a shouting and yelling like so 
many wild Indians. They were so overjoyed at being taken by us that I thought they would tear us 
to pieces.23
Midshipman Wilburn Hall later recalled the revolting stench of so many men, women, 
and children crammed together with little or no sanitation. The young officer wrote, 
“The slaves were nearly all on the slave-deck, shouting and screaming in terror and 
anxiety. I leaned over the main hatchway holding a lantern, and the writhing mass of 
humanity, with their cries and struggles, can only be compared in one’s mind to the 
horrors of hell as pictured in former days.”24 As the ship’s hatches were opened, the 
captives “came tumbling out of the hold, yelling and cringing. They ran forward and 
crouched on the bow. . . . They were nearly starved.”25
Upon hearing that they had captured a slaver with hundreds of terrified Africans 
packed below, Constellation’s crew let out a thunderous cheer. Each member of the 
crew was entitled to a bonus for every recaptured African slave landed in Liberia, as 
well as a portion of the proceeds gained if the slave ship were sold at auction. By law, 
half the proceeds of a ship sale went to the Naval Retirement Fund, but the other half 
was divided among the crew. Interestingly, federal courts had earlier upheld the rights 
of Kroo sailors to their shares of the proceeds—almost sixty-five dollars apiece for the 
capture of Pons.26
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Returning the Slaves to Africa
Taking the slaver Cora was just the first step, since now the Navy was responsible for the 
well-being of the captured slaves. On 27 September sailors from Constellation finished 
repairing Cora’s rigging for the journey back to the United States. Inman ordered a prize 
crew of eleven sailors and three Marines, led by Master Thomas H. Eastman, to sail the 
bark to Norfolk, Virginia, for adjudication. The crew first sailed to Liberia and delivered 
the Africans into the custody of Rev. John Seys, the U.S. Agent for Recaptured Africans. 
Despite measures to improve living conditions and orders “to enable them to have as 
much pure air as possible,” eleven Africans died before reaching their destination.27
The Republic of Liberia was the designated haven for Africans on board slave ships 
seized by the U.S. Navy. The American Colonization Society originally founded Mon-
rovia in 1822, and in 1847 Liberia became an independent state; later it absorbed other, 
adjoining returned-slave colonies at Bassa Cove, Sinoe, and Cape Palmas. The Ameri-
can Colonization Society “supported it year after year with money, shipments of goods, 
and occasional infusions of new settlers.” There was no single “home” to which rescued 
slaves could be returned, and many American officials feared that returning them to the 
Congo River basin would only result in their recapture and resale as slaves. So the U.S. 
government supported their relocation to Liberia. By 1844, about 250 of these “recap-
tives” had been landed there.28
Local committees assisted the traumatized Africans, called “Congoes,” after their ar-
rival. Many of the Africans were apprenticed to Americo-Liberian families. Over two 
hundred of the Africans liberated from Cora settled in Careysburg, where they per-
formed sawmill work. For example, ten males from Cora were apprenticed to a sawmill 
near the Junk River. One of the younger ones, Reverend Seys reported, had “already 
learned sufficient of the business as to be able to take the place at the engine of a man 
who had been receiving $4 a month wages. The place is one requiring much vigilance 
in the application and stopping of steam at certain junctures, and so steady, so punctual 
and reliable is the Congo lad, that the Liberian’s services are no longer required.”29
Between August and October 1860, Liberia was overwhelmed with some 3,600 freed 
slaves.30 Such success in so short a time taxed Liberia’s ability to care for new arrivals. 
Some of the Congoes apprenticed that year ran away, and a small number committed 
suicide. But with no family or friends and no way to return home, most conformed to 
the dominant culture and adopted new lives.
Master Eastman, meanwhile, departed Monrovia and sailed Cora to Norfolk to deliver 
its first mate (Morgan Fredericks), second mate (John Wilson), and third mate (Hans 
Olsen) into the custody of the U.S. marshal. Owing to adverse weather, however, he 
instead sailed Cora to New York, anchoring off the Brooklyn Navy Yard on 8 December 
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1860. The U.S. district court in New York found the evidence damning and confiscated 
the bark, auctioning it for $8,900. (On 7 March 1861 it was seized once more for sus-
pected slave running by the revenue cutter Harriet Lane.)
Some of Cora’s officers did not wait for a verdict on their guilt. Less than twenty-four 
hours after Cora’s arrival in New York, Morgan Fredericks broke out of his stateroom, 
climbed through a porthole, plunged into the East River, and made his escape. Captain 
John Latham, who had been brought to New York in the U.S. store ship Relief, was 
denied bail. A mysterious friend negotiated Latham’s furlough from prison to buy him 
a suit at Brooks Brothers on Broadway. While an escorting deputy marshal was himself 
trying on a suit, Latham and his friend escaped in a carriage waiting outside. Mates 
John Wilson and Hans Olsen denied having known that they were on a slaving voy-
age until they reached Africa. They pleaded guilty to violating the act of 1800—a lesser 
crime of voluntary service on board a slaver. The court sentenced them to ten months 
in prison and a fine of five hundred dollars each. Four other seamen were brought into 
court, but their cases were dismissed.
While these court proceedings were taking place, USS Constellation stayed on African 
station, where it captured one more slave ship, the brig Triton, on 21 May 1861. On 
11 August it set sail for the United States for reassignment. During the Civil War the 
ship protected commerce and conducted diplomatic functions as part of the Mediter-
ranean Squadron. Meanwhile, the Abraham Lincoln administration, occupied by a war 
on American soil, finally agreed to allow the Royal Navy to search American vessels 
suspected to be slavers. This Anglo-American treaty was signed on 7 June 1862. The 
African Squadron was no more.
Conclusions
During the period that the USS Constellation was its flagship, the U.S. Navy’s African 
Squadron captured fourteen slave ships and freed almost four thousand Africans from 
lives of servitude in the Americas. In just over two years, Commodore Inman’s cruisers 
achieved nearly half the captures made during the squadron’s entire existence (1842–61). 
The Navy achieved these results by increasing the number of vessels on station, intro-
ducing smaller, steam-powered vessels, relocating the supply depot from the distant 
port of Porto Praya to St. Paul de Loando, and restricting the boundaries of the cruising 
ground. More aggressive cruising and better cooperation with the Royal Navy’s West 
Africa Squadron were also important factors. Unfortunately, however, squadron com-
manders were ordered to prioritize protection of American commerce over suppression 
of the slave trade, which hampered their success with the latter. Also, as one elderly slave 
smuggler affirmed in 1856, there was so much profit in smuggling slaves from Africa 
that even “if you should hang all the Yankee merchants engaged in it, hundreds would 
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fill their places.” According to this expert in the trade, there was only one possible solu-
tion: “Take the word of a dying man, there is no way the slave-trade can be stopped but 
by breaking up slave-holding.” 31
The U.S. Navy’s African Squadron was “temporarily” canceled during the Civil War, 
when the Royal Navy was given permission to board and search American ships. To 
make an example in support of the Union’s antislavery policies, President Abraham 
Lincoln ordered one American slaver captain, Nathaniel Gordon, to be hanged on 21 
February 1862.32 Because many other equally guilty slave traders were “quietly let off 
with light sentences,” this conviction was described as “obviously a fluke.” 33 Once the 
Confederacy was defeated, slavery in America was finally abolished. With increased 
efforts of the Royal Navy, plus Cuba’s abolition of slavery in 1867, the transatlantic slave 
trade was dealt a decisive blow. Although the end of this trade was mainly the result of 
“breaking up slave-holding,” it should not be forgotten that during the preceding two 
decades U.S. Navy ships like Constellation had played significant roles in the American 
effort to combat the transatlantic slave trade on the open seas.
After the war, the U.S. Navy quickly decided to reactivate the European, East India, and 
Brazil Squadrons, but the “African Squadron was abandoned.” The Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, Gustavus Fox, wrote the secretary, Gideon Welles, on 26 August 1865 that 
“it would be infinitely preferable to give up the African Squadron and have the same 
force in the West Indies under a special Commander. Such a transfer of ships would in-
crease our influence in the seas adjacent to our coasts and which are really our waters.” 
In December 1865, the Navy Department agreed with this suggestion, creating instead a 
West Indian Squadron, on the basis of the argument that “slave ships could be appre-
hended as effectively off the Cuban coast as off Africa.” 34 In 1869, with all North Ameri-
can markets closed to slave ships arriving from Africa, the British government decided 
to abolish the Royal Navy’s West Africa Squadron, “because there were no slave ships to 
catch.” 35 Although French and Portuguese slave traders continued to participate to some 
degree in the transatlantic trade, “by the 1870s it had dwindled to insignificance nearly 
everywhere in the Atlantic.” 36
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Overwhelming Force and the Venezuelan  
Crisis of 1902–1903
HENRY J.  HENDRIX
Few incidents of recent history have remained as clouded as the Venezuelan Crisis of 
1902–3. For more than a century historians have disputed the accuracy of Theodore 
Roosevelt’s recollections of the events of the winter of 1902. The confusion surrounding 
the Venezuelan Crisis stems from assertions made in Roosevelt’s later correspondence. 
His claim that he actively coerced European blockaders to accept arbitration did not 
emerge publicly until October 1915, when one of his letters appeared as an appendix to a 
biography of former secretary of state John Hay.1
The biography’s author, William R. Thayer, included the letter to highlight a previously 
undisclosed diplomatic crisis in the early days of Roosevelt’s administration. Writ-
ten in early 1915, the letter vividly recalls the events of late 1902 from the president’s 
perspective: “I assembled our battle fleet, under Admiral Dewey, near Porto Rico, for 
‘maneuvres,’ with instructions that the fleet should be kept in hand and in fighting trim, 
and should be ready to sail at an hour’s notice . . . I saw the [German] Ambassador, and 
explained that in view of the presence of the German squadron on the Venezuelan coast 
I could not permit longer delay in answering my request for arbitration, and that I could 
not acquiesce in any seizure of Venezuelan territory.”2 
The records of the operational units and commanders of the naval forces involved in 
the “winter exercise” of 1902–3 present a clear picture of the events in the Caribbean. 
For eleven days, between 8 December and 18 December 1902, the future of U.S., British, 
German, and Venezuelan relations hung in the balance as Theodore Roosevelt discreetly 
pursued diplomatic negotiations between Venezuela and the two great European pow-
ers. When Germany, intent on nullifying the Monroe Doctrine and gaining a colonial 
possession in South America, repeatedly ignored the American president’s call for arbi-
tration, Roosevelt committed the combined U.S. Atlantic Fleet to the task of establishing 
the supremacy of American interests in the Western Hemisphere.
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Defining Factors
In May 1901 a German warship appeared off Margarita, Venezuela, and began mapping 
approaches to the harbor. Although Venezuela had maintained its independence for 
more than seventy-five years, it continued to suffer the common ailments of many Latin 
American republics: a growing debt to international powers and a corrupt and weak 
government incapable of paying it off. Venezuela’s constitutional structure maintained 
many of the authoritarian attributes of its colonial past, and the continuing presence 
and influence of institutions such as the Catholic Church, the military, and an orga-
nized landowning class acted to create and support a highly hierarchical social system 
that was prone to graft and corruption.3 
Five Venezuelan presidents came and went during the 1890s, each alternately playing 
the role of reformer and strongman, all gaining wealth from commissions received 
for negotiating loans to their nation on terms very favorable to the European leaders. 
When Venezuela became so indebted that it could no longer afford to pay the interest 
on the notes, the European powers moved to collect. In 1895 this resulted in a loss of 
“disputed” territory to British-held Guiana, but Venezuela warded off outright colonial 
assimilation.4 Concern that this surrender of territory might encourage the ambitions of 
other European powers eager to expand or establish colonial possessions in the area is 
evident in the strongly worded response and activities of the United States throughout 
this crisis.5
In 1902 the mantle of leadership rested on the shoulders of Gen. Cipriano Castro, who 
appears from the vantage point of history to be a caricature of the stereotypical Latin 
American dictator. A career army officer who had spent much of the 1890s exiled in 
neighboring Colombia, he launched a revolution on 23 May 1899 with the stated intent 
to create the strong central government he and his supporters felt was necessary to 
advance the cause of progress in the nation.6 Castro’s military strongman background 
heavily colored his foreign policy, which was a conglomeration of heavy-handed, ag-
gressive initiatives that lacked sophistication or nuance. The American representative to 
Venezuela described Castro as “ignorant, obstinate and willful [sic]. He evidently thinks 
that he is a Power in the World . . . He has never traveled: he knows nothing of the 
outside world; he can not realize the force and power of virtue and justice; he believes 
he is the Child of Fortune, and that he alone is able to govern his country and control 
its destiny.”7 Castro spent much of 1901 fomenting unrest in Colombia in hopes of 
overthrowing its government and creating a greater Venezuelan Republic out of Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Venezuela.8
By late 1901 Venezuela’s European creditors had become strident in their demands that 
President Castro pay more attention to his mounting foreign debts. Venezuela had not 
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paid even the interest on its loans in several years, and Germany, Britain, and Italy were 
increasingly concerned. Castro diverted their requests for economic redress into the 
Venezuelan court system, whose bench was loaded with Castro supporters who ren-
dered verdicts in Venezuela’s favor. Additionally, Castro’s navy seized foreign ships and 
their cargos at sea, and foreign-held homes in Venezuela were raided and looted.9 When 
faced with the threat of European armed intervention to collect on debt and address 
the additional crimes against foreigners, Castro made it clear that he believed that the 
Monroe Doctrine would effectively shield his country.10
The Monroe Doctrine, first enunciated in 1823 by President James Monroe and his sec-
retary of state, John Quincy Adams, forbade the expansion of European colonial efforts 
in the Western Hemisphere.11 The combined effects of the Civil War and the abysmal 
state of the Navy left the United States without the tools to enforce this doctrine for 
most of the nineteenth century, however, and the responsibility for containing European 
expansion into the Western Hemisphere actually fell on the shoulders of Great Britain. 
Britain’s colonial and commercial interests in Canada and the Caribbean made it a 
silent partner in the U.S. strategy, even when the two nations’ policies were in conflict in 
other arenas.12 The United States was willing to accept the dependent relationship until 
the final decade of the century, when the burdens of a worldwide empire on Britain, the 
burgeoning American Navy, and three successive crises (Brazil, 1891; Nicaragua, 1894; 
Venezuela, 1895) forced the two nations to reconsider the nature of their relationship.13 
With regard to Venezuela, however, Secretary of State John Hay, a noted anglophile, 
made it clear that the Monroe Doctrine was never intended to shield a wrongdoing 
state from justice. A consortium of European powers led by Germany and Great Britain 
prepared to test the limits of the United States’ passivity.
While President William McKinley nominally supported the Europeans by urging 
Castro to make a good-faith effort to repay the loans, his vice president took a harder 
line.14 Vice President Theodore Roosevelt reassured America’s southern neighbors that 
while the doctrine posed no threat to them, it promised certain conflict for any “Old 
World Power” that sought to permanently acquire territory in the New World.15 He took 
the additional step of spelling out his personal interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine 
directly to the German consul general, who was encouraged to convey it to Ambassador 
Theodor von Holleben and Kaiser Wilhelm.16 This conversation must have weighed 
heavily on the mind of the German ambassador two months later when he called on 
Roosevelt to express his nation’s sympathies to the new president of the United States 
following William McKinley’s assassination.
In the opening days of the first Roosevelt presidency in September 1901, the European 
powers, with their numerous colonies scattered throughout the Caribbean and their 
sizable business investments in South America, exercised substantial influence over 
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the Western Hemisphere (Table 1). Roosevelt was well aware that the leading nations of 
Europe did not welcome his expansive interpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. If 
the policy was to be effective, he needed to back it up with credible combat power and 
convince the imperial powers of Europe that he would use that power.
Naval Coercive Diplomacy
Shortly after entering the White House, Theodore Roosevelt accepted a report prepared 
for his predecessor by Rear Adm. Robley D. Evans that called into question “the real 
value of our naval force for fighting purposes.” Evans, speaking for the General Board 
of the Navy—an advisory panel of a dozen or so senior officers created in 1901 to advise 
the secretary of the Navy on war planning, the disposition of the fleet, the establish-
ment of bases, and so on—went on to detail the effective strength of fighting vessels 
available to other major naval powers in the event of war.17 Observing the disparity in 
naval strength between the United States, the imperial powers of Europe, and the rising 
power of Japan in the Pacific, Evans noted that “the most phlegmatic observer cannot 
fail to be impressed with such a striking comparison, nor can he avoid appreciating the 
questionable position in which our country would be found, should any one of the many 
international problems of the present time suddenly force us into hostilities.” Evans 
concluded by saying that the General Board urged “greater celerity in the completion 
of such vessels as are already authorized . . . while an equal or greater necessity for a 
further increase in our limited number of fighting ships should . . . be impressed upon 
Congress in the most emphatic manner.”18 Roosevelt reacted with characteristic gusto. 
“I am straining every nerve,” he commented to a friend in the opening months of his 
presidency, “to keep on with the upbuilding of the Navy.”19 Roosevelt clearly envisioned 
needing that strength in his roles as his nation’s chief diplomat and the commander in 
chief of its armed forces.
Roosevelt represented a quandary for European leaders. The populist nature of the 
American democracy led to a shifting foreign policy and inconsistent statements shaped 
largely for domestic consumption.20 The more cosmopolitan Roosevelt crafted his 
pronouncements with domestic and foreign audiences equally in mind, however, and 
he was not given to exaggeration when it came to foreign policy.21 Had the diplomats in 
GREAT BRITAIN FRANCE GERMANY USA JAPAN
Battleships  28 9  15  10  6
Cruisers  120 37  26  20  31
Source: Navy Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 655–657.
TABLE 1
Naval Order of Battle, 1901
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the German and British embassies understood Roosevelt’s character and reviewed his 
prior statements, there would have been no surprise when this staunch defender of the 
Monroe Doctrine interpreted a German communiqué issued in December 1901 not only 
as a challenge to the United States but as a personal affront as well. The message stated 
that while Germany and its partner Great Britain did not seek territorial gains, circum-
stances might require them to pursue “temporary occupation” of Venezuelan harbors 
and their accompanying customhouses.
Roosevelt took no comfort from these assurances.22 After all, the kaiser’s brother had 
recently seized territory “temporarily” in China and then negotiated (at gunpoint) 
ninety-nine-year leases on the holdings.23 Rear Adm. Henry C. Taylor, chief of the Bu-
reau of Navigation and the senior uniformed naval adviser to the president, wrote Roo-
sevelt a memorandum in which he stated that in the likely event that Venezuela ignored 
the European blockade, the powers would respond by bombarding port facilities and 
invading. Germany’s by now familiar strategy in these situations would be to demand 
an indemnity to cover the expense of the conflict. Secretary of State Hay had voiced his 
opinion of this formula a few years earlier while serving as ambassador to Great Britain: 
“There is to the German mind, something monstrous in the thought that a war should 
take place anywhere and they not profit by it.” 24 In a classic European policy formula-
tion, Taylor’s memo concluded that President Castro “could offer nothing but territory,” 
ensuring Germany’s acquisition of a foothold on the South American continent.25 With 
Venezuela overlooking the key approaches to the long-sought-after canal through the 
isthmus joining North and South America, the young American president correctly 
perceived the scenario of the likely establishment of a German naval base, or even an 
active German colony, as a clear and present threat to longstanding U.S. interests. This 
scenario alone would have compelled Roosevelt to act, but the historical record suggests 
that he also saw an opportunity to use the circumstances surrounding Venezuela’s dif-
ficulties to elevate his nation and himself to the level of the other Great Powers and their 
leaders. To maximize this opportunity, he drew on the talents of men he understood 
and respected.
In June 1901 the General Board of the Navy, under the chairmanship of Admiral of the 
Navy George Dewey, had sent a report to President McKinley detailing the scope of in-
fluence the U.S. Navy could expect to exert in the Caribbean in the event of war with an 
unnamed Western European power. This unnamed power was assumed to be Germany, 
and in fact, the Naval War College had conducted a series of war games with negative 
results against the “Black” (German) Navy in 1901.26 Now Dewey, the victor in the Battle 
of Manila Bay and, in Roosevelt’s eyes, the nation’s greatest living hero, reviewed his 
board’s report with the new president. It stated that the “Navy can control the Carib-
bean and its shores in war, if we retain, in peace, vantage points on the shores of Cuba 
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and create a strongly fortified naval base in Porto Rican waters. This control will reach 
Orinoco [near the present-day eastern border of Venezuela] and the Guianas.” 27
Subsequently, on 1 January 1902, a detachment of five Marine officers, one surgeon, and 
one hundred enlisted Marines began the permanent fortification of Culebra Island, a 
thickly wooded, six-mile-long islet sixteen miles east of Puerto Rico.28 Culebra possessed 
no natural freshwater sources aside from that which came from the sky, but it did pos-
sess a magnificent harbor, known simply as “Great Harbor,” that provided valuable pro-
tection for ships during the annual hurricane season.29 One month earlier, in December 
1901, portions of the island had been permanently ceded to the Department of the Navy. 
The conversion of designated areas to a fully equipped naval base now began in earnest, 
“in case of sudden war.”30 Named “Camp Roosevelt” in honor of the president, the camp 
featured barracks for officers and enlisted men, a storehouse for supplies, and a field 
hospital consisting of an operating room and dispensary. The latter was deemed too 
small by reviewers from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, who recommended that it 
be enlarged to the standard size, providing additional sleeping quarters for attendants 
and a six-bed hospital ward.31 Tiny Culebra and its harbor became the cornerstone of 
American naval activities in the Caribbean.
The Navy was also carefully monitoring the mounting domestic and international 
instability that surrounded the Castro regime. Small U.S. Navy vessels that pulled in 
and out of Venezuelan ports for resupply provided surprisingly detailed intelligence 
reports on events unfolding there. For much of the nineteenth century, naval officers 
such as Commo. William Bainbridge with the Barbary pirates, Commo. Matthew Perry 
in Japan, and Rear Adm. John Walker in Panama had functioned with proficiency and 
quiet expertise as the sole diplomatic representatives of their nation in many foreign 
ports.32 They also served as frontline intelligence officers, acting as the eyes and ears 
of the United States with regard to matters critical to national interests. On 28 Febru-
ary 1901 the commander of the USS Scorpion reported that the president of Venezuela 
was encouraging public discontent with the United States over minor civil infractions 
involving American sailors. Lt. Cdr. Nathan Sargent reported that “President Castro 
is unpopular and his foothold is insecure; he feels therefore that if the natural animos-
ity to Americans can be encouraged, he can acquire popularity by his attitude and that 
his position will be greatly strengthened. In addition . . . he imagines he can gain the 
reputation of wielding a firm foreign policy without danger of being called to account 
for his actions by our Government.” The Scorpion’s commanding officer suggested 
that the German government was using its local immigrant population to help stir up 
anti-American resentment: “I am also informed upon very reliable authority that the 
Germans are not wholly guiltless in this antagonism to everything American. They have 
here . . . a large colony in Venezuela, are naturally jealous of us and our trade, and have 
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done their best to work up and accentuate this crusade against us.”33 Reports continued 
to arrive at the White House via the Navy Department detailing the increasing revolu-
tionary unrest and the rising probability of European “intervention” to restore order.34 
Roosevelt knew the nature and the extent of the challenge he faced in the Caribbean, 
and he set about to prepare the instrument of his forthcoming diplomacy.
Winter Exercises
At the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy made a point of focusing its influ-
ence in the Caribbean. Following the Spanish-American War in 1898 the Navy com-
menced a series of “winter exercises,” assembling various units of the fleet to carry out 
inspections and simulated engagements. It fell to Dewey’s General Board to draft plans, 
assign units, and monitor the results. So it was that in May 1901 the General Board is-
sued preliminary orders for the winter 1902–3 exercise. The conclusion of the exercise 
order described a simulated battle between two opposing fleets on the high seas.35
This proposal was refined in November 1901 by Secretary of the Navy John D. Long. Ac-
cording to Long’s instructions, the winter exercise would begin with a series of inspec-
tions followed by combined live-firing drills (with limited expenditure of ammunition) 
to test the accuracy of the battleships’ and cruisers’ big guns and would culminate in the 
aforementioned simulated battle on the high seas between two large naval forces.36 Every 
action ordered appears, from a professional’s perspective, to be in line with standard 
operating procedures. As tensions between the European powers and Venezuela began 
to rise, however, a not too subtle “hidden hand” gradually altered the winter “exercise” 
to full preparation for war.
In early 1902 Ambassador von Holleben warned Kaiser Wilhelm II that Theodore 
Roosevelt would respond strongly to any hint of a permanent German military pres-
ence in South America. Wilhelm dismissed his ambassador’s concern, saying, “We will 
do whatever is necessary . . . even if it displeases the Yankees.” 37 The kaiser viewed the 
expansion of U.S. influence with alarm, fearing that it came at the expense of Ger-
many’s imperialist plans. In 1898, following George Dewey’s defeat of the Spanish fleet 
in Manila Bay, a squadron of German ships sailed into the harbor amid rumors that it 
was intent on acquiring all or part of the former Spanish possession not claimed by the 
previously “nonimperial” United States.38 The United States’ subsequent departure from 
its historical imperial reluctance and acquisition of the entire archipelago, threatening 
to back up its stand with force if necessary, embarrassed the German commander, and 
by extension the kaiser.39 Wilhelm was not one to suffer embarrassment without retalia-
tion. At one point he even considered invading Long Island and using it as a bargaining 
chip to force the U.S. government to turn over certain overseas possessions.40 Ultimately, 
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Wilhelm backed away from that precipice and shifted his focus to other nations in the 
Western Hemisphere.
By the time Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency, Wilhelm had concluded that 
the Monroe Doctrine was a real threat to the expansion of German influence and ter-
ritory in South America. In a government position paper he questioned the doctrine’s 
legality. “The Monroe Doctrine has not become an international law, to which the 
European Nations are tied,” he insisted, and he pointedly began referring to the “United 
States of North America” in his speeches and correspondence.41 Contemporary observ-
ers discerned in Wilhelm’s statements a strategy to “unite Europe, including England, in 
hostility to the Monroe doctrine.” 42 Wilhelm II knew that he had to destroy the legiti-
macy of the United States’ claims of preponderant interest in the Western Hemisphere 
to achieve the goals of German colonial expansion. To do that, he would have to take on 
Theodore Roosevelt.
Upon assuming the presidency, Roosevelt, for continuity, had asked McKinley’s cabinet 
to remain in place. Within six months, however, the new president, who as assistant 
secretary had chafed under John Long’s lethargy, accepted the old man’s resignation, 
graciously describing him as a man who was “single-minded in his devotion to the 
public interest.” 43 Roosevelt took the traditional route of looking to the state of Mas-
sachusetts for a replacement and quickly appointed four-term congressman William H. 
Moody, “whose vigor, sturdiness, and temperament . . . resembled his own,” as the new 
secretary of the Navy.44 Moody’s four years of service on the House Insular Affairs Com-
mittee had educated him on the magnitude of the challenges of carrying out a successful 
imperial foreign policy.45 With Moody’s help, Roosevelt quickly modified the character 
of the forthcoming naval exercise.
In June, Roosevelt took the highly irregular step of asking Admiral Dewey himself to 
assume command of the combined Atlantic Fleet for the winter exercise. Dewey, the 
Navy’s only “four-star” admiral, seldom went to sea, and never for extended periods. He 
preferred to remain in Washington, where he could monitor the Navy from his office 
from nine until noon and then enjoy a nice afternoon nap at home before setting out for 
an afternoon carriage ride followed by dinner and early retirement to bed.46 Revealing 
that the broader international audience was the intended target of his decision, Roose-
velt wrote to Dewey: “Your standing . . . abroad, is such that the effect of your presence 
will be very beneficial.” 47 Roosevelt demonstrated the importance he attached to Dew-
ey’s mission when, despite being bedridden with a leg injury that would ultimately result 
in a painful bone-scraping procedure, he invited Dewey to his sickroom to share his 
private thoughts on the matter. The president made it clear that his reason for assigning 
Dewey was twofold: He wanted Dewey commanding the fleet to “put pride in the people 
and [to] arrest the attention of . . . the Kaiser.” The full extent of Roosevelt’s instructions 
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during this meeting are not known, but a diary entry by Dewey’s wife later that evening 
intimates their sensitive nature: “The Prest. [sic] told G. in strict confidence—what had 
better not be written now.” 48
In August, Roosevelt attempted to telegraph the seriousness of his intentions to the in-
ternational community. Writing to his good friend, British parliamentarian (and noted 
European socialite) Arthur Lee, Roosevelt stated that Dewey was training the fleet for 
war.49 Lee, noted for his numerous contacts in European capitals, could be counted on 
to make sure that this diplomatic tidbit reached the right ears. Deeply sensitive to the 
significance of symbolism in diplomacy, T.R. completed his summer diplomatic foray 
by offering Dewey the use of the presidential yacht, the USS Mayflower, as his flagship.50 
Any attack on this ship, an outward symbol of the American presidency, could be seen 
only as a personal attack on Theodore Roosevelt himself.
Secretary of the Navy Moody had already taken steps to support Dewey in his mis-
sion to the Caribbean. Prior to the president’s offer of the Mayflower, the swift packet 
vessel USS Dolphin had been placed at Dewey’s command, along with an expert staff 
that included Rear Adm. Henry C. Taylor as chief of staff and the newly promoted Cdr. 
Nathan Sargent as Dewey’s personal aide.51 Again, from an operational perspective, 
Taylor’s assignment as chief of staff is worthy of note.
Henry Clay Taylor was regarded as one of the most gifted men of his generation. He had 
served at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, acquiring a reputation as 
an intellectual, an administrator, and an innovator. When the position of chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation was vacated, Roosevelt reached far down and promoted Taylor 
over the heads of many of his superiors into the senior Navy position in Washing-
ton.52 At that time there was no Chief of Naval Operations. Instead, the U.S. Navy was 
run by eight admirals who headed up “bureaus” (navigation, shipbuilding, ordnance, 
etc.). While they were all equal in rank, it was accepted that the head of the Bureau of 
Navigation was the “first among equals.” The assignment of Taylor to be Dewey’s chief 
of staff was thus highly unusual and could have occurred only by the direction of the 
commander in chief. The choice of Commander Sargent, recently the commander of the 
USS Scorpion and the source of so much intelligence concerning the political unrest in 
Venezuela, further underlines the importance assigned to this mission.
Moody took the additional step of ordering U.S. Navy assets in July to survey the Ven-
ezuelan coast for possible German landing zones and to submit suggestions for their 
defense. Later, in an internal memorandum, he informed his bureau chiefs that the 
president was “deeply interested” in the forthcoming maneuvers. Moody directed all in-
volved to provide “hearty and vigorous cooperation” to ensure “that this mobilization of 
the fleet be successfully accomplished.” He concluded by reminding the recipients “that 
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this movement is a test of our ability to meet war demands” and assured his bureau 
chiefs that he would “sanction all reasonable expense within the law and regulations, 
in order that the vessels engaged . . . may be prepared.” 53 This level of personal attention 
at the secretarial level leaps out at the historical and professional observer. In October 
the secretary issued the final instructions for the winter exercise, now just two months 
away. In a telling and dramatic departure from the simulated battle between two fleets 
on the high seas contained in previous versions of the exercise, Moody ordered a battle 
scenario focused on the interception of an approaching naval force intent on securing 
an undefended foreign harbor and mining its main ship channel.54
U.S. Marines Build a Base
Naval power is not completely sea based, and Roosevelt’s preparations did not end with 
Dewey and his fleet. Throughout the late summer and early fall, as the final changes were 
being made to the “winter exercise,” the workings of the other arm of the naval service, 
the U.S. Marine Corps, also showed evidence of Roosevelt’s hidden hand. In September 
1903, on the order of the Commandant of the Corps, a battalion of Marines was consti-
tuted for possible deployment to Panama.55 The battalion comprised 16 officers and 421 
enlisted men under the command of Col. Percival C. Pope, an exceedingly experienced 
commander of troops whose service stretched back to the Civil War.56 The men were 
embarked on board the USS Prairie, which remained tied up at the naval base in Norfolk, 
Virginia, awaiting further orders. On 23 October an additional order increased the size of 
the force by one company under the command of Capt. Smedley D. Butler, bringing the 
force to 19 officers and 522 enlisted men.57 The size and structure of this force represented 
a sizable percentage of the expeditionary combative power of the Marine Corps.
On 5 November this force was ordered to participate in the winter exercise, and the 
Prairie departed Norfolk for Culebra Island.58 The Marines reached the island on 
20 November, disembarked, and began constructing three defensive artillery positions, 
mutually supporting their fields of fire. They built roads strong enough to allow the trans-
portation of heavy guns and ammunition between the emplacements and strung tele-
phone lines between the various encampments. Rear Adm. Francis J. Higginson and Rear 
Adm. Joseph B. Coghlan, the respective commanders of the North Atlantic and Caribbe-
an squadrons, inspected the positions and pronounced them satisfactory.59 The Marines’ 
actions constituted a major effort to establish a defensible base for fleet operations.
Kaiser Wilhelm II remained oblivious to the mounting American resistance to his plan 
for expansion in South America. Throughout the summer and early fall he worked to 
convince the British to act with Germany to coerce Venezuela into paying off its debts.60 
Two months later, in a characteristic boast, Wilhelm played up the capabilities of his 
navy to visiting American Army general (and known Roosevelt confidant) Leonard 
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Wood.61 By early November the forces of Germany and Great Britain were in position 
to take action against Venezuela.62 Rear Admiral Taylor advised Roosevelt that war be-
tween the United States and the European powers was the likely outcome if the situation 
developing off Venezuela turned violent.63
On the evening of 24 November 1902 Roosevelt hosted a private dinner for a small group 
at the White House to honor Baron Speck von Sternburg, a German diplomat and old 
friend. Both men had served in Washington during the early 1890s, Roosevelt on the Civil 
Service Commission and von Sternburg in the German embassy. Roosevelt hoped to use 
the intimacy of personal diplomacy to convey his intentions directly to the kaiser’s senior 
staff. Also at the dinner table that evening was Admiral of the Navy George Dewey.64
Admiral Dewey always maintained the poise and appearance of a cultured man, but in-
side him raged a fierce spirit with but one focus: Germany. While he publicly restrained 
his comments, Washington’s social elite were well aware that Dewey held the Germans in 
particular distaste as a result of the German navy’s actions preceding and following the 
Battle of Manila Bay.65 Mildred Dewey, again in the privacy of her diary, stated her un-
varnished opinion of the U.S.-German relationship, “The truth is, we hate each other.” 66
Roosevelt’s purpose in inviting Admiral Dewy to the White House for dinner could not 
have escaped a professional diplomat of von Sternburg’s caliber. But events in European 
capitals conspired to ensure that the carefully constructed guest list and dinner conver-
sation would not have the time or opportunity to achieve Roosevelt’s aim. Events were 
already in motion.
Germany and Great Britain had begun to consider joint action against Venezuela in the 
early days of 1902.67 Great Britain wanted to seize Venezuela’s gunboats as “a convenient 
form of coercion” and as a means of avoiding the perception of infringing on Roosevelt’s 
Monroe Doctrine.68 The kaiser, however, remained convinced that Roosevelt was bluff-
ing and instructed his ambassador to Britain to communicate his intention to blockade 
the South American republic. Count Paul von Metternich’s arguments carried the day, 
and on 25 November 1902 Germany and Great Britain formally announced their inten-
tion to implement a “pacific” blockade of Venezuela.69
Britain’s participation in the Venezuelan Crisis appears inconsistent with its evolv-
ing national interests in the Western Hemisphere. After a century of acrimony and 
distrust between their two respective nations, the governments of Theodore Roosevelt 
and Arthur Balfour seemed to be successfully knitting together the destinies of the two 
great English-speaking nations. Given the importance it attached to its current relation-
ship with America, Balfour’s government took the precaution of forewarning Secretary 
of State Hay of Britain’s decision to blockade Venezuela. Hay, who was either out of 
touch with Roosevelt’s thinking or deliberately playing his role in a grand Rooseveltian 
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diplomatic drama, responded that while he regretted “that European Powers should 
use force against Central and South American countries,” his country “could not object 
to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided 
no acquisition of territory was contemplated.” 70 Perhaps because of the tepid nature of 
Hay’s assurance, Britain’s new ambassador to the United States, Michael Herbert, felt 
compelled to express his own personal reservations. “I wish we were going to punish 
Venezuela without the aid of Germany,” he wrote to his foreign minister, Lord Henry 
Lansdowne, “for I am not sure that joint action will be very palatable here.” 71
On 1 December Roosevelt traveled the few blocks south from the White House to the 
Washington Navy Yard to see Dewey off. The exact words exchanged between the two 
men are not known, but the substance of the conversation is clear: while Dewey did sail 
with the intention of overseeing the annual winter exercise, there was the very real po-
tential for him to play an even greater role in the developing crisis off the coast of Ven-
ezuela. As her husband sailed south out of communication, Mildred Dewey recorded in 
her diary, “I dread there may be war over Veequela [sic] . . . how can Georg [sic] get thru 
three wars unscathed.”72
Execution
On 7 December 1902 Germany and Great Britain instituted their “peaceful blockade” of 
Venezuela.73 It did not begin well. A Venezuelan mob in Porto Cabello seized the British-
flagged merchantman Topaze at anchor there, and German ships shelled two nearby 
Venezuelan military installations in response. Elsewhere, students marched in the streets 
displaying banners that called on the United States to uphold la doctrina Monroe on their 
behalf.74 President Castro escalated tensions and gave his opponents a legal recipe for a 
declaration of war when he ordered the imprisonment of all male British and German cit-
izens and the seizure of their property.75 On 9 December British and German naval forces 
proceeded to capture the ships of the Venezuelan navy then in port.76 The Germans, in 
their enthusiasm, sank one of their prizes and seriously damaged another.77 Castro, by 
now convinced of the seriousness of the European threat, appealed to the American 
minister in Venezuela, Herbert Bowen, to intercede on Venezuela’s behalf and extend an 
offer of arbitration.78 Britain, increasingly aware of the concern the situation had aroused 
in the United States, assented, but Germany attempted to sidestep arbitration.79
The concept of arbitration as an element of international law emerged from The Hague 
Peace Conference convened by Czar Nicholas II in the spring and summer of 1899. 
While the conference did not achieve its ultimate, idealistic aim of achieving world 
peace, it did result in the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration where na-
tions could seek redress for their mutual grievances without having to resort to armed 
conflict. Germany, not keen to see the martial advantage arising in its shipyards and 
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the forges of the Krupp arms factories nullified by weak nations who sought equal 
treatment through legal venues, opposed the arbitration initiatives.80 Now, as word of 
the Venezuelan offer arrived in Germany, the kaiser’s earlier concerns seemed justi-
fied. Arbitration at this point in the blockade would not allow for the series of events 
necessary for Germany to gain the toehold of Venezuelan territory it needed to begin its 
slow expansion into South America and assert strategic prominence overlooking the ap-
proaches to the long-planned canal across the isthmus. The kaiser rejected arbitration.
According to Theodore Roosevelt’s later accounts, as the Mayflower dropped anchor off 
Culebra Island on 8 December, he was in the White House welcoming a group of Ger-
man businessmen escorted by Ambassador Theodor von Holleben. During this meet-
ing, the president later recalled, he drew von Holleben aside and spoke sharply to him, 
issuing an ultimatum demanding that Germany either accept arbitration within ten 
days or face armed conflict with the United States.81 The shocked ambassador responded 
that he could not forward such a demand, phrased as it was, to the kaiser. Apparently, 
von Holleben left the room convinced that Roosevelt was bluffing. He would not have 
been so certain had he been aware of the actions of Admiral Dewey during the period 
9–18 December 1902.
Naval professionals will quickly discern within the stark events that occurred over the 
next week and a half the differences between a well-executed “winter exercise” and the 
actions of a veteran combatant commander preparing his forces for war. Background 
analysis also reveals the blunt hand of America’s relatively new chief diplomatist and 
commander in chief. Unlike previous exercises, which focused on individual naval 
squadrons, the 1902–3 maneuvers gathered every available battleship, cruiser, and tor-
pedo boat in the Atlantic.82 
By combining the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, European, and Caribbean squadrons, 
Dewey was able to marshal fifty-three ships to counter the twenty-nine ships available 
to Britain and Germany in the Caribbean.83 Although this number may seem exces-
sive, it was necessary, in Roosevelt’s mind, to demonstrate an ability on the part of the 
United States to concentrate an overwhelming force in its claimed “zone of influence.” 
Both Great Britain and Germany possessed larger navies than the United States, but 
they would have had to strip units from other critical areas of their empires (leaving 
trade routes vulnerable to disruption) in order to exceed the combined American fleet. 
Assembling such a force would take weeks—weeks in which Roosevelt would be free to 
exercise his diplomacy.
While Dewey cruised down from Washington, D.C., aboard the Mayflower his task 
force was already exercising in the Caribbean. The individual components of the Atlan-
tic Fleet had begun to assemble off Culebra in mid-November (Table 2). On 1 November 
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the Caribbean Squadron under the command of Rear Adm. Joseph Coghlan had made 
the short transit to Culebra from its base at San Juan, Puerto Rico. Coghlan’s division 
comprised the type of cruisers and auxiliary cruisers that had borne the brunt of the ac-
tion during the Spanish-American War four years earlier. The North Atlantic Squadron, 
largely formed of battleships and under the command of Rear Adm. Francis Higginson, 
arrived on 21 November 1902 from Hampton Roads, Virginia. The remaining two 
squadrons—the South Atlantic Squadron under the command of Rear Adm. George W. 
Sumner and the European Squadron under the command of Rear Adm. A. S. Crownin-
shield—which each comprised a single battleship escorted by three or four armored or 
protected cruisers, rendezvoused in the Gulf of Paria to form the simulated approaching 
opposing force in the winter exercise’s main battle problem.
NORTH ATLANTIC 
SQUADRON
 
CARIBBEAN SQUADRON
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
SQUADRON
 
EUROPEAN SQUADRON
Rear Adm. Francis J. 
Higginson
Rear Adm. Joseph B. 
Coghlan
Rear Adm. George W. 
Sumner
Rear Adm. Arent S. 
Crowninshield
USS Kearsarge (BB), 
flagship
USS Olympia (CL), 
flagship
USS Iowa (BB), 
flagship
USS Illinois (BB), 
flagship
USS Alabama (BB) USS Montgomery (CL) USS Atlanta (CL) USS Chicago (CL)
USS Massachusetts 
(BB)
USS Detroit (CL) USS San Francisco 
(CL)
USS Albany (CL)
USS Indiana (BB) USS Panther (CX) USS Nashville (GB)
USS Cincinnati (CL) USS Marietta (GB)
USS Machias (GB)
USS Scorpion (GBL)
USS Gloucester (GBL)
USS Aileen (GBL)
TORPEDO FLOTILLA
Lt. Cdr. Lloyd 
Chandler
USS Decatur (TB), 
command ship
USS Bagley (TB) 
USS Barney (TB) 
USS Biddle (TB)
USS Shubrick (TB)
USS Thornton (TB) 
USS Stockton (TB) 
Abbreviations: BB, battleship; CL, unarmored cruiser; CX, auxiliary cruiser; GB, gunboat; GBL, unarmored gunboat; TB, torpedo 
boat.
Source: Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), 466–473.
TABLE 2
U.S. Atlantic Fleet Components prior to 1902 Winter Exercise
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The objective of the exercise was for the opposing White force under the command of 
Rear Admiral Sumner to “secure a base” in any one of the five harbors in the vicinity 
of Puerto Rico and Culebra by 6:00 pm on 10 December 1902. The Blue (American) 
force under the command of Rear Admiral Higginson had to intercept this fleet, either 
at sea or soon after its arrival in a port, with a superior force. The result of this exercise 
provides insight into the great challenges of warfare on the vast reaches of the oceans. 
Sumner’s force transited first far to the east and then to the north of the islands before 
making a final swift passage down through the Mona Passage. Sumner successfully 
completed his task—occupying and defensively mining a harbor without resistance—on 
9 December.84
Admiral Dewey had dropped anchor at Culebra’s Great Harbor the previous day. His 
first step on arriving in the Caribbean was to secure fuel and ammunition for his ships 
as well as current intelligence on his surroundings. During his sail down from Washing-
ton Dewey had requested information on the positions of all logistics support ships in 
the Atlantic, and on arrival he ordered all ships to submit a list of the supplies required 
for them to meet “all contingencies.” In the meantime, Secretary Moody had wired his 
naval attachés in London, Paris, and Berlin requesting the desertion rates of the respec-
tive European navies in a rough attempt to ascertain their readiness for war.85
Dewey continued to issue orders at odds with the planned inspection, gunnery exercise, 
and simulated battle. He instructed a majority of the fleet to maintain position outside 
Great Harbor, and all U.S. ships to “maintain sufficient steam pressure to get underway” 
at a moment’s notice.86 Maintaining this high readiness posture was exhausting for the 
men involved and used up large quantities of coal. Further, it was very difficult to per-
form a full material inspection of a ship with the crew manning all stations and the fires 
in the steam engineering plant ignited and hot. Most engine inspections were completed 
when the fires of the propulsion system were out and the steam plant was cold, allowing 
the internal workings of the boiler and the gearing systems to be opened and available 
for visual inspection. Dewey, it seems, was not emphasizing a rigorous material review.
Perhaps the most glaring example of Dewey’s novel approach to the exercise was his or-
der on 10 December to his medical staff to establish a sixty-bed hospital ward in Puerto 
Rico.87 The Marines, as previously mentioned, had built a “standard” six-bed hospital 
ward the year before, and the ships in Dewey’s fleet maintained their own sickbays and 
carried doctors or pharmacist’s mates to tend to the day-to-day ills and complaints of 
the crew. Squadrons typically carried a surgeon who would shuttle back and forth be-
tween the ships to handle the most serious cases. But Dewey took the initiative of mov-
ing his surgeons and their equipment off the major capital ships and borrowing medical 
staff from the growing naval base ashore to establish a land-based hospital capable of 
handling an inordinate number of sick or wounded. Whether that action is viewed from 
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the vantage point of a naval professional or an archival historian, it is clear that Dewey 
was making every effort to ensure that all preparatory steps for combat operations had 
been taken.
A message from Chief of Staff Taylor to the commanding officer of the naval base adds 
another clue to Dewey’s intent. It is customary, when a group of navy ships pulls into 
port, for a shore detail to be formed to assist the local command in the logistical support 
of the ships. This practice maintains order among the sailors allowed ashore (the dread-
ed “shore patrol”) and also provides for the upkeep of the piers and the waterfront. The 
local commanding officer sent a request to Dewey’s flagship for just this sort of detail 
when the Mayflower arrived, but on 11 December Rear Admiral Taylor replied, “I regret 
to inform you it will be impracticable to give you any force of men or boats from the 
fleet at present. The intention of Admiral Dewey is to keep the fleet outside [the harbor] 
in a state of preparations to move at short notice.”88 This and Dewey’s other instructions 
were not typical of a fleet commander preparing his ships for a set schedule of inspec-
tions, gun firings, and simulated battle. In fact, on his second day in the harbor, Dewey, 
a noted stickler for schedules and organization, scuttled a carefully prepared schedule 
and announced his intention to begin material inspections of the major combatants 
immediately.89 He quickly moved through the material inspection phase, pushing on 
into instruction for all ships in the new system of marksmanship developed by Lt. Cdr. 
William S. Sims.90
Back in Washington—according to Edmund Morris’ timeline, on the afternoon of Sun-
day, 14 December—Roosevelt held his second meeting with Ambassador von Holleben. 
After discussing the weather and exchanging other pleasantries, Roosevelt asked if von 
Holleben had a reply for him regarding his previous ultimatum. The ambassador replied 
that since he had assumed that Roosevelt was not serious, he had not sent the message 
to the kaiser. Roosevelt later remembered telling von Holleben that “instead of allow-
ing the three days that remained for an answer I would order Dewey to sail [south to 
Venezuela] in forty-eight hours.” 91 T.R. also began a series of hurried consultations with 
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate that were reported in the New 
York Times and Washington Evening Star for all to see.92 Dewey, for his part, alluded to 
the focus of his attention when he wrote obliquely to his son the same day, “Things look 
rather equally Venezuela way, but we are not in it at the present.” 93
The German ambassador understood with stark clarity his predicament. Following 
his 14 December meeting with Roosevelt, he hurried north to New York City to meet 
with Karl Bunz, the longtime German consul general there and a friend of Theodore 
Roosevelt. Years later, a friend of Bunz recounted that von Holleben came to ask if 
Roosevelt’s threat should be taken seriously. Bunz replied that to the best of his knowl-
edge, Roosevelt did not bluff.94
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That same day, Secretary Moody wired Dewey, via a secure underwater Navy cable, to 
maintain a swift vessel at the ready in San Juan in order to ensure continuous communi-
cations with the fleet. He sent a similar message to the naval station at San Juan to stand 
by to forward instructions immediately to Dewey at sea.95 Dewey and the combined fleet 
had by this time progressed into a sequence of coordinated maneuvers, beginning with 
divisions of four ships, then combining into squadrons, and ultimately coming together 
as a fleet (Table 3). The new torpedo-boat flotilla practiced stealthy night attacks against 
simulated opponent battleships.
Dewey confided to his journal that “some of the evolutions were rather raggedly per-
formed, owing to new ships having joined . . . [I] think angles and turning circles not 
yet having been determined.” 96 The after action report noted that the “cruiser divisions 
TABLE 3
Combined U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 10 December 1902
Commander  
Admiral of the Navy George Dewey 
USS Mayflower, flagship
First Squadron 
Rear Adm. Francis J. Higginson
Second Squadron 
Rear Adm. George W. Sumner
Base Command 
Rear Adm. Joseph B. Coghlan 
USS Vixen (PY), flagship
First Division 
USS Kearsarge (BB), flagship 
USS Iowa (BB) 
USS Massachusetts (BB) 
USS Alabama (BB) 
USS Scorpion (GBL), tender
Third Division 
USS Chicago (CL), flagship 
USS Albany (CL) 
USS Cincinnati (CL) 
USS Newark (CL) 
USS Eagle, tender
Substitute Vessels 
USS Nashville (GB) 
USS Machias (GB) 
USS Marietta (GB) 
USS Bancroft (GB) 
USS Wasp, tender
Second Division 
Rear Adm. A. S. Crowninshield 
USS Illinois (BB), flagship 
USS Texas (BB) 
USS Indiana (BB) 
USS Olympia (CL) 
USS Hist, tender
Fourth Division 
Capt. Asa Walker 
USS San Francisco (CL), command ship  
USS Atlanta (CL) 
USS Montgomery (CL) 
USS Detroit (CL)
Torpedo Flotilla 
Lt. Cdr. Lloyd Chandler 
USS Decatur (TB), command ship 
USS Bagley (TB) 
USS Barney (TB) 
USS Biddle (TB) 
USS Thornton (TB) 
USS Wilkes (TB) 
USS Stockton (TB)  
USS Nina, tender
Transports 
USS Prairie (CX) 
USS Panther (CX)
Tugs 
USS Fortune 
USS Leyden 
USS Osceola 
USS Potomac 
USS Uncas
Water Supply 
USS Arethusa
Supply and Repair 
USS Culgoa
Colliers 
USS Hannibal, USS Leonidas,  
USS Sterling, USS Lebanon,  
USS Brutus, USS Marcellus,  
USS Ajax
Abbreviations: BB, battleship; CL, unarmored cruiser; GB, armored gunboat; GBL, unarmored gunboat; CX, auxiliary cruiser;  
TB, torpedo boat.
Source: Journal of the Commander in Chief, Dewey Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., box 44, 15.
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were handled in connection with line of battle[ships] without confusion and without the 
necessity of frequent signals or signaling at great distances.”
Capt. Albert Gleaves, the commanding officer of Dewey’s flagship, the Mayflower, 
disagreed with that assessment. Gleaves recorded in his memoirs an attempt to steam in 
formation from Culebra to Saint Thomas that left an indelible image of a fleet “without 
form and void—so to speak.” Gleaves felt that the ad hoc procurement practices of the 
Navy Department had resulted in such a multitude of ship designs and capabilities that 
the U.S. Navy was practically unable to operate in formations beyond small groups of 
similarly designed ships. Following the winter exercise, an attempt was made to align 
the fleet in accordance with the ships’ capabilities.97
In another departure from the norms of the day, Admiral Dewey directed that the rein-
forced Marine battalion under the command of Colonel Pope at Culebra dispatch land-
ing parties to the eastern and western shores of Vieques, to the bay of Ensenada Honda, 
and to the northern shore of Puerto Rico. Those Marines left on Culebra not tasked with 
logistical duties were sent into that island’s jungles.98 These reconnoitering parties, each 
comprising an officer and twenty-five enlisted men and supplied with a week’s worth of 
provisions, practiced armed reconnaissance, searching out possible enemy landing sites 
and establishing defensive positions to repel the aggressor force. While the after action 
report makes no mention of Venezuela, Dewey’s involvement and the magnitude and 
realism of the Marines’ activities indicate that this, too, was no mere exercise. Dewey’s 
final report obliquely summarized the Marines’ jungle training: “These various exer-
cises proved of conspicuous value to the officers and men engaged in them and gave us 
much valuable experience for later use.” 99
In reply to Moody’s 14 December letter, Dewey acknowledged the order to maintain a 
courier boat to relay messages and, in a barely disguised request for additional informa-
tion, pointedly asked, “Program of exercises called for dispersal of fleet Friday night for 
Christmas holidays. Shall this be carried out?” 100 Earlier that day Dewey had received an 
intelligence report from the commanding officer of the USS Marietta, operating off La 
Guayra, Venezuela, detailing the actions taken by the British and German war vessels 
Charybdis and Vineta against Venezuelan military installations and port facilities.101 
Based on this information, and clearly expecting a war order, Rear Admiral Taylor 
sent a message to the communications center in San Juan: “Recent intelligence from 
Washington indicates the possibility of urgent dispatches arriving anytime . . . it is prob-
able that such cables may be written in cipher and every precaution should be taken to 
expedite their delivery . . . it is advisable to avoid comment upon questions and topics in 
any way.” 102
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Shortly after transmitting this cable, Dewey recalled all of his force’s ambulatory sick 
from Puerto Rican hospitals in an effort to fully man his ships, and ordered all of his 
ships currently in or near the port to be fully loaded with stores.103 No other indicator of 
the expectation of combat can be so clear as the decision to pull a sick man from his bed 
in order to man his battle station.
December seventeenth dawned ominously as William Moody cryptically instructed 
Dewey not to disperse the fleet. Such instructions along with Dewey’s activities indicate 
that both Dewey and Moody expected the worst. Supplies of coal and ammunition had 
been loaded, and the force had been exercised vigorously at sea. Word from Washington 
indicated no change in the Europeans’ position, and it was apparent that the situation 
was deteriorating. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution endorsing Roosevelt’s public 
warnings to the European nations with regard to maintaining the territorial integrity of 
Venezuela.104 As night fell, Dewey assembled all of his senior commanders onboard the 
Mayflower “for consultations relative to the Venezuelan question.” 105
In the United States, public reaction to events in Venezuela was decidedly anti-European, 
an attitude that was promptly noted in European capitals. Prime Minister Balfour 
learned from his ambassador in the United States, Sir Michael Herbert, “The impression 
prevails in Washington that Germany is using us, and our friends here regret, from the 
point of view of American good feeling towards us, that we are acting with her.” 106 Three 
days earlier Herbert had cabled an encrypted message stating that the U.S. government 
was passing along Venezuela’s renewed desire to seek a “settlement of the present dif-
ficulty by arbitration.” 107 On 16 December Parliament convened to debate the situation 
in Venezuela and the strains it was placing on Britain’s relationship with America.108 Bal-
four appeared in Parliament the following day to announce, “We have no intention, and 
have never had any intention, of landing troops in Venezuela or of occupying territory, 
even though that occupation might only be of a temporary nature.” 109
The next day the American ambassador, Henry White, presented a message from Roo-
sevelt to Balfour’s government strongly urging Britain and Germany to accept arbitra-
tion. Although Balfour was irritated by the impertinence of the suggestion, he felt it 
necessary to maintain the goodwill of the United States and quickly accepted it. Other 
officials of the government stepped forward to acknowledge and recognize the Monroe 
Doctrine. The prime minister also took it upon himself to contact some leading Ameri-
can citizens to ask them to relay to Roosevelt his desire for continued good relations 
with the United States. The burgeoning special relationship between the two English-
speaking nations remained a high priority.110 
In Berlin, the reaction to the United States’ “suggestion” of arbitration was slightly 
different. Much to Lord Lansdowne’s consternation, Germany’s ambassador to Great 
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Britain, Count Paul von Metternich, continued to insist that the kaiser would not 
stoop to arbitration.111 The kaiser, it seems, was continuing to call what he thought was 
Roosevelt’s bluff. Back in the United States, Ambassador von Holleben’s military at-
tachés traveled north to advise him on the strategic implications of the positioning of 
the American fleet.112 Finally overcoming his “mortal terror” of the kaiser, von Holle-
ben transmitted two telegrams to Berlin. Their contents are unknown, but their effect 
was immediate.113 On the evening of 17 December Berlin signaled its acceptance of the 
American arbitration proposal. The kaiser had, as one observer wrote, “tested the Mon-
roe Doctrine and discovered that it held.” 114 
Soon after the crisis ended, Theodor von Holleben was recalled in disgrace by the Ger-
man emperor. The Washington establishment buzzed at both the suddenness and the 
silence of his departure. An explanation that the ambassador’s health was impaired was 
so at odds with his appearance and actions that speculation only increased. Some sug-
gested that he had failed in his mission for the kaiser because he cultivated too friendly 
a relationship with Roosevelt rather than seek out ties with the financial community in 
New York so important to Germany’s industrial expansion. Decades would pass before 
the real nature of his diplomatic demise was understood.
Following the Venezuelan Crisis, the Monroe Doctrine, which the European powers had 
always looked on with skepticism, gained widespread tacit recognition and respect.115 
Wilhelm had blinked, ending Germany’s chance to create colonies in the Western 
Hemisphere. On 18 December, free of worries, Secretary Moody wired his commander 
at sea, “Carry out your proposed holiday itinerary. Merry Christmas.” 116
On 4 January 1903, as the Mayflower made its way back up the eastern coast of the Unit-
ed States, Admiral Dewey summarized the success of his mission in a letter to George 
Dewey Jr. The exercise, he wrote, “has been very interesting and I think beneficial to the 
Navy & Country. I have no doubt the Venezuela question would have given consider-
able trouble had it not been for this splendid fleet on the spot.” 117 Years later, Roosevelt 
would sum up the role of George Dewey and his fleet succinctly during a speech given 
in Oyster Bay. “Dewey,” the former president remembered, “was the greatest possible 
provocateur of peace.” 118
Conclusions
Edmund Morris eloquently described the vacant diplomatic record surrounding the 
Venezuelan Crisis as a “white shape of some vanished enormity, a reverse silhouette cut 
out of the gray text of history.” 119 The naval record of the events associated with the cri-
sis, both in the broader scope of Roosevelt’s overarching naval policy and in the specific 
actions of Admiral of the Navy George Dewey in his role as the commander in chief 
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of the combined Atlantic Fleet, supports Theodore Roosevelt’s later version of events 
as expressed in his 1915 letter to William R. Thayer: “. . . less than twenty four hours 
before the time I had appointed for calling the order to Dewey, the Ambassador notified 
me that His Imperial Majesty the German Emperor had directed him to request me to 
undertake arbitration myself.” 120 
From the outset of his administration it was Theodore Roosevelt’s desire to “upbuild” 
the U.S. Navy, supporting the service’s uniformed leadership in their desire for in-
creased production of capital vessels. When faced with a credible threat to U.S. interests 
in the Caribbean and South America, he authorized the construction of a large naval 
base on Culebra, an island strategically located in the path of European approaches to 
the Caribbean. He altered the nature of a routine winter exercise—both its scenario and 
its composition—flooding the Caribbean basin with the near entirety of the Atlantic 
Fleet to ensure an overwhelming concentration of power during the critical months of 
the crisis. Further, Roosevelt personally made changes in personnel in key political and 
military positions. 
Hence, both naval and historical records seem to provide more than enough evidence to 
support the proposition that the American fleet arrived in the Caribbean with the intent 
of coercing the European nations into accepting mediation. In order for this form of 
diplomacy to be successful, the naval forces involved had to be fully prepared to conduct 
combat operations. In the end, it was this high degree of preparation that helped to con-
vince the Europeans of Roosevelt’s seriousness and bring them to the bargaining table. 
Theodore Roosevelt went to extraordinary lengths to inform European powers of his 
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, both formally through conversations with the 
German consul general and ambassador, and informally through back-channel personal 
conversations with his many contacts on the European continent. He telegraphed his 
intention to deploy a credible combat force by several means, not the least of which was 
naming Dewey the commander of the task force. Roosevelt set a time limit of ten days 
for the resolution of the crisis, and when his ultimatum was ignored, he heightened the 
sense of urgency by accelerating the timetable. Ultimately, it was his presence and force 
of will that convinced Ambassador von Holleben of the seriousness of the situation and 
led the ambassador to overcome the kaiser’s personal resistance to arbitration. Roose-
velt’s discretion, employed throughout the process, enabled his strategy to succeed. Had 
the president gone public with his demands at any time, the kaiser, facing war or public 
humiliation, might well have chosen war. Yet the discreet nature of Roosevelt’s demands 
allowed Wilhelm the opportunity to back down in private and preserved for the imme-
diate present the future relations between the two nations.
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The previous century of tacit cooperation with Great Britain suggested that the British 
would neither actively oppose Roosevelt’s new interpretation of the doctrine nor stand 
in the way of his new activist foreign policy. Nevertheless, the events in Venezuela along 
with the events of the last decade of the nineteenth century suggest that conflict with 
the United States was not outside the realm of possibility. 
Documents recently declassified under the “one-hundred-year rule” at the British 
National Archives suggest that Roosevelt’s actions with regard to Venezuela may have 
had another, albeit unintended, result. As the winter exercise approached and tensions 
increased between the United States and the European powers, the British Colonial 
Office drafted a secret memorandum that was forwarded to the Colonial Defense Com-
mittee, the War Office, and ultimately the Admiralty for comment. The memorandum 
raised questions about the defensibility of British possessions in the western Atlantic in 
the event of a conflict with the United States. In a response entitled “Strategic Condi-
tions in the Event of War with the United States,” the Admiralty expressed doubt that 
“it would be possible to dispatch a sufficient naval force to maintain sea supremacy” in 
the western Atlantic and Caribbean “if at the time of the outbreak of war uncertain or 
hostile relations existed between this country and a European power.” The document 
goes on to state that the United States would be in a position to “stop our supplies from 
Canada” and to secure all food imports from the United States itself, effectively cutting 
off two-thirds of Great Britain’s food supply. The inescapable conclusion was that cur-
rent realities emphasized “the necessity of preserving good relations with the United 
States.” 121 Within two years Lansdowne and Balfour would secure an unofficial security 
arrangement with the United States, the beginning of what has come to be known as 
“the Special Relationship.” 122
Thus it was that Theodore Roosevelt established for all the world to see the two pil-
lars on which he would construct his foreign policy: the Monroe Doctrine and the U.S. 
Navy. His actions during the Venezuelan Crisis established precedents for American 
involvement in the world throughout the twentieth century. 
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Starvation Blockade and Herbert Hoover’s 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, 1914–1919
BRUCE A.  ELLEMAN
It may seem counterintuitive, but starvation blockades can be made more focused and 
therefore more effective by conducting humanitarian relief operations at the same time. 
In any examination of the roles of navies and soft power, humanitarian relief mis-
sions immediately come to mind, but not necessarily in connection with naval block-
ades. One of the most recent, and largest, humanitarian relief missions by sea was the 
post-tsunami Operation Unified Assistance in Southeast Asia during 2004–2005.1 
Several years later, Operation Tomodachi assisted Japan after its devastating tsunami 
crisis. In addition to helping those in need, global navies often use soft-power missions 
to compete with each other for public acclaim. This is perhaps best shown by China’s 
recent “Peace Ark” cruises, in particular to Africa and the Middle East.
One of the first massive humanitarian aid missions by sea occurred during World War I, 
under the auspices of the nonprofit Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB). From 
1 November 1914 through the summer of 1919 this American-created and organized 
effort distributed $927,681,485.08 worth of foodstuffs and clothing to Belgium,  
as well as to the German-occupied areas of northern France. Organized as it was by 
Herbert C. Hoover along business lines rather than as a pure charity, the CRB incurred 
administrative costs during this five-year period of only $3,908,892.74, or just 0.43 
percent of its charitable disbursement, a record that modern aid organizations would 
have difficulty matching.2
Safely transporting aid across the Atlantic was the linchpin of this humanitarian 
operation. All food, clothing, and other gifts were delivered by civilian cargo ships to 
Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, for transshipment to Belgium and northern France. The 
most controversial part of the operation was obtaining permission from England and 
Germany to let the aid ships through their respective maritime blockades. Hoover spent 
countless hours negotiating safe passage, and he often criticized Germany’s ambiguous 
policies toward the aid ships: “There is no way by which they [the German government] 
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can strike the vitals more than this diabolical attitude towards our shipping question.”3 
The CRB’s ships delivered aid not only through the British naval blockade but also 
through German minefields and swarms of U-boats conducting unrestricted submarine 
warfare. In the process, the CRB knowingly helped the British to focus their starvation 
blockade exclusively against the German people rather than against helpless neutrals.
Creation of the Commission for Relief in Belgium
When Germany attacked France through Belgian territory during August 1914, it 
violated the neutrality of a nonbelligerent country. After the war on this front became 
deadlocked in trench warfare just to the north of Paris, approximately ten million 
Belgian and French civilians found themselves trapped behind enemy lines. Prior to 
the war, Belgium had imported much of its food from its immediate neighbors to the 
south—now cut off by trenches—or from the Netherlands. Without access to these 
markets, starvation loomed. During the fall of 1914 the U.S. and Spanish governments 
sponsored a humanitarian relief operation designed to transport food to these inno-
cent civilians caught in the midst of war. This effort was organized as the Commission 
for Relief in Belgium, and its volunteer director was a young mining engineer named 
Herbert C. Hoover.
The creation and workings of the Commission for Relief in Belgium are well document-
ed.4 During 1916, Lewis Richards wrote a lengthy internal report describing the CRB, 
“Some Things an American Delegate Should Know.” 5 Soon after the war began, “Local 
Relief Committees were formed in every State in the Union and in almost every country 
in the World, with the result that from all parts of the globe came an unceasing flow, not 
only in foodstuffs but of money and clothing as well, in an ‘elan’ of charity, such as the 
World had never seen.” 6 The CRB shipped in “wheat, sugar, maizes, lard, coffee, bacon, 
rice, margarines, beans and soup.” 7 Kindhearted people around the world were eager 
to donate; “gift cargoes arriv[ed] with every evidence of having been packed in a way 
which suggests more of the heart of the donor than of practical knowledge of shipping.” 8
What made this humanitarian operation different from other previous efforts was the 
distribution of aid according to “business principles.” According to Richards: “This is 
the reason that we sell some of our gifts and thus the well-to-do Belgian in buying our 
gifts and other food stuff is directly helping to care for his neighbour less fortunate 
than himself.”9 This was in sharp contrast to “professional” charities, which perhaps 
gave food away for free but often had much higher handling and administrative costs, 
including fat salaries to their directors. By contrast, many of the employees of the CRB, 
including Hoover, were wealthy businessmen who donated their time.
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Since there was no international exchange of currency during the war, the CRB quickly 
ran into trouble figuring out how to use proceeds to purchase more food. In early 
November 1914, for example, Hoover had yet to divine a “method by which a country 
devoid of credit documents can translate some form of obligation into the purchase of 
goods.” Even if “we can find a method,” Hoover thought, it was unlikely that more than 
half of the CRB’s payments could be made.10 One idea that was eventually implemented 
was that Belgians living overseas who wanted to send money back home to their families 
could purchase food aid in the United States. A credit for this purchase was put on the 
books in U.S. dollars, and then an appropriate amount of Belgian money was remitted 
to the family members using local currency collected when selling food. By May 1917, 
the CRB had delivered the equivalent of some five million dollars to family members 
in Belgium through its Commercial Exchange Department.11 The CRB also paid for 
many in-country services on behalf of the Belgian government, once again in direct 
proportion to the food aid being purchased overseas. Such “barter” systems proved 
highly effective.
For purposes of the distribution of aid, Belgium was divided into the nine provinces of 
Antwerp, Brabant, East Flanders, Hainault, Liege, Limburg, Luxemburg, Namur, and 
West Flanders; plus the city of Brussels (located in Brabant), which was treated as an 
equal member.12 Later, northern France was also covered by the CRB, in six districts: 
Charle ville, Lille, Longwy, St. Quentin, Valenciennes, and Vervins.13 Once the aid was 
delivered it was consigned to the Belgian organization, which in turn handed it over to 
regional committees. Approximately six thousand communes in Belgium were respon-
sible for the final distribution of the food aid. As Hoover put it, “We have attempted to 
handle this problem of [feeding] millions of people by intense decentralisation.”14 At this 
point the CRB agents’ “control ceases . . . except as to the moral obligation governing the 
equitable distribution to the civil population.”15
In distributing food aid, a major concern was avoiding waste. Of the estimated 
2,750,000 indigent poor in Belgium, some 1,200,000 were considered to be fully des-
titute; these received all food and clothing for free. The less poor were required to pay 
20 percent of the price, while another million or so paid 50 percent.16 Wealthy Belgians 
who could afford to buy food on the free market were required to pay full price. These 
percentages appeared on ration cards issued by each commune. All proceeds from these 
sales were then used to buy and import more food. The accounting firm of Deloitte, 
Plender, Griffiths, & Company agreed to donate its services to make sure that no money 
was wasted. Hoover early on emphasized the importance of relying on outside auditors 
so as “to make the whole business a complete national monument of efficiency and com-
mercial accuracy.”17
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Hoover’s top priority was to ensure that no Belgian or French civilians suffered from 
hunger. The CRB provided wheat, rice, maize, bacon, lard, peas, and beans, and later 
yeast for making bread from the imported grain. Although it received requests for many 
other manufactured products, the CRB felt that to agree to import such items into the 
war zone might “bring us into conflict with normal trade.” As a result, the CRB stuck 
to basic commodities that were in short supply in Belgium, so as to remove “us from 
all feeling of competition with the ordinary course of trade.”18 All aid was “distributed 
equitably to the Belgian civil population only.”19
Other U.S. charities sought to dominate the transfer of aid to Belgium. By November 
1914, however, Hoover was able to announce that the CRB had nine million dollars in 
funds “absolutely under our control” and that “we do not propose to be dictated to by 
any little hole in the corner organization in New York like DeForest’s committee which 
might secure five or six hundred dollars.”20 The head of the CRB New York office, Lin-
don Bates, reassured Hoover that the CRB was the “shining mark,” receiving about 80 
percent of “the nationwide philanthropy of the country.”21 As for the competing groups, 
“We are going to get a harness on these people by sheer merit.”22
The CRB’s key leverage was over the means of transportation. On average, it took two 
months to purchase food in the United States, get it to a port, load it, and deliver it to 
Rotterdam, where it crossed militarized borders into Belgium and northern France.23 
During late 1914 it was estimated by Hoover that transportation costs would average 20 
percent of the food cost; in other words, for every dollar spent on transportation a total 
of five dollars’ worth of food could be purchased and delivered.24 During mid-November 
1914, Hoover told one of his competitors, “Through patriotic assistance of large English 
and continental shipping firms [we] are able [to] secure shipping on much better terms 
than you can secure in open market.”25
One of Hoover’s top goals was to maximize efficiency. He even told Bates in the CRB’s 
New York office in early 1915 that “if this job is going to [be] done efficiently,” the CRB 
must become “the complete and over-riding organisation for all relief work in Bel-
gium.”26 As the next section will discuss, the creation of the transportation network to 
deliver food aid to Belgium was the most important link in the aid chain. Safe delivery 
of aid by sea proved to be one of the most difficult and constant challenges that Hoover 
faced during the five years of operation of the CRB.
Delivering Humanitarian Aid by Sea
All aid to Belgium and northern France was shipped by sea; the main office in London 
was responsible for purchases in Great Britain and the United States and for arranging 
transportation to Rotterdam. This put enormous responsibility on Hoover’s shoulders, 
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as the CRB chairman. During the fall of 1914, Hoover even complained to his wife that 
the “whole responsibility [for] purchase dispatch and delivery [of] some ten thousand 
tons of food stuffs per week rests on me.”27 The key to Hoover’s success was control 
over maritime transportation. When the CRB was challenged by other aid societies, 
Bates was, he reassured Hoover, “confident our ability to take care of Inland and Ocean 
freights makes us impregnable.”28 Likewise, Hoover reassured W. H. Page, the American 
ambassador in London, that “as far as I can see we [CRB] are the only channel through 
which such relief can be introduced into Belgium.”29
Hoover’s efforts were fully supported by the U.S. government. On 7 November 1914, 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote to James Gerard, the U.S. ambassador to Berlin, 
“Belgian Commission requests that you secure from German Government unmolested 
passage for neutral food ships from United States to Holland [intended] for Belgium.”30 
By February 1915, the German government confirmed “the freedom of ships on the high 
seas and in port.”31 Even after the German submarine blockade was set to begin on 18 
February, the German foreign minister, Gottlieb von Jagow, promised Hoover “to have 
orders issued of the most scrupulous care of [the CRB’s] steamers.”32
But the British too had to cooperate if this aid program was to work. On 8 November 
1914 Hoover asked the Foreign Office contraband department official, Lord Eustace 
Percy, for a grant of “immunity from all British naval authorities” for CRB cargo ships 
heading for Belgium.33 Against much British opposition—including from Winston 
Churchill and Lord Kitchener, who argued that any aid would ultimately help Ger-
many—Foreign Secretary Edward Grey and David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, supported the humanitarian operation mainly for the “great propaganda 
value for Britain in U.S.” When Hoover was pressed for funds, the British government 
even agreed to back the activities of the CRB financially.34
While in public Hoover had to persuade opponents in Britain to support the CRB, in 
secret he told his closest advisers that much of the public condemnation in England was 
for show, so as “to maintain by all means the conviction in the German mind that the 
English and the Allies generally were extremely discontented with our feeding of the 
Belgians.” Hoover was convinced that otherwise “if the German people thought for one 
moment that the English were anxious that the Belgians should be fed, they would at 
once stop food . . . as a weapon to force the hand of the Allies.” 35
As Hoover recounted in a later letter to Percy, the CRB provided a useful service for 
Whitehall. In particular, it was an “implement by which Allied Governments are able to 
secure an exception to their blockade policy, and which makes the blockade a feasible 
thing in the eyes of the world in general.” If the CRB were not providing food to inno-
cent civilians in Belgium and northern France, public pressure might soon turn and the 
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Allies “would be compelled to relax the blockade.”36 In private, therefore, Percy assured 
Hoover that as the U.S. ambassador in London told him of the departure of each vessel 
carrying CRB aid he would send a “telegraph to the [Royal Navy] fleet to allow the ves-
sel to pass without any delay.”37
In exchange for British promises “to place no obstacles in the moving of ships” leased by 
the CRB, the German government needed to agree not to requisition any food in Bel-
gium; if food were taken from the Belgians while they were receiving aid from the CRB, 
Hoover could be accused of indirectly supporting Germany. During early February 
1915 Hoover visited Berlin to meet with Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg 
and representatives of the Reichsbank. Hoover called the German treatment of Belgium 
“an undoubted blot on their whole national character” and suggested that it was “only 
the lack of imagination that did not lead them to see that an entire change of attitude 
towards Belgium would produce for them the friendship of the world.” He argued that 
a “generous attitude toward Belgium” would help “secure the favourable opinion of the 
United States [at that point neutral] towards the Germans.” After lengthy discussions, 
the German government grudgingly agreed. Although Hoover deserves much credit for 
this success, one cannot help but suspect that Ambassador Gerard’s argument was the 
more convincing—that is, that the CRB’s goal was to keep the Belgians from starving 
and “that in keeping them from starvation the greatest possible military service was be-
ing done to the Germans.” 38
To avoid delays caused by British ship inspections, aid cargoes were “consigned” to the 
CRB—otherwise “we must expect [the cargo ships] will be held up on voyage possibly 
for days.” 39 To sidestep lengthy inspections, it was particularly important that the char-
ity ships contain “whole cargoes of food for Belgian relief.” 40 For example, a relief ship 
was held up by the British at Falmouth for two days when a “small bundle [of] tents”—
considered to be a contraband item—was discovered on board.41 Inspections were later 
moved to Halifax, Nova Scotia, but by August 1917 there was a shortage of fifty-nine 
thousand tons in the pipeline. Lord Robert Cecil agreed to eliminate the Halifax inspec-
tions.42 With the entry of the United States into the war in 1917, the two allies could 
cooperate more closely. Beginning in August 1917, inspections of the cargoes could be 
carried out during the loading process in U.S. harbors. This reform saved an estimated 
thirty thousand tons in cargo capacity by cutting the total number of transit days per 
month from seventy-six to only sixty.43
Once the cargo ships arrived in Rotterdam, their aid cargoes were transshipped to ligh-
ters with flags bearing the initials “C.R.B.” The lighters had to be approved by the Ger-
man authorities, and all lightermen held German-issued passports.44 While the lighters 
were essential for delivering aid from the Netherlands to Belgium, the lightermen had 
to be watched carefully to make sure they did not try to take undue advantage of their 
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unhindered access across otherwise militarized borders. It was up to the local CRB 
agent to check that all seals remained unbroken, check the lighters for false bottoms, 
look into the bilges, and examine “other places where, unfortunately, the dishonest ligh-
terman is likely to hide commodities in an endeavor to increase his income.” 45
To keep costs low it was determined that “as far as possible, the transportation shall take 
place by water.” 46 But it was often necessary to transport food aid by railway or truck, 
usually during the final stages. German authorities provided these carriage services for 
free, since the CRB was providing a much-needed humanitarian service—the feeding of 
approximately ten million people—for which otherwise Germany would be expected to 
pay. In one early misunderstanding, a local stationmaster charged for a CRB shipment, 
but he was later ordered by the German authorities “to pay [the CRB] back at once the 
money collected for freight,” because “the German Government [was] refusing to accept 
any money from [the] American Commission.” 47
Due to these procedures, shipping problems were “practically negligible”; the “adminis-
trative cost is approximately one-half of one per cent—a phenomenal achievement.” 48 If 
the CRB’s administration of the transportation of food aid and clothing to Belgium was 
almost flawless, however, increasingly strict German regulations affecting cargo vessels 
delivering aid to Rotterdam would soon cause great concern for Hoover.
German Regulations on Maritime Shipping
While the British government insisted on inspecting all CRB ships in English-
controlled ports to make sure they did not carry contraband, for its part the German 
government issued official passes allowing the aid vessels through military lines on 
their way to Rotterdam. Over time, German regulations on shipping became more and 
more complicated, especially with the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare. This 
caused enormous problems for Hoover, located in London, and the CRB agents living 
and working in Rotterdam, throughout Belgium, and in northern France.
London was the administrative and financial hub of the humanitarian operation, 
but the port city of Rotterdam acted as the main distribution hub: “Our purchase[s] 
arrive in Rotterdam on vessels under the protection of distinctive markings, such as 
side-cloths containing the words: ‘RELIEF COMMISSION,’ flags, etc.” 49 Over time, 
the protections for the aid ships became more elaborate, and each vessel had two flags, 
two pennants, and two side cloths, or large banners.50 On 3 March 1915, Dr. Henry Van 
Dyke, the American minister at The Hague, reported that the German government had 
declared that all ships bringing aid to Belgium were to bear “flag and markings clearly 
visible and lighted at night to pass through English channel unmolested.” German sub-
marines had been warned not to sink these ships, but because there was no way to turn 
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off the many mines in the English Channel, the Germans emphasized the “impossibility 
of giving safe conduct.” 51
On 6 March 1915, the German minister in The Hague outlined new requirements. An 
official CRB pass was to list the name of the ship, its master, port of registry, and an 
official ship number. Second, the ship had to have “on board exclusively goods of the 
American Commission for Relief in Belgium intended for the suffering civil popula-
tion in Belgium.” Third, the German pass was valid only from an American port to 
Rotterdam and back home again, at which point it had to be returned to the German 
consul general or ambassador. Fourth, the master of the ship was to “abstain during 
the outward and return voyage from any and all actions that may involve assistance to 
Germany’s enemies.” Fifth, the Imperial German Navy had the right to search the ship 
at any time. Sixth, and finally, in “case of non-compliance with the above conditions the 
ship loses all right to preferential treatment.”52
Prior to departure, each ship’s captain had to sign a declaration that, first, his cargo 
included only food and clothing intended for Belgium; second, that he would not assist 
Germany’s opponents; third, that after the voyage he would turn over these protec-
tions to the German consul; and fourth, that his vessel could be searched by German 
authorities. If contraband were discovered on board the ship, he acknowledged, it would 
forfeit all rights to preferential treatment.53 It was particularly important to the Germans 
that all CRB flags and banners be collected after arrival. As one internal CRB memo 
observed, “You can understand how the business of this commission might be upset 
should a captain hold back from delivering one of our flags and hoist it to escape from 
attack after he has finished his work for the Commission and [is] bound on another voy-
age. Our object is to prevent any possible misuse of the Commission flag.” 54
Despite the flags and banners identifying them as carrying aid to Belgium, about a 
dozen CRB ships were sunk in the first years of the program, mainly by sea mines. 
Beginning in 1915, additional flags were draped diagonally across the upper decks of 
aid ships so that German pilots could more easily identify them.55 To ensure maximum 
visibility, all CRB flags were twelve by fifteen feet in size, with lettering of twelve by 
eighteen inches; the banners were five feet by a hundred; the pennants were five feet 
wide, tapering down to two and a half feet, with twelve-by-twenty-inch letters.56
This system, while highly practical, was not foolproof. One cargo ship, Harpalyce, was 
apparently sunk by a torpedo from a German submarine on 10 April 1915. Of the forty-
four crew members, seventeen perished, including the master.57 Thirty-three of the crew 
members were Chinese sailors based in London; their names were not even reported, “as 
the crew list went down with the vessel.” Although there was no proof that the ship had 
been torpedoed, the surviving crew members surmised that a mine would have struck 
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the “fore-part of the vessel” rather than “against the ship’s side.” Furthermore, the third 
officer claimed to have seen a submarine, as did the captain and chief officer of the 
nearby cargo ship Elisabeth.58
This supposed torpedo sinking threatened the entire CRB transportation operation. 
The commission was partly to blame, since the German government had advised all aid 
ships to take a northerly route, by “way of the Shetland Islands”; the CRB later argued, 
“Against this we protested that it was fully and absolutely unfeasible,” mainly because 
of the British requirement that all ships stop at an English port to be searched.59 Hoover 
complained that “there is nothing in international liability, military necessity or, on its 
lowest plane, in military advantage, in sinking one of those ships, it is simply murder 
gone mad.” 60 Hoover further stated that the “‘relief ’ character must have been evident to 
the murderers of these innocent men engaged in a humanitarian task. . . . It is absolutely 
in its complete barbarism without parallel in the last century.” 61
In addition to protesting directly to the German government, Hoover turned to the U.S. 
government for support, asking that it “demand in common humanity, consideration 
for us and the people who serve us.” When describing to Ambassador Page how the 
German attack imperiled the lives of ten million people who depended on the arrival 
of the food aid, Hoover declared, “I count myself as not being given to hysterics over 
the abnormal events of modern warfare but if this action can be reconciled with any 
military necessity, or, to put it on its lowest plane, . . . any military advantage, . . . we 
can but abandon any hope that civilisation has yet accomplished anything but enlarged 
ruthlessness in destruction of human life.” 62
The German torpedo attack immediately affected the other aid ships and their crews. 
For example, soon after this incident the mainly Chinese crew of Lincluden refused 
to sail, and the owners had to hire a brand-new crew in Rotterdam.63 The captain of 
Dowgate evidently argued that “the pass which he secured gave him no protection if 
he was to be torpedoed without warning,” so “he could not see any reason not to resist 
a submarine.” Since one commitment all masters of aid ships had to make was “not to 
aid the enemies of Germany,” Dowgate’s captain “preferred to go without a pass, and be 
perfectly free in his actions.” 64
In mid-April 1915, Hoover learned that Dowgate, engaged to deliver food aid to Bel-
gium, had been refused “safe conduct” by the German authorities on its homeward 
journey, which imperiled arrangements for shipping for all future deliveries, and not 
only that—“those [ships] already fixed will[,] if they are wise[,] decline to go.” Hoover 
condemned the torpedo attacks, stating the Germans had “no excuse under laws God or 
man,” and immediately ordered John White, Lindon W. Bates’s assistant, to go to Berlin 
to “take up” this issue with authorities “if this whole organization [is] not to break 
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down.” 65 Another effect of this torpedo incident, equally if not more important, was its 
potential impact on marine insurance. If the commission’s cargo ships were refused 
insurance, the aid operation would probably cease to function.
The Crucial Role of Marine Insurance
Marine insurance was a very important consideration, since without it no ship-
ping company would agree to transport the CRB shipments across enemy lines. On 
21 December 1914, Hoover explained to Walter Runciman, of the Board of Trade in 
Whitehall, that any British-owned CRB aid ship would be given “the benefit of the Gov-
ernment War Risk Insurance Scheme” and that the commission had “received from the 
Admiralty general consent for the steamers proceeding, and they have advised that they 
will give special consent for each ship if required.” 66 On 1 February 1915, an internal 
CRB memo somewhat optimistically remarked about banners on aid ships, “It occurred 
to us that it might also be helping our underwriters since the steamer would be less 
liable to be subject to attack by a German war vessel.” 67
After the sinking of Harpalyce, Hoover asked the German government to repay the 
commission a hundred thousand pounds for the lost ship, which “would be little enough 
to pay the extra cost of insurance which we are going to be [obliged] to [assume] over 
this action.” 68 As Hoover explained to Brand Whitlock, the American ambassador to 
Belgium during World War I, the insurance issue was really the Achilles’ heel of the 
whole operation: “If the Germans are endeavouring to break down this Commission 
they are going about it in the proper manner.” 69 Germany’s adoption in 1917 of unre-
stricted submarine warfare resulted in the sinking of forty thousand tons of CRB ships 
and the delay of 165,000 tons of food aid.70 By June 1917 Hoover was forced to admit, “If 
there is any jeopardy to the Belgian people, it is due entirely to transport.”71
However, Germany’s reluctance to give safe passage to outbound ships, at least, had 
some validity. On 17 March 1915 the German minister at The Hague made clear that 
his government would not give safe passage to any ship leaving Rotterdam unless “the 
vessel is proceeding directly to the United States without touching at any English ports.” 
This was to avoid the ships’ taking up “other cargoes after completing their work for the 
commission.”72 But vessels leaving Rotterdam often needed to take on coal in Britain 
to reach their next destinations, whether the United States or some other country. The 
German requirement that they return directly to their countries of origin, therefore, 
was unrealistic.
On 16 April 1915, Hoover, greatly concerned, told John White that the German “refusal 
to grant return passes is an admission by the Germans themselves that they have torpe-
doed that boat.”73 White agreed that this new German requirement to return directly to 
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the United States was detrimental to the whole aid program: “It is impossible that such 
an understanding of the agreement should have existed.” To this point only British-flag 
vessels had been used to transport aid to Belgium. Because of the dangers involved, “up 
to the present time the commission has not been able to charter a single neutral vessel.” 
White concluded, “This new technical interpretation of the passport would seem to have 
been put forward merely as a cloak to cover the torpedoing of the steamer [Harpalyce].”74
Hoover feared that British War Risk Insurance would be lost if German submarines 
were sinking CRB aid ships. Up until the Harpalyce incident, the British government 
had insured the CRB ships, since virtually all were British registered. But now this 
arrangement was in jeopardy. At one point Hoover estimated that it might cost the aid 
program an additional three million pounds sterling if the CRB were forced to insure 
all the ships itself.75 The commission’s monthly insurance premiums might increase 
from forty to seventy thousand pounds. Two days after the sinking, on 12 April, Hoover 
warned Whitlock that if the ship had indeed been torpedoed, the “English government 
will, certainly withdraw the Government Insurance on ships.” Hoover found the timing 
of the sinking particularly bad: “We were just getting our programs of deliveries into 
shape,” and so “it fills us with intense anxiety for the future.”76
On 1 May, Hoover explained to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin that formerly all insur-
ance coverage had been based on “the joint undertaking of the Germans and the British 
not to interfere with our shipping.” As a result of the Harpalyce incident, the insur-
ance association “[had] now put up the rates to a fabulous figure.” Unless something 
could be done to guarantee future deliveries, “this is likely to throw the loss of the ship 
[Harpalyce] on to the Commission or an expense of, say some £90,000 odd, aside from 
the increase in insurance rates which would make a very large sum monthly.”77
Throughout the spring German attacks on the relief ships continued. For example, on 
14 March 1915, even before the Harpalyce had been sunk, SS Sutton Hall had reported 
a torpedo fired at it, though its relief flags and banners were clearly displayed.78 Later, 
City of Dortmund and Elfland were also attacked: “German officers have now on four 
separate occasions deliberately attacked vessels bound on this philanthropic errand 
under guarantees given [by] the German Government itself.” The CRB felt compelled 
to warn the German government that “the British ships will have to be withdrawn from 
the Commission’s service if the attacks upon them continue.”79
During May, when more information on the Harpalyce incident had become available, 
Hoover told Page that “it would appear, without doubt, that the Germans admit [in their 
description of events] that the Harpalyce was sunk by a submarine.”80 In July, however, 
Hoover was not very optimistic that he could convince the German government to 
admit guilt formally: “In general things are going rather badly, both in Belgium and 
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here in London, and I am afraid that much friction as to detailed administrative things, 
which are to be imposed on us from both sides, will break down the whole machinery.” 81 
In a private letter, Hoover acknowledged that because the relief effort was unofficial, 
“We are an orphan and have to do the best we can without any right guardians.” 82
Negotiations with the German government continued throughout the summer, with 
Hoover seeking reparations to reimburse the shipping companies for lost vessels. But 
in July German officials were able to produce a photograph of Harpalyce unloading in 
Rotterdam with the CRB banner along its side rolled up, most likely to avoid being dam-
aged. This photograph was alleged to prove that “the ship has not always been equipped 
with the side markings as agreed upon.”83 Hoover was not convinced, but he could not 
prove that the flag had been unfurled prior to the ship’s departure from Rotterdam. 
On 9 August Hoover admitted, “I do not believe we can pursue this matter any further 
advantageously.”84 All further CRB claims for reimbursement were ignored by Berlin.
Under the constant threat of refusal by the war risks associations to insure “future ves-
sels proceeding to Rotterdam,” Hoover felt “compelled,” he told Ambassador Gerard, to 
continue his investigations of the torpedo incidents.85 Hoover was under no illusion that 
he would win; this was merely an effort to stave off any final action by the insurance 
associations, “on the ground we are still negotiating” with the Germans. If no solu-
tion could be reached, there might be a “boycott of all cargoes through Rotterdam.” 86 
Hoover’s problems in finding adequate cargo ships to carry aid to Belgium became even 
worse when the British naval blockade of Germany intensified.
The Impact of the “Starvation Blockade” on the CRB
As the war entered its third year, the British “starvation blockade” began to be felt in 
Germany, even more so in its occupied territories. The CRB’s shipments of food aid fell 
below expectations. In an undated report of late 1915 or early 1916, Hoover stated that 
the food reaching Belgium and northern France was “entirely below that generally ad-
vanced by dietary specialists” as barely “sufficient” to sustain life. The biggest problem 
was not money but access: “The dominant factor—even were more monetary supplies 
available—is the volume of shipping which can be obtained from over the seas.” Due to 
the lower than expected shipping volume, “it has hitherto been impossible to deliver the 
whole programme [of aid], due to unexpected shortages in shipment, shipping, loss of 
ships, and various uncontrollable causes.” 87
Meanwhile, forced requisitioning of food was being carried out by German authori-
ties in Belgium. Rice and corn were evidently being shipped back to Germany. Reports 
received by the British government claimed that some sixteen thousand tons of relief aid 
had been sent from Belgium on to Germany. This report made Hoover “so angry that I 
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almost choke.” 88 If substantiated, this misallocation of food aid might have threatened 
the entire humanitarian operation. Hoover, in London, told W. B. Poland in Brussels 
that if these rumors proved to be true, “with the state of mind in this country [Britain] 
at the present moment, if these facts were made public you can take it that the Relief 
Commission would be suppressed by popular clamour.” Hoover called it the “greatest 
crisis” the commission had yet faced, “almost the last blow.” 89
Upon investigation, however, it turned out that of 17,499 tons of food taken by the Ger-
mans from Belgium, only 911 tons—including rice, waste corn flour, and beans—might 
have come, entirely or in part, from food aid delivered by the relief effort.90 Even if all 
911 tons had come from CRB aid, this was a small proportion—only about 5 percent—of 
the total.
To complicate matters further, it became harder to find cargo ships willing to transport 
the food aid to Rotterdam. On 31 December 1915 Hoover reported that “the shipping 
situation is becoming almost desperate.” 91 One possible solution was to use a number 
of interned German steamers that had been detained by the Allies and were in neutral 
ports. These ships would sail under Dutch flags with Dutch crews.92 While the French 
Foreign Department supported this plan, the French Department of Commerce op-
posed it, “claiming that the German submarines would capture one of their own ships 
and convert it into a privateer.” 93 Hoover was forced to report to the CRB executive com-
mittee that the French government “absolutely refused to assent to the German shipping 
contract.” 94 The French were particularly critical of the prospect that the German ship-
ping company would make money off the scheme, even though it was only about two 
hundred and fifty pounds per ship per month, which was far below normal cargo rates.95
At one point Hoover, made desperate by refusals to grant the CRB additional cargo 
ships, warned the French that he would be put “in a [too] difficult position to go to 
the charitable world and ask them to subscribe money to make up a deficiency which 
is deliberately created for a military purpose.”96 In early 1916 Hoover announced that 
no more food could be delivered to northern France, a threat that “produced a perfect 
storm in Paris.” Hoover traveled to Paris in an attempt to “direct the hurricane.”97 He 
warned President Raymond Poincaré that “we were in jeopardy of total failure owing to 
the lack of shipping.”98 On his return from Paris Hoover was pleased to be able to report 
that the French government had agreed to the use of the German vessels.99 However, by 
now Hoover’s arrangement with the German company had expired, and he was unable 
to renew it.
Desperate for ships, Hoover convinced the Belgian government to pass a requisition 
law under which, when it went into effect on 8 February 1916, the CRB was able to 
obtain leases on nineteen Belgian cargo vessels.100 By mid-April, this number increased 
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to twenty-one, plus four other Belgian-owned ships flying the British flag. However, 
as Hoover warned R. L. Craigie of the British Foreign Office, this was still inadequate. 
Over a four-month period only thirty-three CRB shiploads had arrived in Rotterdam, 
rather than the forty-five to fifty that were necessary to keep the aid pipeline flowing at 
the required levels.101
Hoover found all these setbacks and government obstructions very frustrating. What 
had initially been thought of as a temporary aid program would eventually continue for 
four and a half years. Several times Hoover had offered to terminate the CRB or to turn 
it over completely to the Belgians, but each time the British government had insisted 
that he remain in charge. Being “neutral,” it pointed out, Hoover and his American as-
sistants had “no official position limiting their liability.”102
What upset Hoover more than anything else were repeated press accusations, as 
mentioned above, that the CRB’s aid helped the Germans. For example, the English 
newspaper Western Morning News ran a series of articles accusing the CRB of a long list 
of infractions. These included feeding Belgians working for the Germans, on the one 
hand, and providing Germany with crucial strategic goods, on the other. One British 
journalist, J. Byers Maxwell, specialized in anti-CRB articles. In one Maxwell claimed 
that the “Germans are able to utilize the labour of the Belgians, who are being fed from 
the charitable contributions of England and other countries, and thereby the enemy 
directly benefits from such payment.” Not only did this use of humanitarian aid show 
the Germans’ “cleverness in breaking the British blockade,” but by feeding the Belgians 
“we are helping the Huns to keep the population quiescent.”103 Another, similar article 
from the same British newspaper claimed that lard and fats being given to the Belgians 
as food were being turned into nitroglycerine.104 On 13 March 1916, Hoover acknowl-
edged to Whitlock that “these continued pin-pricks over the question of our fidelity to 
the guarantees are becoming simply heart-breaking.”105
Over two decades later, on 25 August 1940, Hoover would tell an interviewer that 
the “British sent agents to watch the operations of the C.R.B., and they could find no 
instances of food being used by the Germans.”106 Meanwhile, however, Hoover and the 
CRB spent much time trying to disprove all accusations, no matter how groundless, 
because, ridiculous as some of these stories sounded, the British government was forced 
to react by fine-tuning the Royal Navy’s naval blockade against Germany. Aid lists 
were constantly inspected and revised to ensure that nothing could inadvertently help 
Germany. For example, when the Germans requisitioned all “raw and manufactured 
wool” in Belgium, the CRB was ordered to halt all shipments of donated clothing.107 
Beginning in January 1916 all animal fodder was cut, it having been reported that eighty 
thousand German cows were being pastured in Belgium.108 To avoid accusations that 
CRB-provided fats were being misused, Hoover was told to deliver only “hard soap” 
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that could not be melted down to make explosives.109 In reaction to news reports detail-
ing additional German demands on Belgium, Percy was forced to tell Hoover, “In face 
of German [requisition] policy, we are feeling obliged to force the reservation of local 
stocks in Belgium for the exclusive use of the population by cutting off the prospect of 
any increase[d] importations.”110
By 12 February 1917, matters had reached the point that the German government 
insisted that all Americans working on behalf of the CRB leave Belgium. The shipping 
problem became worse than ever after the United States entered the war. During July 
1917, the Directeur des Services du Ravitaillement wrote to complain, “For political 
reasons, French or English steamers cannot go to Rotterdam; the American Govern-
ment ask us not to charter American ships for any purpose and all neutral shipowners 
refuse at present to sail to Rotterdam on account of the risk to be sunk.”111 Desperate for 
ships, Hoover turned to the Scandinavian countries; a number of Norwegian and later 
Swedish and Finnish ships were leased.112 By October 1918 over two hundred thousand 
tons of Swedish “dead weight” shipping was under contract.113 Later still, Argentinian 
ships were leased. The CRB even tried to purchase its own ships from various German 
shipping companies, including from the Hamburg-American Line and North German 
Lloyd, to help alleviate its “almost desperate tonnage situation.”114
The one positive development from the U.S. entry into the European war was that 
President Woodrow Wilson appointed Hoover to a newly created position of food 
administrator. In January 1918 Hoover wrote to a colleague in Belgium to explain his 
new job: “You will be astonished to realize that I am now putting the American people 
on a practical rationing of many of the commodities most urgently needed in Europe, 
with a view to saving from our consumption a sufficiency to carry the Belgian Relief 
and to provide their essential foods.” The main CRB office was located right “next door 
to mine” and so was “a matter of constant solicitude.” In particular, Hoover could now 
make certain guarantees: “As my department practically controls the dispatch of food-
stuffs from the United States, you may be assured that the Belgian Relief will have full 
priority in shipments.”115
Eventually, after more than four years of war, the last days of the CRB seemed to ap-
proach. By spring 1918, many of Hoover’s plans to purchase cargo ships had failed, and 
he had been forced to appeal to Lloyd George for greater access to British shipping.116 
The CRB now faced enormous difficulties getting even minimal food aid delivered to 
Rotterdam. It is not altogether clear whether, had the war not ended when it did on 11 
November 1918, the CRB’s shipping program could have been sustained at the levels 
needed to get through the winter of 1918–19.
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Final Delivery Statistics
On 21 October 1918, as the Great War was finally winding down and Allied victory 
loomed on the horizon, Herbert C. Hoover presented to President Woodrow Wilson a 
summary of the CRB’s activities to date. Public charity had reached $32 million, in addi-
tion to which the British government had donated $120 million, the American govern-
ment $200 million, and the French government $220 million, for a grand total of $572 
million.117 By the time the CRB wrapped up its operations in early 1919, this number had 
increased to $806,209,313.45, of which $52 million, or over 6 percent of “the total funds 
secured by the Commission,” had been the result of charitable contributions.118
During the four and a half years of the CRB’s existence, almost 120 million bushels of 
breadstuffs were delivered, almost 550 million pounds of pork products, 73 million 
pounds of other meat, 715 million pounds of rice, 283 million pounds of beans and 
peas, and 113 million pounds of dairy products, to name just a few commodities. In ad-
dition, over twenty million garments were distributed to the needy.
But despite this monumental effort, Hoover acknowledged, the local populations had 
been put on a “drastic regime” in which “there has been under-nourishment,” though 
fortunately “no starvation.”119 This compared favorably to Serbia, which Hoover esti-
mated suffered 25 percent civilian losses during the war due to starvation, and especial-
ly to Poland, which he estimated at a whopping 50 percent.120 Two months later Hoover 
asserted flatly that when the experience of these two countries were compared with the 
“no loss” by “starvation” among the ten million inhabitants of Belgium and northern 
France, “the difference was simply the Relief Commission.”121
Such a massive relief effort had first and foremost required access to international 
commercial shipping. Hoover reported to Wilson that the CRB had at any given time 
depended on seventy transatlantic steamers to transport food aid to Rotterdam and 
another five hundred canal boats and tugs to deliver food and clothing to Belgium and 
northern France. When the goods arrived, they had been housed in some two hundred 
central warehouses before being sent on to individual communes for final distribu-
tion.122 Between November 1914 and April 1919 the CRB had chartered 903 separate 
ship passages to transport close to four and a half million tons of aid—an average of 
seventeen ships delivering 83,000 tons per month.123 The final numbers were even 
larger, with 993 oceangoing and 1,320 cross-channel ships delivering a total of 5,174,431 
metric  tons.124
Because of the commission’s almost total reliance on international shipping, the CRB 
was once described by a critic as a “piratical state organized for benevolence.” That 
is, “like a pirate state, the CRB flew its own flag, negotiated its own treaties, secured 
special passports, fixed prices, issued currency, and exercised a great deal of fiscal 
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independence.” However, whatever the negatives, “its bold acts of benevolence were 
accomplished with an efficiency and integrity that later became a model for modern 
foreign aid.”125
Hoover was understandably proud of the efficiency of this administration, particularly 
that his “overhead” costs were “less than three-eighths of one per cent.”126 He had sought 
men with business experience rather than “the usual charity cranks,” telling a colleague 
that “one must have common-sensed, solid, business people, used to dealing with large 
affairs and doing so on an adequate, business and financial basis.”127 Hoover was par-
ticularly offended by self-serving philanthropists. Concerning the “New York bunch,” 
he said, “There is no place in the world where there is such unlimited snobbery as New 
York and because we happen to be common or garden[-variety] people they do not 
seem to think we deserve even the treatment that is ordinarily meted out to servants.”128 
Hoover especially spurned what he called “professional charity workers.”129
Virtually everyone associated with the CRB gave Hoover most of the credit for its 
creation and flawless administration. Lord Curzon once referred to the CRB as an 
“absolute miracle of scientific organization,” and even an erstwhile critic called the 
humanitarian operation the “biggest task ever grappled by an individual. A Joseph came 
to Belgium. He undertook to feed a whole country.”130
Conclusions
Humanitarian aid layered on top of a naval blockade had the effect of making Britain’s 
strategy more focused. If the CRB had not existed, Britain’s starvation blockade of the 
continent would have hit friend and foe alike. Hoover understood quite well that his 
humanitarian efforts made the blockade more effective: “At the close of the war,” he 
later reminisced, “the Belgians were in fine physical condition, while the German people 
were starving.”131 The simultaneous adoption and mutual alignment of a humanitarian 
relief operation and a strict naval blockade can greatly intensify the strategic impact of 
the latter against an enemy.
The delivery of humanitarian assistance was not a simple task. Although both London 
and Berlin guaranteed the aid ships’ safety, of the fifty-three ships damaged during their 
voyages, fifteen were torpedoed, and twelve struck mines and sank. These numbers 
broke down to just slightly over 1.5 percent torpedoed and 1.3 percent mined, an overall 
loss of just under 3 percent of the number of ship passages.132 Hoover freely admitted 
that the CRB humanitarian effort was not a complete success and that “much food has 
been lost by submarines and some native food taken by the Germans.” But, in short, 
“We have done all that finance, shipping and administration could accomplish.”133
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Francis Cogswell Wickes, who served with the CRB for almost three years, in giving 
Hoover full credit for the CRB’s success, emphasized his entrepreneurial spirit: “It was 
this spirit which alone made the work possible. And this spirit was the spirit of bound-
less personal loyalty felt by each and every member towards the one dominating and 
heroic figure, towards the great chief, Herbert C. Hoover. He had conceived the Com-
mission, he had created it, he had carried it on through its countless crises. It was he who 
inspired it. The Commission for Relief in Belgium, was Hoover, and Hoover alone.”134
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The Allied Embargo of Japan, 1939–1941
From Rollback to Deterrence to Boomerang
S.  C .  M.  PAINE
In the 1930s, the United States faced numerous grave national security challenges as the 
world appeared to be going to ruin, with global economic depression and brewing wars 
in Europe and Asia. To cope with Japan’s expanding war in China, Washington needed 
to devise a low-cost and politically feasible strategy acceptable to both isolationists and 
financially pressed American voters. Over a decade, U.S. strategy toward Japan evolved 
from nonrecognition of its invasion of Manchuria through political neutrality and trade 
embargo to a combination of trade cessation and forward basing of the U.S. Fleet. All of 
these strategies attempted to exert sufficient diplomatic and economic pressure to force 
Japan to halt its aggression.
The Japanese government, however, did not respond to the evolving American strategy 
as anticipated, even though it lacked access to the wide range of natural resources neces-
sary to fight the war it chose. U.S. deterrence ultimately backfired, because the sunk 
costs of Japan’s own failed strategy were already so high that to back down would have 
emasculated the Imperial Japanese Army. Instead, the Japanese government chose a 
military strategy that had a remote hope of success—albeit a high chance of going down 
in flames—over an even higher likelihood of regime change at home if it reversed itself 
after incurring such huge human and financial costs in China.
This chapter examines the various stages of the U.S. deterrence strategy over a ten-
year period. Each stage adopted incrementally more restrictive trade limitations that it 
was hoped would be sufficient to pressure Japan to back down and yet insufficient to 
prompt Japan to escalate instead; the U.S. Navy, in particular, hoped to delay—or bet-
ter yet, avoid—war with Japan so that the U.S. military could concentrate on defeating 
the fascists in Europe. Rather than preserving a tenuous peace with Japan, however, 
the American strategy boomeranged, precipitating Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. As 
Americans discovered, some nations make mistakes of such magnitude that they are 
immune to deterrence and insist on taking the paths to ruin for themselves and others.
C
H
A
PT
ER
 F
O
U
R
70  the newport papers
The Problem: Strategy on a Shoestring versus Regional Domination
As the international order collapsed in the 1930s, the Imperial Japanese Army made 
policy by fait accompli. It occupied Manchuria and later Central China to protect 
Japan’s significant investments there, restore order in a neighboring failing state, create 
an autarkic zone of sufficient size to compensate for Western protectionism, and prevent 
the spread of communist influence from the Soviet Union.1 These goals were all big-
ticket items for Japanese policy makers. Asia, however, was not at this point a big-ticket 
item for the United States, whose economy remained a mess, whose primary allies faced 
invasion by Germany, and whose trade with China remained minor. Japan was em-
barked on a program of expansion of its empire—first into Manchuria (1931–33), then 
into North China (1934–36), and finally throughout Central and South China (1937–45). 
With the massive escalation of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the U.S. gov-
ernment sought a low-cost strategy that would avoid American economic or military 
overextension and yet deter further Japanese expansion and eventually pressure Tokyo 
to roll back its conquests and restore the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek to 
full sovereignty over China.
U.S. pressure increased incrementally, starting with nonrecognition. On 7 January 
1932, the United States responded to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria by refusing to 
acknowledge these conquests—the so-called Stimson Doctrine, named for American 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson—but Japanese conquests continued unabated and 
soon encompassed North China.2 On 6 December 1931, the State Department Division 
of Far Eastern Affairs had initially examined the possibility of a boycott of Japan as re-
taliation.3 Article 16, paragraph 1, of the League of Nations Covenant required “the sev-
erance of all trade or financial relations” by all league members should any resort to war 
in violation of the covenant, a crime Japan had clearly committed. It also required “the 
prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals 
of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member 
of the League or not.” 4 The hitch was the United States was not a member; no member 
other than China was interested in implementing article 16. Neither was the United 
States. Yet without full U.S. participation, any trade sanctions would be meaningless, 
given American domination of Japan’s foreign trade.
At the time, the State Department and the War Department disagreed on the advis-
ability of imposing economic sanctions. When Secretary of State Stimson supported the 
idea, President Herbert Hoover “replied that that meant war and must be considered as 
such.” But when the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. William V. Pratt, predicted that 
such a war would last from five to seven years, Hoover declared he “would have nothing 
to do with sanctions.” 5
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With World War I still looming large in American thinking, Congress passed a succes-
sion of neutrality acts, starting on 31 August 1935. These acts forbade trade with either 
side in a war, lest the United States again become embroiled in costly hostilities leading 
to disappointing results. President Hoover’s successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, chose 
not to apply the law to China and Japan, on the technicality that neither had officially 
declared war against the other. Congress simply renewed the act, on 29 February 1936, 
making it permanent on 1 May 1937.6
Once Japan’s radical military escalation that began on 7 July 1937 brought hostilities 
into China’s coastal areas central to American investment and commercial interests, the 
Chief of Naval Operations, now Adm. William D. Leahy, recommended that the U.S. 
and British fleets maintain a distant blockade, off California and Singapore, respective-
ly, to cut Japan’s imports of oil, scrap iron, cotton, and copper and thereby undermine 
its military operations. The State Department disagreed.7 Instead, on 14 September, 
President Roosevelt announced that U.S. merchantmen could no longer transport war 
matériel to either China or Japan.8 On 5 October, his famous quarantine speech signaled 
the American judgment that Germany and Japan were pariah states, lying outside the 
international order.
Tension quickly escalated on 12 December 1937, when Japanese forces attacked and sank 
the gunboat USS Panay on the Yangzi River near Nanjing. During the ensuing two-week 
diplomatic crisis, President Roosevelt ordered the drafting of secret plans to blockade 
Japan from the Aleutian Islands to Hong Kong and tried to secure British cooperation. 
He intended to implement the blockade upon the next provocation. Britain held that do-
ing so would lead to war; the United States disagreed and began building a fleet capable 
of conducting such a blockade.9 In March 1938, the Joint Army-Navy Board completed 
the last prewar version of Plan Orange, which envisioned rising American-Japanese 
tension leading to a surprise Japanese attack and then the U.S. economic and military 
defeat of Japan.10 In other words, from the 1930s American military planners anticipated 
responding to a Japanese attack with a combined military and economic strategy.
To conduct the military part of this strategy, the United States would need a strong 
navy. Back in 1934 the United States had taken the first steps to create naval forces 
capable of insulating the country from the brewing troubles in North Africa, Europe, 
and Asia: the Vinson-Trammell Act authorized, but did not fund, a buildup of the U.S. 
Navy to the limits set at the London Naval Conference of 1930. In 1938 a second Vinson 
naval act finally funded the construction plans authorized under the original act for the 
first expansion of the fleet since World War I. In the four intervening years, however, 
the ceilings established in London in 1930 lapsed.11 With the outbreak of World War II 
in Europe on 3 September 1939, the United States loosened the Neutrality Act’s trade 
restrictions in favor of Britain and France and soon afterward included China.
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In the same years the United States had ramped up aid to the Nationalist government 
to keep it in the fight against Japan—and presumably to keep Japan tied down and less 
able to cause problems elsewhere. On 15 December 1938, the U.S. Export-Import Bank 
had issued twenty-five million dollars in credits to a Chinese-owned, U.S.-based trading 
corporation.12 From 8 February 1939 until 21 March 1942 it provided the Nationalist 
government a succession of six loans totaling $620 million.13 Undoubtedly these loans 
helped keep China fighting, but they failed to roll back Japanese conquests, let alone 
deter new ones.
On 28 June 1940, within a week after the fall of France on 22 June, Congress passed a 
third Vinson naval act, funding naval expansion 11 percent beyond the lapsed London 
limits. A fourth Vinson bill, passed as the Two-Ocean Navy Act on 19 July, authorized 
a 70 percent naval expansion to build a navy of two fleets, one for the Atlantic and the 
other for the Pacific—a navy with four times the tonnage and four times the airpower of 
Japan’s.14 These prospects, however, did not deter Japanese leaders but instead led them 
to perceive a fast-closing window of opportunity during which they must act.
Between 1932 and 1938 the U.S. government tried to increase pressure on Japan to roll 
back its invasion of China. Yet nonrecognition, neutrality, and aid to the beleaguered 
victims all failed to dampen Japan’s aggression. On the contrary, the problem of Japa-
nese expansion quickly became worse, not better, and there were no signs of change in 
the adverse trend lines. Therefore, in mid-1938 the United States began implementing 
a new strategy of, on the one hand, escalating trade restrictions on the matériel neces-
sary for Japan to continue hostilities and, on the other, forward basing the U.S. Fleet at 
Hawaii starting in 1940.
Escalating Embargoes
The new American strategy was to use a combination of a “fleet-in-being” and widen-
ing embargoes to deter and eventually roll back Japanese expansion while preventing 
Japan from stockpiling the resources necessary to fight the United States or, even 
more likely, the Dutch or British for their colonial possessions in Asia. Embargo seemed 
a highly promising strategy, given Japan’s overwhelming dependence on imports 
of raw material. The Chinese clearly thought so: the Chinese Council for Economic 
Research fed the United States statistics on the Japanese reliance on American imports 
to wage war in China.15 The Chinese government believed “that the United States, 
through Japan’s dependence on American exports, could have stopped the invasion 
of China in its tracks at any moment” since the 1937 escalation with embargoes of, 
especially, petroleum products, copper, steel and iron semi-manufactures, and ma-
chine tools.16
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In 1931 the United States had been Japan’s most important trading partner, with a vol-
ume of trade that was a multiple of Japan’s second- and third-most-important markets, 
China and British India. Prior to hostilities, the United States had bought 40 percent of 
Japanese exports and had provided 34.4 percent of Japan’s imports, including 49.1 per-
cent of its iron imports, 53.6 percent of its machine tool imports, and 75.2 percent of its 
oil.17 According to a 13 October 1940 American newspaper report,
of 32 commodities held indispensable to the prosecution of war, Japan possesses only two with 
exportable surpluses. These are graphite and sulphur. It is domestically self-sufficient in three—
coal, pyrites and foodstuffs. Its supplies of 16 are inadequate to meet domestic demands. They are 
iron ore, aluminum, chromium, copper, manganese, zinc, asbestos, f luorspar, mica, phosphates, 
iron and steel scrap, finished and semi-finished iron and steel, machine tools, aircraft, automo tive 
equipment and hides. It is completely or almost completely dependent on foreign sources for  
11—antimony, lead, mercury, nickel, tin, tungsten, magnesiate, nitrates, petroleum, potash  
and rubber.18
Japan, then, was fatally dependent on two key resources, oil and iron. Without them, 
its military forces could neither move nor shoot. Moreover, its war in China had made 
it more, not less, reliant on imports. Whereas it had imported 67 percent of its oil in 
1935, this figure grew to 74 percent in 1937 and to 90 percent in 1939.19 It also imported 
more than 90 percent of its iron and 75 percent of its lead, zinc, dyes, and chemicals.20
This dependence had enormous military implications. A refusal to sell is easy to 
implement, and the denied resources ultimately proved impossible for Japan to replace. 
The U.S. government tightened its trade embargo against Japan over a period of three 
years. On 11 June 1938, in response to the many Chinese civilian deaths from the 
Japanese bombing of Guangzhou (Canton), Secretary of State Cordell Hull imposed a 
“moral embargo” on U.S. exports of aircraft and equipment to “countries the armed 
forces of which were engaged in the bombing of civilian populations by air.”21 On 1 
July 1938, the United States required export licenses for aircraft and for the resources 
needed to fly, arm, and produce them.22 According to the Munitions Control Board, 
American arms exports to Japan had previously soared, from $1.9 million in 1937 
to $9.2 million in 1938, when 97 percent was spent on aircraft and aircraft parts and 
motors.23
Soon the United States gave Japan a heads-up for troubles to come: on 26 July 1939, 
Secretary of State Hull officially notified the Japanese ambassador to the United States, 
Horinouchi Kensuke, that the United States was invoking article 17 of the 21 Febru-
ary 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan to 
terminate it, effective six months hence.24 The Japanese derided the decision as “hasty 
and abrupt.”25 The United States justified its actions on the grounds that Japan had 
hamstrung American businesses in occupied China with “quantitative limitations, 
monopolistic instrumentalities, exchange control, and related measures affecting the 
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importation and exportation of goods and remittance of funds,” as well as by placing 
restrictions “upon the navigation of China’s waterways and upon travel and residence 
and trade in various parts of China.” Therefore, “It follows that so long as agencies and 
instrumentalities of the Japanese Government continue in fact to render inoperative the 
practice of equality of treatment for American commercial interests throughout large 
areas of China, there exists a serious obstacle to the conclusion by the United States of 
a new commercial treaty or agreement with Japan.”26 Renunciation of the treaty did 
not improve business conditions in China, but it did set up the United States to begin 
embargoing products in earnest once the treaty expired in late January 1940.
Japan, for its part, gave the United States notice of its intentions as well: in early April 
1940 it claimed special economic interests in the Dutch East Indies. In response, Secre-
tary of State Hull declared an American resolve to maintain the regional status quo.27 In 
1939 Japan had imported just 2.3 million barrels of oil from the Dutch East Indies out of 
that region’s total exports that year of 24.4 million barrels.28 Clearly, Japan now wanted 
the lion’s share.
On 2 April 1940, the U.S. Fleet—minus the new but still small Atlantic Squadron—
sortied from its base at San Diego for annual exercises off Hawaii. The original schedule 
drafted in 1939 had anticipated its departure from Hawaii on 9 May. On 7 May the stay 
was extended for two weeks, and on 15 May it was made indefinite. The force was to act 
as a fleet-in-being to deter Japan from a possible southward resource grab in the Philip-
pines or the Dutch East Indies.29 The timing of these naval reinforcements was intended 
to support the increasingly tight U.S. embargoes on Japan.
By June 1940, the U.S. government had instructed American customs authorities 
not to permit certain equipment exports to Japan or the Soviet Union. The Japanese 
were unhappy about that, since they knew of no laws requiring such restrictions.30 
On 4 June, Secretary of State Hull explained to the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. 
Grew, that anticipating the imminent passage of a bill restricting the export of war 
matériel and dual-use commodities and manufactures, President Roosevelt had au-
thorized the Navy Department to requisition “certain tools and supplies” and customs 
officials to stop their export.31 Japanese diplomats urged the United States not to restrict 
trade to Japan.32
The pending legislation to which Hull referred marked a change in the justification for 
U.S. trade restrictions from the prevention of aerial bombing of civilians to the impera-
tive to stockpile resources to meet defense requirements. On 2 July Congress passed the 
Act to Expedite the Strengthening of National Defense (known as the Export Control 
Act), authorizing the president to prohibit the export of war matériel and strategic 
resources in order to stockpile them at home. President Roosevelt invoked the act that 
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very day, prohibiting a long list of items and threatening that “all violations of such 
provisions will be rigorously prosecuted.”33 On 26 July 1940, on the first anniversary of 
the American abrogation of its commercial treaty with Japan, Roosevelt invoked the 
new act to cut the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and various categories of iron and 
steel scrap.34
Between the introduction of the Export Control Act on 2 July 1940 and 28 May 1941, the 
United States repeatedly broadened the list of items embargoed (see the table). Because 
Japanese military activities were so prejudicial to American business interests in China, 
there was little private-sector pushback against these restrictions on their sales and 
credits to Japan.35 In hindsight, the Japanese government would have done itself a great 
service had it placated neutral American businessmen, with the hope that they would 
stand up for continued trade rather than embargo. But, like its military strategy, which 
made virtually all the major Western powers its enemies, Japan’s economic strategy 
alienated most foreign businessmen as well.
With German armies sweeping through Europe and the alarming prospects for the fall 
of Britain, on 14 September 1940 the United States introduced the first peacetime con-
scription in its history. This was clearly a step toward war. On 27 September, in response 
to Germany’s early victories against France, Japan joined the Axis powers. This decision 
unwittingly transformed Japan, in American eyes at least, from a regional bully in a 
secondary part of the world into a pariah state in cahoots with America’s most deadly 
enemies in Europe. Almost immediately, U.S. trade restrictions against Japan tightened 
even further.
DATE RESTRICTIONS EMBARGOED ITEMS SOURCE
1 Jul 38 No export licenses to  
countries aerially bombing 
civilians.
aircraft, aircraft parts, munitions FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 201–202.
26 Jul 39 U.S. renunciation of 1911 
Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation. Effective in six 
months.
  FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
p. 189.
15 Dec 39 Same. aluminum, molybdenum FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 202–203.
20 Dec 39 Same. technology transfers for high-quality 
aviation gasoline production
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 203–204.
26 Jan 40 Treaty renunciation in effect.   “Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation between the United 
States and Japan,” art. 17, p. 105.
U.S. Trade Restrictions
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DATE RESTRICTIONS EMBARGOED ITEMS SOURCE
2 Jul 40 Export Control Act. United 
States to stockpile strategic 
resources. Defense-related 
items subject to case-by-case 
export licensing.
aluminum, antimony, asbestos, 
chromium, cotton linters, flax, 
graphite, hides, industrial diamond, 
magnesium, manganese, manila fiber, 
mercury, mica, molybdenum optical 
glass, platinum-group metals, quartz 
crystals, quinine, rubber, silk, tin, toluol, 
tungsten, vanadium, wool; ammonia 
and ammonium compounds, chlorine, 
dimethylaniline, diphenylamine, nitrates, 
nitric acid, nitrocellulose, soda lime, 
sodium acetate, strontium chemicals, 
sulfuric acid; aircraft parts, armor plate, 
nonshatterable glass, optical elements 
for armaments; metalworking machinery 
for melting or casting, pressing into 
forms, cutting or grinding, or welding
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 211–12.
26 Jul 40 Same. aviation lubricating oil, aviation motor 
fuel, iron and scrap steel, tetraethyl lead
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 217–18.
12 Sep 40 Same. technology transfers relevant for the 
production of aircraft and aviation 
motor fuel; equipment or technology 
transfers relevant for the production of 
tetraethyl lead
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 220–21.
26 Sep 40 Unrestricted exports only 
to Britain and Western 
Hemisphere. Previous licenses 
to others revoked.
iron and steel scrap FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 222–23.
27 Nov 40 Defense-related items subject 
to case-by-case export 
licensing.
machine tools FRUS, 1940, Far East, vol. 4, p. 
617.
10 Dec  40 Exports outside Britain and 
Western Hemisphere restricted 
to prewar levels.
iron and steel scrap FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
p. 232; FRUS, 1940, Far East, 
vol. 4, p. 620.
20 Dec 40 Defense-related items subject 
to case-by-case export 
licensing.
abrasives, aviation lubricating oil 
equipment and technology, balancing 
machines, bromine, cobalt, ethylene, 
ethylene dibromide, gauges, hydraulic 
pumps, measuring machines, 
methylamine, plastic molding machines, 
strontium metals and ores, testing 
machines, tools incorporating industrial 
diamonds 
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
p. 36; FRUS, 1940, Far East, vol. 4, 
p. 620.
10 Jan 41 Same. brass, bronze, copper, nickel, potash, 
zinc
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
p. 238.
29 Jan 41 Additional reporting 
requirements for licensed 
exports to destinations other 
than the British Empire.
paperwork must include affidavits 
indicating the total exports of the 
licensed item to the relevant country 
since 1 January 1937
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
p. 241.
2 Feb 41 Defense-related items subject 
to case-by-case export 
licensing.
calf and kip skins, radium, uranium, well 
and refining machinery; expanded list of 
specific items included in the embargo 
of iron and steel exports
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 242–28.
U.S. Trade Restrictions, continued
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DATE RESTRICTIONS EMBARGOED ITEMS SOURCE
25 Feb 41 Same. aircraft pilot trainers, atropine, 
belladonna, belting leather,  
beryllium, graphite electrodes, sole 
leather 
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 248–51.
4 Mar 41 Same. borax, cadmium, carbon black, coconut 
oil, copra, cresylic acid and cresols,  
fatty acids, glycerin, jute, lead, palm 
kernel oil and palm kernels, petroleum 
coke, phosphates, pine oil, shellac, 
titanium
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 253–54.
 4 Mar 41 Same. anything related by manufacture, 
design, description, technology, or 
possible adaptation to any of the items 
subject to export licensing
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
p. 254.
27 Mar 41 Same. acetic aldehyde, acrylonitrile, alkyd 
resins, aniline, animal fats, arsenic 
trichloride, bristles, butadiene, butylene, 
carbon electrodes, chloroacetyl chloride, 
chloropicrin, chloroprene, cork, cuprous 
oxide, detonators and blasting caps, 
dibutyl phthalate, dicyanodiamide, 
diethyl phthalate, dipropyl phthalate, 
ethylene chlorhydrine, explosives, 
fatty acids, formaldehyde, guanidine 
nitrate, hexamethylenetetramine, 
iodine, kapok, monochloroacetic 
acid, naphthalene, nitroguanidine, 
nux vomica, nylon, omega 
chloroacetophenone, pentaerythrite, 
petrolatum, phenol, phthalic anhydride, 
Rochelle salts, sodium chlorate, 
strychnine, styrene, sulfur chlorides, 
tartaric acid, thiodiglycol, various 
nitro-derivatives, various polymers 
and copolymers, vegetable oil seeds, 
vegetable oils, vinylidene chloride, 
wood pulp
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 258–59.
14 Apr 41 Same. all machinery, caffeine, calcium cyanide, 
casein, manufactures, sodium cyanide, 
theobromine, vegetable fibers 
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 260–61.
28 May 41 Above trade restrictions to be 
applied in the Philippines, the 
Panama Canal Zone, and the 
District of Columbia.
all of the above FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 261–62.
14 Jun 41 German and Italian assets in 
the United States frozen.
all trade with Germany and Italy under 
U.S. government control
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 266–67.
25 Jul 41 Japanese assets in the United 
States frozen.
all trade with Japan under U.S. 
government control
FRUS, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, 
pp. 266–67.
1 Aug 41 Revocation of all valid export 
licenses except to the Western 
Hemisphere, the British Empire, 
Egypt, the Dutch East Indies, 
unoccupied China, and the 
Belgian Congo.
all petroleum products FRUS, 1941, Far East, vol. 4, 
p. 850.
U.S. Trade Restrictions, continued
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The Japanese Response to the U.S. Embargo
Once Japan had taken the territories accessible via the Chinese railway system (mainly 
accomplished by 1939), its military and strategic paradigm had reached the limits of its 
manpower constraints. So Japanese strategy turned from trying to dislodge the Nation-
alist government from its mountainous redoubt in Sichuan Province to preventing it 
from spending its foreign loans on the matériel necessary to stay in the fight. Having 
called on Britain to sever the Burma Road supply route in July 1940, on 22 September 
the Japanese pressured the French governor of Indochina to allow their troops to land 
in Haiphong, which they did the following day.36 Japan intended thereby to cut the last 
important supply line to China—the route across the Indochinese border. Three days 
later, on 26 September, the United States began retroactively revoking steel-scrap export 
licenses issued after 26 July 1940 and permitting future unrestricted iron and steel scrap 
exports only to Britain and the Western Hemisphere.37 This meant no more U.S. iron or 
steel for Japan.
The Department of State took very seriously the Imperial Japanese Navy’s plans for a 
resource grab throughout the South Pacific, the so-called Southward Advance policy.38 
The Japanese government was well aware that the likely American response would be a 
trade embargo.39 On 17 February 1940 Ambassador Grew had reported that the previ-
ous day Foreign Minister Nomura Kichisaburō had discussed with Diet members the 
growing support in Congress for a trade embargo but that rather than taking it seriously 
Nomura had optimistically predicted that U.S. implementation of an embargo “would 
require a considerable length of time.” 40
On 8 October 1940, when Ambassador Horinouchi lodged an official protest against 
the iron-and-steel-scrap “virtual embargo,” characterizing it as an “unfriendly act,” 
Secretary of State Hull replied that given the “constant and repeated Japanese depreda-
tions against American rights and interests in the Far East, the Japanese Government 
was in no position to characterize a national defense measure as an unfriendly act.” 41 
Hull asserted that “those who are dominating the external policies of Japan are, as we 
here have believed for some years, bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile ter-
ritory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to extent in the South and in southern 
continental areas of that part of the world.” 42 He concluded, “I reiterated the view that it 
was unheard of for one country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country, 
contrary to all law and treaty provisions, to turn to a third peacefully disposed nation 
and seriously insist that it would be guilty of an unfriendly act if it should not cheerfully 
provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying 
out its policy of invasion.” 43 The exchange impressed neither side.
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On 15 October 1940, President Roosevelt authorized the requisitioning of war matériel.44 
On 27 November, following his reelection on 5 November, the United States restricted 
machine tool exports; soon afterward, it loaned China a hundred million dollars and 
began augmenting its forces in the Philippines—an archipelago that lay astride Japan’s 
sea lines of communication between the home islands and the oil fields of the Dutch 
East Indies.45 On 30 December, Roosevelt made his arsenal-for-democracy speech, 
promising that America would arm democracies beset by aggressors. His next key piece 
of legislation interpreted “democracy” broadly to include China and the Soviet Union: 
on 11 March 1941, he jettisoned the old strategy of neutrality by signing the Lend-Lease 
Act, which allowed massive aid to nations beset by invaders. He extended military aid 
initially to Great Britain and soon to Russia and China.46 Like the abandoned neutrality 
strategy, Lend-Lease produced no discernible mitigating effect on Japanese expansion. 
This left a freeze of Japanese assets as the last remaining economic tool.
Back in May 1939, the British ambassador to Japan, Robert Craigie, had raised the 
possibility with the U.S. ambassador, Joseph C. Grew, of a retaliatory trade embargo 
should Japan act against the International Settlement in Shanghai. Grew had not been 
enthusiastic.47 Meanwhile, the British had pressured the United States to halt the flow 
of natural resources being transshipped from the Japanese empire to Germany via the 
Trans-Siberian Railway.48 On 26 July 1940, when President Roosevelt announced his 
intent to subject petroleum products, tetraethyl lead, and steel and iron scrap to licens-
ing procedures, the British feared that this move would propel the Japanese to take 
control of Dutch East Indies oil fields.49 By October 1940 the United States, Canada, and 
Britain were planning future trade restrictions on Japan.50 The British were pushing for 
a coordinated trade policy among Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands severe 
enough to prevent Japan from stockpiling strategic materials yet not so severe as to 
provoke a declaration of war.51
On 23 November 1940, the Council on Foreign Relations issued a confidential study on 
Japan’s vulnerability to American sanctions concluding that combined action by the 
United States, Britain, and the Netherlands would withhold “essential imports,” deprive 
Japan of the foreign exchange to buy elsewhere, and strain its merchant marine capac-
ity, which was already insufficient for stockpiling. Also, most critically for U.S. naval 
strategy, “Japan would have to operate outside of Japanese waters, far from her home 
bases.” In the event of war, these long sea lines of communication would make the Japa-
nese fleet vulnerable to attack, especially from the U.S. Navy’s robust submarine force. 
Nevertheless, as the report presciently predicted, sanctions alone “would not necessarily 
stop her war machine.” 52
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The Freeze of Japanese Assets
On 14 June 1941, the United States froze German and Italian assets. A week later, on 22 
June, Germany invaded Russia, and Japan redoubled its efforts to sever outside support 
to China. Between 24 and 27 July 1941 Japan occupied southern Indochina. The United 
States immediately retaliated, freezing on 25 July Japanese assets in the United States 
worth five hundred million yen, thereby putting “all financial and import and export 
trade” involving Japanese interests under U.S. government control. On 14 July the 
United States had decoded a Japanese military communication indicating that “after the 
occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is . . . the Netherlands Indies.” 53
On 25 July 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Harold R. Stark, and the Chief 
of Staff of the U.S. Army, Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall, sent a joint dispatch to their 
subordinates in Hawaii, the Philippines, the Panama Canal Zone, and Great Britain 
alerting them that the United States would embargo all trade with Japan, save through 
a licensing system, and that all Japanese assets in the United States would be frozen: “It 
is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be 
seized at this time. United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered 
to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan.” 54 Wakasugi Kaname, special 
aide to the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Nomura Kichisaburō, requested 
assurances from the U.S. government that it would not seize or detain Japanese ships 
wishing to enter American ports—at that time, these ships were remaining out at sea. 
The United States, notwithstanding Stark and Marshall’s provisional guidance—refused 
to provide such assurances.55
On 26 July, on the second anniversary of the American renunciation of its commer-
cial treaty with Japan, Britain followed suit, freezing Japanese assets in Britain and 
the empire. It also notified Japan of an intent to abrogate Japan’s 5 May 1911 Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the 
British Dominions beyond the Seas and India, as well as Japan’s 12 July 1937 trade and 
commerce treaty with India and its 7 June 1937 trade and commerce treaty with Burma. 
All these abrogations would go into effect six months later in January 1942.56 Also on 
26 July the United States appointed Gen. Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief of 
U.S. forces in East Asia and made plans to improve defenses in the Philippines.57 On 27 
July, the Dutch government too froze Japanese assets.58
Britain had been urging the United States to ramp up economic pressure on Japan (but 
to do so with great care). On 3 March 1941, the British ambassador to the United States, 
E. F. L. Wood, first Earl of Halifax, had called on Secretary of State Hull, who later 
reported of their conversation, “He brought up the question of an embargo on exports of 
gasoline to Japan” and provided a document from his embassy that began, “One of the 
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main weapons which the Democracies hold against Japan is her dependence on them for 
many of the materials without which she would be unable to maintain her war effort.” 
The British document continued, Japan had used “the last twelve months to import 
quantities of these materials far in excess of her current consumption needs.” Given that 
a “large proportion of these excessive imports has undoubtedly gone to build up strate-
gic reserves,” the British recommended a denial of just “excess supplies.” 59 According to 
a second enclosed document, “in the last six months of 1940 more than one million bar-
rels of aviation grade spirit went to Japan, compared with 560,000 barrels in the twelve 
months of 1939. In 1941, 180,000 barrels have already gone, and orders for an additional 
250,000 barrels are reported.” The British did not recommend a complete embargo, 
simply a curtailment sufficient to prevent further Japanese stockpiling.60
Then, on 1 August 1941, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles revoked all valid 
licenses allowing the export of petroleum products to any country outside the Western 
Hemisphere, the British Empire, Egypt, the Dutch East Indies, unoccupied China, and 
the Belgian Congo.61 This meant no exports to Japan. Some believe that the oil embargo 
was made total not by intention but by mistake, through a bureaucratic snafu.62 In any 
case, it put Japan in dire straits. At the time Japan had reserves of 9.4 million kilotons 
and consumed 450,000 kilotons per month, giving it about a year and a half ’s supply at 
stable consumption rates.63 Japanese leaders construed this period as defining a deadline 
for making alternate supply arrangements.
The escalating embargoes, far from deterring Japan, appear to have acted as an ac-
celerant as Japanese leaders put the finishing touches on their plans to expand the war 
throughout the Pacific. Within a week of the total oil embargo, just as the British had 
predicted, the Imperial Japanese Army favored going to war in the Pacific. The total oil 
embargo meant that Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere had to be expanded 
to include the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies. In September the cabinet and thereaf-
ter an imperial conference confirmed the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy’s recom-
mendation for the “Southern Advance” war plan to take over European colonies in 
Asia during the window of opportunity opened by the war in Europe, when neither the 
colonial powers nor Russia could interfere. The navy, but not the army, added Hawaii to 
the list of targets.64 Both services wanted to complete their conquests before the window 
began to close: Japan’s relative naval strength would peak in late 1941 at near parity with 
the U.S. Navy and thereafter decline rapidly in relative terms as a result of the American 
building program under the Two-Ocean Navy Act.65
On 10 November 1941, Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori warned Ambassador Grew, 
“The freezing by the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many im-
portant raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is capable of menac-
ing national existence to a greater degree than the direct use of force.” 66 With Japan’s 
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power diminishing with each passing day, Prime Minister Tōjō and other leaders had 
concluded, “If Japan could not solve the fatal situation by means of diplomacy then there 
would be no way remaining to her but to take up arms and break through the military 
and economy barrier flung around her.” 67
As the postwar trials made clear, in the estimation of the Imperial Japanese Army high 
command “there was but a faint prospect of a successful conclusion of the negotiations, 
and . . . Japan would therefore eventually have to go to war.” It was convinced that while 
negotiations dragged on, Japan was being subjected to gradual exhaustion of natural 
resources as the economic warfare of the Allied powers began to take full effect; that 
the nation was losing its power to fight; and that hostilities should therefore be com-
menced while Japanese fighting power was still relatively strong compared with that of 
the potential enemy. The Naval General Staff believed that if “war was to be inevitable, it 
should be determined upon promptly.” 68
On 26 November 1941, the United States delivered another ultimatum to Japan—the 
“Hull Note,” for U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull. It required Japan to evacuate Indo-
china and China, including Manchuria, and to repudiate both its puppet government in 
China under Wang Jingwei and its Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Within the 
fortnight Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—clearly not the desired outcome of a strategy of 
deterrence. In the end, the United States succeeded in deterring a Japanese attack not 
against itself but against Russia—the Imperial Japanese Army finally gave up its long-
standing war plan to invade Russia as relations with the United States deteriorated.69
The U.S. Navy Fleet-in-Being at Pearl Harbor
U.S. military and economic deterrents were supposed to work hand in hand. The 
embargo strategy accurately identified and targeted a key Japanese strategic vulner-
ability: Japan could not sustain military operations in China, let alone across the Pacific, 
without a long shopping list of imported natural resources. In October 1941, Ambas-
sador Nomura informed the foreign minister, Adm. Toyoda Teijirō, “If the United States 
continues to carry on economic warfare against Japan, a measure just short of armed 
warfare, the United States will be able to attain the objectives of a war against Japan 
without firing a shot.”70 Nomura warned President Roosevelt, “People in my country 
take the freezing of assets as an economic blockade and they go even so far as to contend 
that the means of modern warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can survive 
without the supply of material vital to its industries.”71
Yet the embargo failed in its primary objectives either to roll back or deter further 
Japanese conquests. Instead, it succeeded only in its third objective, of limiting Japanese 
resource stockpiles for future military operations. The problem lay not in the strategy’s 
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understanding of an enemy critical vulnerability but in Japan’s reaction to the strat-
egy. In 1938 analysts in the State Department warned that an oil embargo would risk 
“Japan’s forcibly taking over the Netherlands East Indies.”72 On 7 June 1940 Maxwell 
M. Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, accurately predicted that a 
“restriction or prohibition of the exportation of petroleum products . . . would tend to 
impel Japan toward moving into the Dutch East Indies.”73 On 19 July 1941 the direc-
tor of the War Plans Division provided the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, 
with a “study of the effect of the embargo of trade between the United States and Japan” 
that predicted, “An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by Japan on 
Malaya [a key source of iron] and the Netherlands East Indies [a key source of oil], and 
possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific.” The report recom-
mended not embargoing all trade with Japan at that time lest the United States become 
overextended in a possible two-front war.74
The trick would be to deter such a Japanese escalation. This is where forward basing 
of the U.S. Navy came in. The stationing of the Battle Fleet in Hawaii was considered 
essential for the implementation of an embargo and as a deterrent against a Japanese 
seizure of the Dutch East Indies oil fields.75 Despite the risks of military escalation, from 
1938 to 1941 Stanley K. Hornbeck, who served as chief of the State Department’s Divi-
sion of Far Eastern Affairs (1928–37) and subsequently adviser on political relations to 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1937–44), supported the strategy of increasing economic 
pressure so that American exports would not facilitate Japanese aggression or, even 
worse, allow Japan to stockpile resources that it would one day use against the United 
States.76
On 24 July 1940, Hornbeck reported that
the possibility of substantial embargoes by this country is linked closely with the question of the 
existing location and the possible alteration of the location of the U.S. Battle Fleet. So long as we 
have the Fleet in the Pacific, and especially while we have it at Hawaii, the Japanese have reason to 
fear what we may do in the field of embargoes. The Fleet stands as the defensive and shielding arm 
behind which and screened by which there is the potential striking power of the other arm, em-
bargo. If and when our Fleet leaves the Pacific and moves into the Atlantic, Japan will have reason 
to be very little fearful that we will go in extensively for embargoes. Thus, our present setup—with 
authority for embargoes and with the Fleet in the Pacific—contributes greatly to the maintenance of 
the negative equilibrium in Japanese political thought.
Hornbeck believed that forward basing was the best available strategy to ensure that 
“there will be no abrupt and drastic change in [Japan’s] foreign policy in the immediate 
future.”77 Sixteen months later the abrupt and drastic change occurred anyway.
At the postwar International Military Tribunal of the Far East, defendants such as 
former prime minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki, former vice chief of the Naval General Staff 
Adm. Kondō Nobutake, and former minister of the navy Adm. Shimada Shigetarō listed 
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the factors that had driven Japan to attack the United States. Quite ironically, the factors 
they cited had been the main elements of the American strategy of deterrence, which 
according to them, far from deterring further aggression had actually propelled it. 
Specifically Tōjō listed six major points: first, the American renunciation of its Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation in 1939, followed by growing numbers of embargoed items; 
second, skyrocketing U.S. military appropriations, most notably for naval and air assets; 
third, peacetime conscription; fourth, growing military coordination among the United 
States, Britain, and the Netherlands; fifth, the strengthening of U.S. defenses in the Phil-
ippines; and sixth, capping them all off, the Allied freeze of Japanese assets.78
To this list Admiral Kondō added the forward basing of the U.S. Fleet at Hawaii, Japan’s 
deadlocked negotiations with the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina in pursuit of 
alternative sources for supplies, and the growing Allied aid to the Nationalist govern-
ment of China. According to Admiral Kondō, this aid made Chiang Kai-shek “confident 
of victory” and undermined Japan’s ability to win the war in China, which was “Japan’s 
greatest concern at that time.”79 Rather than deterring Japan’s attack, as intended, the 
U.S. Navy’s fleet-in-being in Hawaii invited attack by offering a poorly defended, lucra-
tive target.
The Boomerang Effect
Far from deterring a Japanese attack, then, escalating U.S. military and economic pres-
sure did not even delay but apparently precipitated one. General Tōjō listed in his open-
ing statement before the military tribunal the tightening trade embargo against Japan as 
the first of three causes of the Pacific War, causes that together forced “Japan to invoke 
the right of self-defense.”80 He highlighted the effectiveness of the American freeze of 
Japanese assets: “Japan was quite unable to keep its population alive by the products 
raised within the Empire alone. Japan had to obtain the necessary commodities by 
trade. By the freezing of assets by the United States, Britain and the Dutch East Indies, 
more than half of Japan’s foreign trade disappeared and the toil of eighty years’ standing 
[to become a great power] was wiped out.” With the oil embargo, “Japan’s navy was thus 
to lose mobility after her oil stock was exhausted; solution of the China Incident [Japan’s 
euphemism for its war against China] was made practically impossible; Japan’s defense 
was emasculated.”81
The Imperial Japanese Navy too saw the American embargoes not as deterrence but as 
a looming deadline for war. According to the testimony of Admiral Shimada, “These 
embargoes and freezing orders were deliberately designed to paralyze, and in themselves 
were capable of paralyzing within a short space of time, the entire economy of Japan. 
They were designed to force Japan’s capitulation in China from sheer industrial and raw 
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material exhaustion. One of the principal commodities vitally affected was oil. Without 
it [her] civilian economy and her entire national security would be strangled.” 82
At the root of the failure of the U.S. strategy of deterrence was the enormous value 
Japanese civil and military leaders placed on the attainment of their objectives in China. 
Prior to Pearl Harbor, Japan had suffered 600,000 casualties in China, a sunk cost of 
stupendous proportions that its leaders found difficult to justify to the Japanese people.83 
The domestic and political costs, not to mention “loss of face,” associated with a uni-
lateral withdrawal from China would have been simply too great to bear. Ambassador 
Grew warned that an embargo alone would not force Japan to abandon its “adventure 
in China.” 84
At an imperial conference in September of 1941 the prime minister, General Tōjō, 
argued that together the American oil embargo, its Lend-Lease aid to Russia, and its 
increasing military aid to Chiang Kai-shek constituted an attempt to encircle and 
destroy Japan. General Tōjō and Japan’s other leaders—civil, army, and navy—who 
rarely agreed on much, concluded that peace on American terms, entailing a withdrawal 
from China, would lead to the gradual impoverishment of Japan and undo the efforts of 
generations of Japanese to transform their country into a modern power. War with the 
United States, on the other hand, offered a fifty-fifty chance of success. Finance Minis-
ter Kaya Okinori alone repeatedly raised economic concerns indicating the unfeasibil-
ity of Tōjō’s plans. The others ignored him.85 On 5 November Tōjō predicted, “America 
may be enraged for a while, but later she will come to understand [why we did what we 
did].” 86 He argued that risking war with the United States was better than “being ground 
down without doing anything.” 87 His and his colleagues’ misreading of the American 
psyche also failed to deter, and like America’s deterrence strategy, produced for Japan 
a strategic boomerang, delivering precisely the kind of war Japan could never win and 
that ended with atomic bombs on Japanese cities.
As it turns out, Japanese leaders did not perceive the U.S. strategy as one designed to 
deter. They concluded that American demands put at risk the survival not only of their 
country but of themselves personally, responsible as they were for Japan’s China policy, 
leaving them a stark choice between fighting or perishing. Americans would have 
disagreed that their demands threatened Japanese survival. They did not perceive the 
tremendous value that the Japanese attached to stability in China or the extreme fear the 
Japanese leadership had of the spread of communism. Americans would have argued 
that the Japanese invasion greatly exacerbated Chinese instability, to which the Japanese 
would have responded by pointing to the rapid economic development of Manchuria as 
proof of what was possible if only the Chinese would cooperate.
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Conclusions
Because the United States faced aggressors in both Europe and Asia, it had to devise 
a cost-effective and politically feasible method to deal with both. Its economy had 
not come close to recovering from the Great Depression, world trade remained ham-
strung by protectionism, and American voters remained devoutly isolationist until the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 changed everything. Until then, 
isolationist voter sentiment severely constrained American policy choices.
So the United States settled for a “Europe first” strategy, which meant adopting in Asia 
a shoestring strategy of economic embargo in combination with a forward-based fleet-
in-being, in the hope that the two together would slow if not deter further Japanese 
expansion. This strategy, far from deterring Japan, apparently hastened its military 
operations. At the root of this strategic boomerang was the enormous value the Japanese 
civil and military leadership placed on their version of a stable China. They equated 
it with national survival. Little could deter those who already considered their very 
survival at stake.
For a trade-dependent nation like Japan, embargo was a lethal strategy. But because the 
stakes were so high, rather than backing down Japan escalated, and this escalation then 
required an expensive boots-on-the-ground solution for the United States. It turns out 
that there was no cheap deterrent strategy that would set Japan right, only a very costly 
one bought at the price of tens of thousands of American lives.
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After the Fall of South Vietnam
Humanitarian Assistance in the South China Sea
JAN K.  HERMAN
The nature of the 1975 humanitarian crisis in South Vietnam, which was the result 
of the Vietnam War’s chaotic conclusion, was not altogether unfamiliar to those who 
had witnessed the aftermath of the first Indochina war in 1954.1 Perhaps the greatest 
humanitarian assistance mission accomplished by the U.S. Navy in the latter half of the 
twentieth century occurred at the end of the first Indochina war, during which the com-
munist Vietminh, based in northern Vietnam, overthrew French colonial rule. Under 
the Geneva terms that ended that war in 1954, the Vietnamese could decide where they 
wished to settle. Few in the south chose to go north, but with the collapse of French rule, 
hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed south to escape the communists.
On that occasion the U.S. Navy was called on to conduct Operation Passage to 
Freedom, a mission that also had an important medical component. Navy physi-
cians and hospital corpsmen provided medical care for the refugees in camps set up 
near Haiphong, the port of embarkation for the refugees. Those camps were complete 
with tents, potable water, food, and medical care. Preventive medicine teams worked 
diligently to control the rodent and insect populations, spray for malarial mosquitoes, 
and purify water. By the time Passage to Freedom was completed, Navy ships had 
evacuated more than 860,000 refugees to South Vietnam.2
In 1975, the U.S. Navy was tasked yet again, this time to assist many thousands of South 
Vietnamese intent on leaving communist Vietnam, often permanently. Some com-
mentators have compared the U.S. Navy operation in 1954 to the events that unfolded 
in the spring of 1975, but this comparison only goes so far. The mass exodus from 
North Vietnam in 1954 occurred after hostilities had ended. In addition, the evacuation 
from north to south on board Navy ships took place during a period of three months 
and went relatively smoothly.3 By contrast, the rapid demise of the South Vietnamese 
government during the spring of 1975 and the ensuing refugee crisis occurred during an 
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active conflict, and the U.S. Navy was given little or no warning that its services would 
be required to assist fleeing Vietnamese military personnel and civilians. 
Background to the Crisis
On 27 January 1973, the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Re-
public of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (i.e., the Vietcong) 
signed what became known as the Paris Peace Accords. The agreement called for a 
cease-fire in place, allowing both the North and South Vietnamese armies to hold the 
positions they already occupied. The terms also allowed for those armies to resupply 
during the cease-fire. Other provisions spelled out terms for the release of American 
prisoners of war, repatriation of the dead, and future negotiations between North and 
South Vietnam for eventual reunification.
Up until 1975, that document provided the United States a face-saving solution to what 
had become the longest war in American history. But the Paris Peace Accords merely 
delayed the inevitable and offered a “decent interval,” in the phrase of a former chief 
analyst of North Vietnamese strategy for the Central Intelligence Agency, Frank Snepp.4 
The cease-fire gave the North Vietnamese an opportunity to rebuild their strength 
in areas they occupied in northern South Vietnam, to stockpile munitions and other 
supplies, and to construct a vast network of roads, oil pipelines, and radio networks in 
preparation for what was to be their final offensive.5
On 1 March 1975 the communists struck with a ferocity that staggered the South Viet-
namese defenders. By the close of the month the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was 
hard pressed on all fronts. The People’s Army of Vietnam now fought a conventional 
war with tanks and artillery, this time without the threat of B-52s and U.S. troops to 
slow its advance. Three North Vietnamese divisions captured the Central Highlands 
town of Banmethuat, then sliced eastward, effectively cutting South Vietnam in two. 
North Vietnamese tanks also rolled south along coastal Route 1. Names that had etched 
deep scars in the American psyche after years of war now took the headlines again: 
Chulai, Hue, Danang, Quinhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Nhatrang.
The fall of South Vietnam’s second-largest city, Danang, portended a humanitarian 
crisis of unprecedented dimensions; it was a dress rehearsal for what in a few weeks 
would become commonplace. Mobs of refugees sought escape at Danang’s port. Fleeing 
men, women, and children crawled over docks like ants, some wading into the harbor 
in pursuit of ships, tugs, fishing boats, and barges that had already left their piers. Many 
Vietnamese drowned in the attempt.
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The Humanitarian Crisis Unfolds
On 25 March 1975, the U.S. Navy alerted ten auxiliary transports to stand by for refu-
gee evacuation—SS American Racer, SS Green Forest, SS Green Port, SS Green Wave, 
SS Pioneer Commander, SS Pioneer Contender, SS Transcolorado, USNS Greenville 
Victory, USNS Sgt. Andrew Miller, and USNS Sgt. Truman Kimbro.6 Some refugees 
managed to escape Danang by sea, some in barges towed by tugs supplied by the Navy, 
others on board the transports named. The relentless communist advance sparked a 
chain reaction, as port after port fell to the invaders. Chaotic radio intercepts from the 
evacuation ships told of South Vietnamese army deserters selling scarce water supplies 
to refugees. On some of these vessels, firefights between rival soldiers broke out over 
food and water. The refugees were often caught in the cross fire, many being killed and 
thrown into the sea.
Conditions were almost indescribable, according to Lt. Cdr. Daniel Daly, an aide to Rear 
Adm. Donald Whitmire, commander of the Seventh Fleet’s Task Force 76 and in overall 
charge of the evacuation: “[They] were armed government deserters or Vietnamese 
soldiers somehow separated from their units among the refugees. We were afraid that 
fights would break out on those ships. We had visions of soldiers machine-gunning 
someone with a thousand people standing behind the targets being hit by the bullets 
that missed. There was no place for anyone to go.”7
Daly recalls that fatalities on those ships were becoming unacceptable. When Vietnam-
ese army deserters hijacked USNS Greenville Victory on 3 April, Whitmire put squads 
of U.S. Marines on board the merchant ships to protect the crews. Daly recorded a radio 
exchange between Whitmire and one of those Marines on board the contract ship SS 
Transcolorado:
Admiral: “Son, this is Admiral Whitmire. I want you to tell me what conditions are re-
ally like in your ship.”
Marine: “Begging your pardon, sir, but I am currently standing in two inches of shit. 
There are no latrines on this ship for the refugees. They just squat where they are. The 
stench is unbelievable.
“About two hours ago I saw a baby being born. As its head came out of the mother, it 
plowed a furrow in the shit on the deck. About ten minutes ago, I saw the bodies of both 
the baby and the mother thrown overboard. Someone gets thrown overboard about 
every fifteen minutes.”
Daly vividly remembers watching “tears flow down Admiral Whitmire’s face as he 
listened. We all knew we were witnessing a world-class tragedy.” 8
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By the third week of April, the enemy had effectively neutralized what remained of 
South Vietnamese forces and was approaching Saigon from all directions. Days prior to 
the fall of the capital, the thousands of panicked refugees attempted to flee the country 
in anything that would float or fly.
Lt. Robert Lemke was on board USS Kirk (DE 1087), a 438-foot destroyer escort. 
Kirk was part of Task Force 76, cruising just off the South Vietnamese coast. As the 
war reached its tragic climax in the last week of April, that task force of U.S. Navy 
ships received a new mission: to support the evacuation of an estimated six thousand 
Americans, mainly embassy personnel and military advisers. But the task force was also 
assigned the job of securing the escape of “sensitive” South Vietnamese who had worked 
for the United States during the war. Their very survival would be in question once the 
North Vietnamese took control. Their numbers were estimated to be in the thousands, 
not counting their dependents.
Lemke one morning wandered into the ship’s Combat Information Center (CIC) before 
breakfast to catch up on the operations. A large radar screen that consolidated infor-
mation from the other radar displays was prominent and hard to miss. One look put 
everything into perspective—distance to the coast and the positions of other ships and 
their movements. Each green blip was a ship or floating object. One glance enabled the 
observer to mark these ships’ locations on a master grid.
What seemed odd to Lemke was the shoreline, which appeared fuzzy and out of focus. 
He went topside to the flying bridge and through large binoculars scanned the bright-
ening horizon. The mystery of the blurry radar screen instantly cleared up. Hundreds 
of boats were heading out to sea in Kirk’s direction. Lemke later recalled, “The radar 
looked a little fuzzy only because there was so much activity on the water.” 9
As the vessels approached, he noted every type of watercraft from small fishing boats to 
rubber rafts. The lieutenant was shocked to see a small wooden dugout to which a man, 
woman, and two children clung for dear life. “On that dugout were all the family posses-
sions, including a small motorbike. These people were simply paddling out to sea hoping 
to get to the rescue ships,” he remembers.10
By this time, Kirk’s commanding officer, Cdr. Paul Jacobs, had made his way to CIC and 
was looking at a radarscope in utter amazement. The screen was overwhelmed by tiny 
images flowing together into a single blob. “There were so many contacts that the screen 
was becoming white as small boats were heading out to sea. It looked like Dunkirk in 
reverse.” 11
Lemke and the crew of USS Kirk were not the only Navy personnel to witness the 
unfolding humanitarian disaster. Up and down the coast, boats, rafts, and even canoes 
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loaded to the gunwales fogged many a radar screen. On board USS Cook (DE 1083), 
Kirk’s sister ship, the executive officer, Lt. Cdr. Ray Addicott, beheld a sea dotted by 
small boats. He noted that several contract ships from the Military Sealift Command 
were already taking refugees on board. Within hours, the sky would also be smeared 
with the exhausts of countless South Vietnamese air force and army helicopters, packed 
with refugees fleeing their homeland. Hospital Corpsman Second Class (HM2) Randy 
Hudson, a crewman of the carrier USS Hancock (CVA 19), later commented that he was 
surprised there were no midair collisions: “They were coming from all over and from 
every direction, and so frequently that the sky was dark from jet exhaust.”12 How would 
the men of Task Force 76 provide food, water, medical care, and comfort to dispirited 
people who had just lost everything, including their homeland?
Operation Frequent Wind
The evacuation of noncombatants from South Vietnam was not well organized. The 
ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham A. Martin, had long observed a policy of not 
preparing for an evacuation, arguing that closing the embassy or making other visible 
preparations for withdrawal would only panic the South Vietnamese government and 
that the beleaguered nation would then descend into chaos. Despite pleas from both 
civilian and military advisers to devise an effective evacuation plan, Martin greatly 
complicated the situation by refusing even to consider the contingency.
With the North Vietnamese armies now at the gates of Saigon, the very chaos Ambas-
sador Martin had hoped to avoid had come to pass. Enemy rockets and mortars rained 
down on Tan Son Nhut Airport at dawn on 29 April, rendering most runways unusable. 
Plan B—Operation Frequent Wind, a backup plan (hastily put together by Task 
Force 76 with Pentagon and presidential concurrence and approved at the last minute 
by the ambassador) that entailed the use of Navy, Marine, and Air Force helicopters—
became the only viable option. That strategy called for CH-53 and CH-46 helicopters, 
staged from carriers and amphibious support ships offshore, to fly into Saigon and land 
at predetermined rendezvous sites such as soccer fields, racetracks, and parks. Those 
helicopters would then embark Americans and “sensitive” Vietnamese. After each load 
of evacuees had been safely delivered to the task force ships, the helicopters would refuel 
and return to Saigon until all had been safely transported out of the city.
Despite Ambassador Martin’s failure to prepare or to keep in close contact with the 
naval task force offshore, the shuttle mission began quickly, on the morning of 28 April. 
Bing Crosby’s hit song “White Christmas,” broadcast over a Saigon radio station, was 
the signal for evacuees to assemble at predetermined rendezvous locations. As American 
helicopters headed back out to sea with their human cargoes, Navy, Marine, and Air 
Force pilots suddenly noted the sky behind them dotted with other helicopters. South 
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Vietnamese air force and army “Hueys” (Bell UH-1s) packed with refugees were heading 
out to sea, seeking any deck that would offer them refuge. It was these aircraft that were 
now showing up on radar screens throughout the task force.
USS Kirk’s chief engineer, Lt. Hugh Doyle, saw the situation for what it was: “A pilot had 
a Huey fully loaded with fuel. His family is standing next to him, and out on the hori-
zon he knows there are U.S. ships. It doesn’t take a genius to put it all together and say, 
‘Kids! Get in the airplane. We’re going!’ We had no advance warning. They just started 
coming.” 13
Just before 11 am on 29 April, sailors in Kirk’s CIC reported to the bridge an inbound 
South Vietnamese helicopter, which then flew overhead and out of sight. Kirk’s crew 
noted that the Vietnamese helicopters passed up their relatively small ship looking for 
bigger decks to land on. Nevertheless, some of the officers saw the possibilities of get-
ting directly involved in the action and bringing home a trophy or two. Doyle recalls, 
“Wouldn’t it be great to grab a helicopter? Wouldn’t it be great to take part in this?” 14
With the captain’s permission, a member of Kirk’s crew who spoke rudimentary Viet-
namese began broadcasting an invitation to Vietnamese fliers looking for a place to 
land. As an antisubmarine platform, the destroyer escort had a small flight deck for its 
Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) helicopter, which was now out of order 
and housed in its retractable hangar.
“Be careful what you wish for” might have crossed someone’s mind as Vietnamese 
Hueys suddenly began swarming above the flight deck. More than one Huey circling 
the ship had as many as twenty people crammed together; the aircraft was designed for 
fewer than half that number. Following one landing, a crewman observed that four or 
five people were grasping with one finger a single D ring attached to the aircraft’s deck.
After taking two helicopters on board, the destroyer escort’s small flight deck was at ca-
pacity. Jacobs made an instant decision. “Over the side,” he ordered, and crew members 
quickly began dragging the aircraft to the deck edge and dumping them overboard to 
make room for more landings. This exercise of jettisoning helicopters became routine 
throughout the task force as South Vietnamese Hueys descended on the fleet and—
without authorization—began landing on their decks. Many other choppers, once they 
were out of fuel, ditched in the ocean, with great loss of life.
As the Hueys landed on board Kirk and the refugees disembarked, many crewmen at 
first felt uneasy and suspicious. No one could be absolutely sure that all the “guests” 
were harmless refugees. Perhaps Vietcong or North Vietnamese infiltrators lurked 
among the refugees, bent on taking over the ship. The crew had already heard horrify-
ing stories of murder and mayhem that had occurred on overcrowded transports.
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With the arrival of each successive aircraft and the disembarkation of its passengers, 
men assigned to a security detail relieved the Vietnamese of their weapons. Although 
the evacuees seemed to pose no threat, armed guards remained alert. Access to certain 
parts of the ship was curtailed, and, when necessary, refugees were assigned escorts. 
But most of these people were not peasants from the countryside or the poor refugees 
Lemke had recently seen escaping in a dugout. They were fairly well-off and from South 
Vietnam’s upper classes. Many were families of aircraft’s pilots. The uneasiness soon 
dissipated as the crew recognized the scope of the tragedy that had befallen these people 
now without a country.
“You could tell they were scared,” Aircrewman (Mechanical) Third Class (AW3) Donald 
Cox later recalled. “They were almost in shock as you looked at their faces. The chil-
dren, of course, were crying and scared. The women were just following along and 
basically would do whatever was needed. The men were trying to protect their families. 
They were doing everything they could to try to survive.”15
In the blink of an eye, officers and men began converting their man-of-war into a 
humanitarian-assistance ship. With ten to twenty people on board each helicopter, the 
refugee population grew rapidly. The ship’s heads were made available for their sanitary 
needs, and the mess crew soon provided water and hot food on deck to the new arriv-
als. Very quickly, officers and men set up a holding area on the second level above the 
main deck where the refugees could rest and take a breather after their recent ordeal. 
Crewmen spread blankets and mats on the steel decks and set up lean-tos, canvas tarps, 
plastic sheeting, and awnings to shade them from the oppressive sun and tropical 
rain. Many sailors, trained as warriors, comforted distraught mothers and babies and 
brought them refreshments and other sustenance. Young sailors tenderly held babies or 
aided their mothers in diapering the infants and toddlers, bringing smiles and laughter 
to refugees who faced uncertain futures.
Not far away from where Kirk was operating, other refugees were being received as well. 
On board the carrier Hancock, HM2 Hudson heard from one of the senior medical offi-
cers that the refugees would be coming from a plague-endemic area. As a safety precau-
tion, members of the crew received shots if they had not yet had plague immunization. 
When the refugees came on board, they were dusted with the insecticide lindane. As 
Hudson later recalled, “That was my first encounter with these folks when they came off 
the helicopters and into the superstructure. Prior to that, we were given some rudimen-
tary Vietnamese lessons. I don’t know whether we were speaking gibberish or we were 
actually speaking the language. Yamaki, which means ‘Cover your eyes, and then turn 
around so we can spray you down.’ In retrospect, I wonder if any of that spraying was 
very effective or even necessary. It was kind of a dignity issue to me. I looked at it several 
years later and said, ‘What a welcome to America!’” 16
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Like the refugees who had landed on board Kirk, these former citizens of South Vietnam 
appeared to be from its upper classes. Hudson noted that “they weren’t in wretched con-
dition. They were from Saigon, a big city. If you compared them to us, they were mostly 
middle class. None of them were in rags. I suspect that many were pretty frightened hav-
ing taken a helicopter ride. They had just left their country—their home. I don’t know 
if anyone had an outright panic attack, but there was definitely an air of excitement and 
urgency. ‘Come on! Get out of the helicopter! Get on down here!’”17
By late afternoon of 29 April, helicopter activity on board Kirk had slowed considerably, 
but not before fifteen helicopters had landed, discharging a total of 157 men, women, 
and children. The following morning a far more dramatic sight awaited the crew. Hun-
dreds of Vietnamese vessels were now fleeing South Vietnam. Nearby, larger evacuation 
ships stood by to embark some of the refugees. One of them had already taken on board 
hundreds of refugees, reminding Kirk’s chief engineer of a Hershey bar lying on a sum-
mer sidewalk and just crawling with ants.18
The contrast between these refugees and those on the various helicopters was remark-
able. “The helo people were relatively calm,” Doyle noted. “The Vietnamese fishermen 
and peasants who were coming out in these boats, on the other hand, were just in a 
frenzy.” 19 By this time Kirk had received orders not to rescue any of the new boat refu-
gees but instead to stand by and protect the freighters assigned to take on these now-
displaced persons. At midday the destroyer escort rendezvoused with the contract SS 
Green Port and transferred all of its 157 refugees to that freighter.
Mission Creep: Saving the South Vietnamese Navy
Many thought their job was done, but at 9:30 on the night of 30 April, Kirk’s captain 
received a strange order from Rear Admiral Whitmire—to approach the flagship, USS 
Blue Ridge (LCC 19), to pick up a civilian passenger. Whitmire told Jacobs that USS Kirk 
had been chosen for a special mission and that Jacobs would be taking his orders from 
Richard Armitage, an agent working for the Secretary of Defense. Armitage, when he 
arrived on board, explained the mission and its importance. He briefly recounted how 
he had earlier been ordered to save or destroy as much sensitive material and technol-
ogy as possible so it would not fall into the hands of the North Vietnamese. But South 
Vietnam’s sudden collapse had shortened the timetable. Most of the Vietnamese army 
had already surrendered. But the South Vietnamese navy was a different story. This 
young agent explained that senior South Vietnamese naval officers had no intention of 
surrendering their ships.
Kirk would now rescue those vessels, and Armitage outlined how. Steaming alone, the 
ship would rendezvous with the remaining South Vietnamese ships at Con Son Island, 
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more than 120 miles southwest of Vung Tau, where he and the South Vietnamese Chief 
of Naval Operations would supervise their escape to the Philippines. Faced with skepti-
cism from Kirk’s officers, Armitage emphasized that the gamble was worth taking. If 
they didn’t carry out this mission, the ships could not be saved and their personnel 
would most likely be slaughtered by the North Vietnamese. Jacobs immediately ordered 
a new course set for Con Son Island. Another chapter of USS Kirk’s adventure was about 
to begin.
Planning for the new mission had actually begun several days earlier in an office at the 
South Vietnamese navy’s headquarters on the Saigon River. By then the North Viet-
namese army was at the city’s gates. At South Vietnamese navy headquarters, Capt. 
Kiem Do, deputy chief of staff for operations, met with his old friend Armitage. The two 
had worked together on many other missions during the war. Armitage told him that he 
wanted to discuss evacuating the South Vietnamese fleet before the communists took 
over Vietnam. They agreed to gather the fleet at Con Son, strategically located relatively 
close to Saigon and the Mekong Delta.
The arrival of communist troops, however, moved up the schedule. Armitage again met 
with Captain Do and other officials of the Vietnamese navy and told them that rather 
than leaving on 3–4 May, the original plan, they would have to evacuate that very eve-
ning, 29 April. Armitage would meet them at Con Son Island. Armitage advised Do that 
the Vietnamese should send all the major ships they had not destroyed to Con Son with 
as many people on board as possible. Armitage then boarded a helicopter to get out to 
USS Blue Ridge to inform Rear Admiral Whitmire of what he had just arranged.
Armitage’s “deal” with the South Vietnamese, in which the U.S. Navy would “rescue” 
what remained of their fleet, had not been authorized by his superiors back at the Penta-
gon. The plan was conceived by Armitage and Do alone: “When I showed up on the Blue 
Ridge, I had nothing. I had no wallet. I had no passport. I had no identification. And I 
looked around when I came off the helo and saw the flag lieutenant. I said, ‘Lieutenant. 
This is going to be hard to believe but I’m on a mission from the Secretary of Defense 
and I need to speak to Admiral Whitmire.’”20 Now this thirty-year-old was on board 
Kirk and calling the shots. It was Wednesday, 30 April 1975.
When Kirk approached Con Son Island as dawn broke, the crew saw scores of Viet-
namese ships, their decks packed with refugees. Jacobs would recall the sight: “As we 
approached we could see their f leet there . . . and swift boats [fast patrol craft] just 
milling around dead in the water. Some of them were anchored, some were not. They 
were adrift. You could look over and see the ships just loaded with people all the way 
up to the bridge. I would estimate 2,000 or 3,000 people on one of these Coast Guard 
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WHECs [high-endurance cutters]. I said, ‘Oh, my God!’ . . . no water, no food—and this 
is going to be an insurmountable problem. How are we going to pull this off?’”21
Operations Specialist Second Class James Bongaard, one of Kirk’s radarmen, was 
overwhelmed by what he saw. “There were just thousands of people on top of this deck. 
I can’t really describe the look on their faces. I can only imagine what they might be 
going through. Elation that they got away. And number two, where are they going? They 
have no idea where. They’re fleeing so in one way they’re happy. But in another way they 
don’t know where they’re going. It’s sort of a blank, odd stare.” 22
“They were just crammed in there just as tight as you could get,” Machinist’s Mate 
Fireman Kent Chipman remembers. “I don’t know how many people were on each ship 
below deck. But above deck, there were just thousands of people, as many as you could 
get on board. And they were sitting, standing. They were just overloaded to the max.” 23
Armitage later recalled, “[I saw] 29 or 30 ships and about 31,000 people on board them. 
So the Kirk for me was ideal. They [Kirk] could communicate with the rest of the U.S. 
fleet. They would go with us across to the Philippines and be able to rescue any folks 
who might be in harm’s way. Some had been wounded. Some were pregnant. All were 
sick after a while and I needed some way to take care of those folks. And the Kirk for me 
was perfect.” 24
Jacobs immediately briefed the crew on Kirk’s impending mission. But he wondered how 
he and his small ship would be able to provide humanitarian assistance to an estimated 
thirty thousand people, as well as lead them safely across nearly a thousand miles of the 
South China Sea to the Philippines.
The immediate goal was to make order out of chaos. Kirk began corralling the ships 
and shuffling them into various positions. The first task was to transfer Armitage to 
the Vietnamese flagship so he could confer with the South Vietnamese Chief of Naval 
Operations and his staff. Then several members of Kirk’s crew, including enginemen, 
electricians, machinist’s mates, and the chief hospital corpsman, went from ship to ship 
to determine which of the Vietnamese vessels required assistance. Jacobs remembers 
the sorry state of some of those ships. “Sometimes we couldn’t even pull the anchor up. 
We’d have to slip it—break it loose and let it drop. Some of them got under way without 
any anchor.” 25 A number of ships could not start their engines, and Kirk’s mechanics 
worked to remedy those situations.
Some of the vessels leaving Vietnam jammed with refugees were barely seaworthy. 
Several fishing boats had never before even ventured far from land. One landing ship 
had defective bow doors that would not close completely and was taking in water faster 
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than its pumps could expel it. Before it sank, its passengers were transferred to the South 
Vietnamese flagship, Tran Nhat Duat.
The outcome of Kirk’s mission was anything but certain. How would the North 
Vietnamese victors react to the potential escape of what remained of the South Viet-
namese navy? The destroyer escort was well equipped to fight Soviet submarines but 
with its single five-inch deck gun was virtually defenseless against hostile aircraft. And 
that threat was very real. By now most South Vietnamese airfields, along with fighter 
aircraft, were in the hands of the communists. Moreover, some South Vietnamese pilots 
had already defected and were flying missions against their former countrymen. “We 
were like sitting ducks,” recalls Jacobs. “They could have taken the planes off, taken the 
Kirk out and all the Vietnamese ships.” 26 To emphasize the point, an unidentified low-
flying jet appeared off Kirk’s starboard bow. Fortunately, the aircraft flew on; the crew 
refocused its attention on the task at hand—aiding refugees.
Kirk finally got under way with its sister ship USS Cook, which had joined the effort. 
Kirk now led a very long formation of warships and fishing boats in two parallel col-
umns, about a mile apart, sixteen ships in each. The formation extended five miles, the 
destroyer escort in the lead. The convoy could steam only as fast as the slowest vessel, a 
speed that would seldom exceed five knots. All ships—no matter what their condition—
sought Kirk’s and Cook’s protection and were completely dependent on those ships’ 
generosity for food, water, and fuel.
The Mission Changes 
As the procession of ships moved eastward across the South China Sea, the entire idea 
of having to defend it against attack quickly evaporated. There were no attacks. The 
mission now evolved into taking Kirk’s chief hospital corpsman, Stephen Burwinkel, on 
house calls and delivering water, rice, and medicine. His responsibility for the well-
being of an estimated thirty thousand Vietnamese was unheard-of in U.S. Navy history. 
But this hospital corpsman was no amateur.
Before becoming part of Kirk’s commissioning crew in 1972, Burwinkel had seen duty at 
a U.S. Navy hospital in Morocco, served on two ships, and tended wounded Marines in 
Vietnam. The thirty-four-year-old Cincinnati native was beloved by his crew, not only 
for his cool, even temperament and wry sense of humor but also for the consummate 
skill he brought to his profession. Burwinkel was an independent-duty corpsman—that 
is, a highly trained health-care professional able to run the medical department on any 
Navy vessel without an assigned physician. “Chief Burwinkel was just tireless,” Doyle 
would recall. “He was a country doctor making house calls. But he had 30,000 patients 
and he didn’t have a little jeep to drive around in. He had a boat.” 27
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Doyle was referring to a swift boat, which Kirk’s crew sent up and down the columns 
of Vietnamese ships. Burwinkel would go on board each ship to hold sick call and pro-
vide whatever health care he could. Besides his medical kit he wore a pistol on his hip, 
not knowing whether any of those vessels harbored North Vietnamese who might do 
him harm.
Following a long day of making rounds, Burwinkel would return to the destroyer escort, 
grab a bite and a catnap, replenish his supplies, and head back out. “How he did it is 
beyond me,” Doyle would recollect. “In short, he’s a wonderful man and a wonderful 
doctor, and he was absolutely what we needed at that time. He’s not a doctor, of course. 
We call[ed] him ‘Doc.’ He’s a hospital corpsman but he’s an independent duty hospital 
corpsman and very capable. I would have anointed him doctor right after we got into 
Subic because of what he did.” 28
Operations Specialist James Bongaard reflected the feelings of many fellow crew mem-
bers. “A lot of people like myself who saw these people up close that one day early on 
knew that we had to do everything possible to help them. For a lot of us who had been in 
the Navy just a couple of years, we had never really done anything. We’d go out and play 
war games and circle around, but we never really did anything of any accomplishment. 
Now, all of a sudden, we had someone to take care of. We were doing something special. 
We weren’t hunting people down. We weren’t trying to shoot anybody. We would give 
up sleep, give up our off-time to do anything we could to haul rice, give them water, do 
whatever we could.” 29
But making a difference was indeed difficult. Despite his skill and limitless energy and 
the assistance of a junior corpsman, Hospital Corpsman Third Class Mark Falkenberg, 
Chief Burwinkel was hard pressed. Dehydration and diarrhea ran rampant on board the 
overcrowded and unsanitary ships. Because of overtaxed and often nonworking toilets, 
refugees relieved themselves in communal buckets, on the deck, or over the side. Both 
Kirk and Cook sailors found it necessary to come alongside many of these ships and 
train their fire hoses on decks besmeared with feces.
Lt. Cdr. Ray Addicott, Cook’s executive officer, vividly remembers the squalor that 
greeted his ship as it moved among the fleet: “The people were almost on top of each 
other. It was nasty. Our sanitation team would come in and hose down all the decks. A 
lot of people would spread their clothes out so we could also hose the clothes down.” 30
Cook’s skipper, Cdr. Jerry McMurry, later recalled the conditions on one of the Viet-
namese landing ships: “The ship was loaded with what I estimated were 4,000 people, 
and the decks were just running with urine. We used fire hoses to wash down those 
decks, and then we tried to get enough freshwater on board because it was hotter than 
hell during the day—up to 110.” 31
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Conjunctivitis, also called “pinkeye,” was epidemic. “I saw many cases of conjuncti-
vitis caused by the unsanitary conditions and exposure to the sun,” Burwinkel later 
lamented. The combination of tropical sunlight and contaminated water sent the highly 
contagious disease raging among the flotilla. Burwinkel recalls, “I was very much afraid 
of that conjunctivitis spreading because it is a very virulent illness. I was afraid that if I 
caught it, that would be the end of it.” 32
Before four days had passed the corpsman had gone through his supply of antibiotic 
ophthalmic ointment to treat the eye disease. He had also expended all his Kaopectate 
and Lomotil, which he had used to stem the diarrhea epidemic. Burwinkel was out of 
other drugs and dressings too, as well as two other essential items—diapers and baby 
formula. Without emergency resupply, Doc Burwinkel and his helpers would be out of 
business. Kirk’s skipper quickly radioed an emergency appeal for medical supplies, and 
within a day the U.S. Air Force responded. Soon a specially equipped C-130 arrived on 
the scene from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and dropped two fully loaded 
fifty-five-gallon drums suspended from parachutes. Burwinkel was soon back making 
his rounds.
Those rounds also meant seeking out near-term pregnant women and taking them on 
board a commandeered swift boat. Burwinkel had located five women who seemed 
on the verge of childbirth and brought them on board Kirk, where he could monitor 
their condition. To accommodate the pregnant women the crew had converted a crew’s 
lounge into a maternity ward. Each morning Jacobs visited the women to deliver a pep 
talk and encourage them to get busy and start having their babies. One of those women, 
seventeen-year-old Lan Tran, later remembered the morning ritual: “He came every day 
to our room. He always smile. He told us he want at least one baby to be born on the 
ship and named after the USS Kirk.” 33 Despite the captain’s cheerleading, none of the 
women gave birth. Their babies would arrive later.
The motley flotilla plodded steadily eastward across the South China Sea, a body of wa-
ter notorious for frequent storms and rough seas. Sailors and passengers alike observed 
the uncharacteristic calm and commented on how fortunate that was. Lemke noted that 
“some of the ships were not very seaworthy and the mild conditions allowed them to 
transit safely. The flat seas also enabled Kirk to continue using its small boats in trans-
ferring people and material back and forth.” 34
Mission Finale
Feeding and providing water to more than thirty thousand refugees were too big a job 
for Kirk and Cook alone. Soon other Navy vessels joined the flotilla to lend a hand. Swift 
boats, motor whaleboats, and a number of landing craft scurried about among the Viet-
namese vessels, delivering food, water, fuel, and assistance. USS Mobile (LKA 115), an 
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amphibious cargo ship, provided not only rice but the temporary loan of four corpsmen, 
a physician, and medical supplies. The stores ship USS Vega (AF 59) and the tank land-
ing ship USS Tuscaloosa (LST 1187) also pitched in, as did Barbour County (LST 1195). 
With their small boats, these ships transferred tons of stores and rice to Kirk and Cook.
During that first week of May, Kirk’s gig (the captain’s boat) and motor whaleboat shut-
tled back and forth among the fleet. Its crew delivered food and water, Chief Burwinkel 
held sick call, and engineers and machinist’s mates repaired cranky diesel engines and 
bilge pumps. The other American vessels also maneuvered around the formation, pro-
viding engineering, medical, and logistical support.
As the fleet finally approached Philippine territorial waters on Monday, 5 May, a 
diplomatic crisis developed, one that threatened the entire plan and the welfare of the 
refugees. Ferdinand Marcos, president of the Philippines, suddenly declared that since 
the Republic of Vietnam no longer existed, the South Vietnamese vessels could not 
enter Subic Bay or any other port in the Philippines. The dictator was torn between his 
alliance with the United States and a desire to be an integral part of the new reality in 
Southeast Asia. Marcos perceived a weakening commitment on the part of the U.S. gov-
ernment to deter communist expansion. If the leader of the free world had abandoned 
an ally, South Vietnam, what guarantee did he have that it would not leave his nation to 
the same fate? The changing political landscape meant normalizing relations with com-
munist governments in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. He would not offend the North 
Vietnamese by allowing the remnants of the South Vietnamese navy into his nation.
As William Sullivan, ambassador to the Philippines, tried to get Marcos to change his 
mind, the flotilla killed time by tracing a circuitous course off the Philippine coast. 
Jacobs and the other participating U.S. Navy commanding officers faced a dilemma. 
Conditions on board the Vietnamese vessels were steadily deteriorating despite their 
own best efforts. Many refugees had been at sea for more than a week. Some were 
demoralized, not only by the death of their nation, but by the loss of family members. 
Others were despondent over having left spouses and children behind. More than a few 
were reaching the ends of their ropes.
Finally, Marcos and Sullivan reached an agreement. Most of the South Vietnamese 
vessels had once been American, and now that the South Vietnamese government no 
longer existed they could be returned to U.S. ownership. Naval personnel, mostly from 
Kirk’s crew, would board the vessels, replace South Vietnamese flags with U.S. flags, 
and take command. The vessels would then enter Subic Bay as U.S. Navy ships. Shortly 
after 10 am on 6 May, personnel transfers to the Vietnamese vessels began. By day’s end 
thirty-nine Kirk crewmen had been embarked on board the ships. Lieutenant Lemke 
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was told to deliver orders to each of the Americans on those ships, along with an Ameri-
can flag.
Lt. Rick Sautter, officer in charge of Kirk’s LAMPS detachment, would recall the events 
on the South Vietnamese warship he boarded. “A boat came by and delivered the packet 
with the American flag. And the ceremony was to be done with as much dignity as 
possible. It was kind of a feeling of finality. That was the final step in the fact that South 
Vietnam no longer existed.”35
Capt. Kiem Do recalls the observance with great emotion: “A young officer came on 
board our ship and said, ‘You’ll have to lower the flag and hoist the American flag up 
and sail in.’ I said to him, ‘We lost our country. We lost our pride. We lost everything. 
But please. A last favor. Try to have a ceremony of down the flag and raise the flag up. A 
ceremony that would save us some face, particularly those people aboard the ship, thou-
sands of them.’ Finally we got the approval. Every ship would have a ceremony of change 
of authority to return those ships to the American Navy. We had a very emotional 
ceremony. It was right at sunset, 6 or 7 of that day. All the people flocked to the deck and 
sang the national anthem, crying at the same time to lower their flag and then raise the 
American flag ceremoniously. So the dignity is there. Even though it is a big loss for us, 
at least it saved our face and also our dignity.” 36 
Once on board the ship Lemke was to command, he later observed, “The ship was 
silent. . . . Then, as a South Vietnamese officer prepared to lower the South Vietnam-
ese flag, his crew sang a capella the national anthem of their former country. It was a 
very moving time. As the yellow and red colors were slowly brought down, the refugees 
joined the crew in singing their national anthem . . . and then in silence the American 
flag was raised.” 37
At 12:27 pm on Wednesday, 7 May, Kirk’s log recorded a Filipino aircraft flying over to 
check the vessel’s identity. Two hours later Kirk passed just under a mile to starboard of 
Grande Island in Subic Bay. AW3 Cox observed that many of the refugees seemed elated 
once they realized “they finally were safe and that they had a new life ahead of them. 
And the new life was going to be much better than anything they could have imagined 
under communist rule.” 38 Two and a half hours later the destroyer escort moored at 
Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, ending its five-day, thousand-mile odyssey across 
the South China Sea.
The refugees did not remain long at Subic Bay. Following the terms of the diplomatic 
agreement, they boarded vessels either operated or contracted by the Military Sealift 
Command and within two days were on their way to Guam. In a hastily assembled tent 
camp, the first of several sites the United States would provide for the Vietnamese, Navy 
medical personnel again offered their services until the refugees were moved to other 
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camps in California, Arkansas, Florida, and Pennsylvania—way stations on their jour-
neys to permanent settlement in the United States.
Conclusions
USS Kirk’s humanitarian accomplishment and those of the other Navy ships that assist-
ed went virtually unnoticed for many years. The mood of Americans in 1975 was that 
the long Vietnam nightmare was over; they just wanted to move on. Moreover, the men 
of Kirk and of the other ships participating in that massive rescue in the South China 
Sea never thought they had done anything extraordinary. Feeding refugees and diaper-
ing infants were not war-related feats that warriors felt worth sharing with old buddies 
in American Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars halls, and many did not discuss these 
humanitarian experiences with family or friends. 
For the officers and men of USS Kirk, however, those events of forty years ago and 
their role in rescuing the South Vietnamese refugees have had a profound impact. Cox 
observes that they had gone to Vietnam with expectations of being in combat and had 
been trained and prepared for it. But when they got there they found out that combat 
was not what was needed: “It was a heart and hand that was needed. We didn’t recognize 
it at first. We just did our jobs. It was after that that we realized that our Vietnam expe-
rience was totally different from our brothers who had walked in the field in combat. 
We recognized that it was going to be a positive experience for the rest of our lives. We 
were there to save life and not to destroy it.” 39
The architect of the rescue, Armitage, added another perspective regarding the mission: 
“Seeing the men—and it was only men then—of the USS Kirk, and realizing how much 
a part of their lives and what a great capstone this was to their careers, that moved me 
that they could feel so good about their involvement in that rescue. I envied them. They 
weren’t burdened with the former misadventure of Vietnam.” 40 Another player in the 
drama, Erich von Marbod, who was then a high-ranking official of the Department of 
Defense and Armitage’s superior, points out the story’s real impact. After the war, Presi-
dent Gerald Ford’s task force for the resettlement of Indochina refugees relocated more 
than 130,000 evacuees from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in communities around 
the United States. It was not long before almost all of them became American citizens. 
Since Kirk and its sister U.S. Navy vessels had saved more than thirty thousand South 
Vietnamese refugees, a quarter of Vietnamese refugees resettled in the United States by 
Task Force 76 can trace their new beginnings in this nation to that very successful and 
unusual humanitarian mission.41
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Continuing to Serve
Deploying Naval Vessels as Artificial Reefs
TOM WILLIAMS
Naval vessels that are close to the end of their useful lives as part of a fleet or that have 
already served their full terms of duty can still find important and honorable ways to 
contribute to the common good. Historically, ships can be sunk as part of gunnery exer-
cises, can be sunk on purpose during wartime to form blockships, or can be turned into 
naval museums, some of which appear to be strategically placed near major waterways 
to act as potential blockships in times of war.
On 25 November 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the National Defense 
Authorization Act (originally HR 1588, sec. 1013), allowing decommissioned ships to be 
donated for use as artificial reefs. The first ship in the program was the aircraft carrier 
USS Oriskany (CV 34), which was sunk on 17 May 2006 approximately twenty-four 
miles south of Pensacola, Florida.1 This program is intended to reduce the inactive-ship 
inventory in a “cost-effective and environmentally sound manner.”2
This chapter will begin by summarizing briefly the historical use of blockships and on-
going U.S. Navy programs for sinking ships, during both times of war and peace. Most 
of this chapter, however, will focus on sinking naval vessels to form artificial reefs. This 
innovative use of naval ships can play an important economic role for coastal communi-
ties by increasing maritime tourism and fishing, even while playing a positive ecological 
role by boosting local marine life.
Blockships
A “blockship” is a vessel deliberately sunk to prevent the use of a river, canal, or harbor. 
It may be sunk by a navy defending the waterway, to prevent the ingress of attacking 
forces, or it may be brought by enemy raiders and used to prevent the waterway from 
being used by the defenders. This practice goes back many centuries. In the eleventh 
century, around 1070, five Skuldelev ships were sunk at Roskilde Fjord to prevent the 
northern Vikings from landing at Roskilde.3 The ships were excavated in 1962 and 
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identified as vessels of different types, ranging from cargo ships to warships; they are 
now on display in the Viking Ship Museum in Roskilde, which is the Danish national 
museum for ships, seafaring, and boatbuilding in the medieval period. Another example 
of early blockships can be found in the Dutch raid on the Medway and Thames Rivers 
during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–67), when the Royal Navy sank a number of 
merchant ships and warships to block attacking forces.
During World War I, on the night of 23 April 1918 British naval forces sank blockships 
to neutralize the port of Bruges-Zeebrugge, Belgium. Older British ships were sunk in 
the canal entrance to prevent German ships from leaving port. The port was used by 
the German navy as a base for submarines and light shipping; the latter was of critical 
importance, especially in the English Channel. The raid was intended to sink three old 
cruisers to block the flow of traffic into and out of the port, but the execution did not go 
as planned. Of the three ships, which were all filled with concrete, only HMS Intrepid 
and Iphigenia made it to their destination, which was the narrowest point of the canal; 
HMS Thetis was scuttled prematurely.4
Another example of the strategic use of blockships occurred at Scapa Flow, in the 
Orkney Islands, off the coast of Scotland, where the British placed a naval base in 1904. 
Scapa Flow has a shallow sandy bottom less than two hundred feet deep and is a natural 
anchorage for ships. Following Germany’s defeat in World War I, its fleet was relocated 
to Scapa Flow, pending a final decision on its fate by the Paris Peace Conference. On 
21 June 1919, after eight months of waiting, Rear Adm. Ludwig von Reuter made  
the decision to scuttle the German fleet at Scapa Flow; he was not aware that there had 
been a last-minute extension to finalize the details of the peace treaty.5 He ordered  
all seventy-four ships scuttled; the British were only able to save four ships from sink-
ing—Baden, Nürnberg, Emden, and Frankfurt. According to one estimate, “Over 
400,000 tons of modern warships were sunk, the largest loss of shipping in a single day 
in history.” 6
During World War II, the British again used Scapa Flow as a naval base. However, the 
defenses constructed during World War I had not been maintained, and on 14 October 
1939 a German submarine penetrated the roadstead and sank HMS Royal Oak, after 
which HMS Iron Duke was sunk by Luftwaffe bombers. The base was closed in 1956 in 
recognition of the deferred maintenance, operating cost, and general obsolescence. The 
assemblage of ships on the bottom of Scapa Flow is now a popular destination for scuba 
divers and provides a substantial amount of trade and income for the local economy. 
Divers must first obtain a permit from authorities; they are allowed to enter the wrecks 
but not to retrieve artifacts located within three hundred feet of any wreck. The wrecks 
of Royal Oak and the dreadnought HMS Vanguard, which exploded at anchor during 
World War I, are war graves protected under the Protection of Military Remains Act of 
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1986. Another protected site is the wreck off Marwick Head, Orkney, of HMS Hamp-
shire, which while carrying Lord Kitchener on 5 June 1916 hit a mine and sank. The 
10,850-ton armored cruiser went down in a heavy storm four days after the battle of 
Jutland; only twelve survived from its crew of 655. It lies in 210 feet of water a mile and 
a half off Marwick Head, on which the Kitchener Memorial now stands. Only divers of 
the British armed forces are permitted to visit any military sites.7
In China, it was a longtime tactic of the Chinese navy to block any maritime threat to 
China’s rivers and canals by clogging harbors with log booms and chains strung from 
rows of floating junks. Following Japan’s 1937 invasion of China, the Nationalist navy 
proved inadequate to counter the Imperial Japanese Navy, so the vast bulk of the Chi-
nese naval ships were eventually sunk in the Yangzi River. This effort to block Japan’s 
invasion upriver proved futile. In 1940, Chiang Kai-shek ordered that the Navy Min-
istry be dissolved.8 A Chinese naval force that had taken decades to build was quickly 
disbanded and destroyed to ensure it would not fall into enemy hands.
Beginning in the 1930s, conflict over the use and control of the Suez Canal escalated. By 
the 1950s the Egyptian government was planning to construct the Aswan High Dam. To 
help pay for the project, Egypt seized and nationalized the canal, so as to charge higher 
passage fees. Israel invaded Egypt on 29 October 1956, followed by Britain and France, 
on the grounds that passage through the canal should be free. In retaliation, the Egyp-
tian blockship Akka was towed into place and scuttled, “together with another forty-
seven concrete-filled ships, effectively closing the waterway.”9 Eventually Egypt sank a 
total of fifty ships in the canal to block passage.10
Nevertheless, since World War II, with the decrease in naval warfare, there have been 
fewer instances of the use of blockships. During March 2014, however, a Soviet-era war-
ship, decommissioned in 2011 and designated for scrapping, was sunk with two other 
Russian naval ships at the entrance to Lake Donuzlav, on Crimea’s western coast. The 
three vessels were sunk so as to fill a gap between two spits of land, in an effort to block 
the Ukrainian navy from leaving port. Rather than gaining international support for 
the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this action—plus the land-based invasion of Ukrai-
nian territory by pro-Russian “volunteer” forces—has been widely condemned both in 
Europe and in the United States.
Many older naval vessels continue to function as museums. The historic preservation of 
naval vessels can provide economic benefits to communities through increased tourism. 
Currently there are approximately 187 ships registered in the Historic Naval Ships As-
sociation and open to visitors. Examples of U.S. Navy ships that continue to serve in this 
capacity are Arizona, Lexington, Midway, and Missouri. Many of these ship museums 
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are located along important channels and in strategic harbors, where if needed they 
could be quickly relocated to serve as blockships.11
Ship-Sinking Exercises
Navies often use old ships for gunnery practice. The U.S. Navy’s ship-sinking opera-
tions, or exercises, are called SINKEXes, and it conducts most of them at four major 
locations: north of Kauai, Hawaii; off California; off the East Coast; and off Puerto Rico. 
The exercises are used to hone “weapons firing skills and proficiency.” 12 According to 
Navy spokesmen, sinking exercises can also enhance fleet readiness by “providing envi-
ronmentally clean target ships for at-sea live-fire exercises.” Chris Johnson, spokesman 
at Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, acknowledged in 2012 that 118 ships 
had been sunk in SINKEXes between 1999 and 2012.13
Because of the possibility of severe damage to the environment, these SINKEX 
activities have been criticized by environmental groups, including the Sierra Club. 
But the Navy argues that it prepares all vessels used in SINKEXes in strict compliance 
with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations. According to a document 
provided by Lt. Cdr. Paul Macapagal, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon, “Fleet sink 
exercises are conducted in compliance with the Marine Protection, Research and Sanc-
tuaries Act (MPRSA). . . . Each ship provided is put through a rigorous cleaning process, 
which includes the removal of all PCB [polychlorinated biphenyl] transformers and 
large capacitors, all small capacitors to the greatest extent practical, trash, f loatable 
materials, mercury or fluorocarbon containing materials, and readily detachable solid 
PCB items.” 14
The problem with these preparations, environmentalists have argued, is that in 1999 
the Navy was granted a general permit from the EPA that exempted it from the strictest 
federal standards governing ocean dumping under MPRSA. According to Colby Self, a 
member of the Seattle-based Basel Action Network, which has sued to stop the SINKEX 
program, “They are ‘cleaned,’ but when you look at the requirements of the cleaning, 
it’s not sufficient. They’re not removing anything that’s not ‘readily detachable.’ No 
scraping, no use of machinery, no removal of machinery. They are not going to open up 
bulkheads to get at asbestos.” 15
The Navy’s response is that SINKEX ships are sunk in deep, remote waters, in at least 
six thousand feet of water at least fifty nautical miles from land. The Navy conducts its 
own environmental surveys of the area before any sinkings are authorized to ensure that 
no humans or marine mammals are harmed. The program has carried out the sinking 
in 2005 of the forty-year-old aircraft carrier USS America, which was sunk in a SINKEX 
about three hundred nautical miles southeast of Hampton Roads. At this writing in 
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2012, four ships have been sunk, three off Hawaii in July, and one off Guam in Septem-
ber. But according to Chris Johnson, “No more are planned for 2012.” 16
Historical Use of Artificial Reefs
Artificial reefs have been used for enhancement of commercial fishing in two ways. 
First, almost immediately after the artificial reef deployment fishermen can target 
specific species of fish. Second, there is an expectation that over time artificial reefs will 
resemble local natural reefs, as assemblages including sessile organisms associate with 
a reef ’s surface, structure, and surrounding water column and eventually increase bio-
mass at the site. This aspect has led to a redefinition of the use of artificial reefs in the 
last decade from the historic one of simply fish attractors to a more expansive one that 
includes the role of ecosystem developers, which provides recreation for scuba divers 
and other visitors.
Reef making is not new. As discussed previously, blockships have been used since 
ancient times. The Greek geographer Strabo recorded the use of artificial reefs by the 
Persians across the Tigris River to obstruct the passage of naval pirates from India.17 The 
Roman historian Polybius later recorded that the Romans built a reef across the mouth 
of the Carthaginian harbor in Sicily during the First Punic War to trap Carthaginians 
there.18 Obstructing harbors with sunken ships, logs, or other structures was a common 
naval tactic. As arsenals got more sophisticated, rocks and logs were replaced by mines 
and other more destructive devices.
In the United States, the first documented artificial reef was built in 1830, when log huts 
were sunk off the coast of South Carolina to improve fishing. However, it was not until 
the latter part of the twentieth century that artificial reefs were supported by commu-
nity efforts; artificial reefs before this time were built by ad hoc volunteer groups. Most 
reefs constructed off U.S. coasts have used materials of opportunity, relying on volun-
teers and materials that were readily available and free, or nearly so.19
Ship sinkings not only benefit local communities but can also benefit the government, 
in terms of disposal of retired military vessels. In 1994, the Atlantic States Marine 
Fisheries Commission reported that at least 666 steel-hulled vessels had been sunk for 
reefs since 1974. Forty-one of these ships had been donated to the states by the Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) pursuant to the Liberty Ship Act (Public Law 92-402, 1974), 
amended in 1984 by PL 98-623 to include ships other than Liberty ships. Although 
MARAD ships account for only 6 percent of the total inventory of vessels, they con-
stituted by 1994 almost all the forty-four sinkings of large ships, defined as those over 
three hundred feet long.20 Nearly half the 666 ships were very small fishing boats or 
tugboats no more than seventy-five feet long. There is today a reported demand among 
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Atlantic and Gulf Coast states for between five and six hundred additional ships just to 
meet the increasing need for improved fish resources.21
MARAD and the Navy have jointly responded to the value of “reefing” retired vessels by 
establishing an Artificial Reef Program. MARAD maintains the National Defense Re-
serve Fleet (NDRF) as a reserve of ships for defense and national emergencies. There are 
three fleet sites: the James River Reserve Fleet, at Fort Eustis, Virginia; the Beaumont 
Reserve Fleet, in Beaumont, Texas; and the Suisun Bay Reserve Fleet, at Benicia, Califor-
nia. When ships are no longer considered useful for defense or aid missions, MARAD 
arranges for their responsible disposal.
In 2001, Congress passed the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act.22 
This act authorized MARAD to use appropriated funds for the procurement of ship-
dismantling and recycling services. Since that time, MARAD’s Ship Disposal Program 
(SDP) has utilized vessel sales and ship-recycling services as the primary means of 
disposing of obsolete NDRF vessels. The SDP includes reefing as a disposal option and 
accepts applications from coastal states, U.S. territories and possessions, and foreign 
governments. This legislation also allows MARAD to provide financial assistance for 
specific domestic reefing projects.
Using Naval Ships to Create Artificial Reefs
An important nonmilitary use of navies is in reef building. As mentioned above, the 
2003 National Defense Authorization Act (originally HR 1588, sec. 1013) allows ap-
propriate decommissioned ships to be donated for use as artificial reefs. This legislation 
calls on the Navy to accomplish the overall process for artificial reefing to deliver a cost-
effective transfer of available naval vessels. This process also provides a viable alterna-
tive available to the Navy’s Inactive Ships Program, administered under the Naval Sea 
Systems Command and MARAD, under the Department of Transportation, to reduce 
the inventory of unneeded vessels.
The Navy’s program to sink ships is also known as “Ships 2 Reefs.” Its main objective is 
to reduce the size of the inactive ships inventory in a cost-effective and environmentally 
sound manner. The program is a partnership of agencies, localities, and the various 
applicants. The Navy prepares the vessel as an artificial reef through several steps, 
including environmental remediation in accordance with the EPA’s best management 
practices. Other costs, including the towing and sinking of the ships, are considered as 
part of cost-sharing proposals from applicants. MARAD coordinates federal agency 
solicitations and applications for obtaining vessels for use as artificial reefs.23
Donation and transfer applications for Navy and MARAD ships for use as artificial 
reefs may be submitted only by states, commonwealths, territories, and possessions of 
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the United States, and municipal corporations, or political subdivisions thereof. Foreign 
countries, except by Navy policy, and other foreign applicants are ineligible to apply for 
or receive obsolete warships, defined as aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroy-
ers, frigates, and submarines. This policy specifies that applications can be submitted 
only by local governments, either on their own behalf or in support of private industry. 
For example, both the Spiegel Grove and Vandenberg projects were proposed by local 
entrepreneurs but were applied for by local governments—Florida’s Monroe County for 
Spiegel Grove and the City of Key West for Vandenberg. The Navy is currently accepting 
only one application from each state per vessel available for reefing. The first warship 
offered for donation by the Navy for sinking as an artificial reef was Oriskany.
The other ships sunk for reefs have all been MARAD vessels. MARAD recently has 
updated its own program in two ways: first, MARAD will no longer consider for reef-
ing vessels built before 1985; second, vessels that are within twenty-four months of a 
more expeditious method of disposal, such as recycling, will not be included. The 1985 
date ref lects the agency’s concerns about PCB products or components in the sup-
ply stream used in vessel construction or repairs. If these amendments to the program 
are continued, there will certainly be a negative impact on the availability of ships for 
artificial reefs.
These policy amendments were announced to the public in a memorandum dated 
13 April 2012. A recent casualty of this policy change is USS Kawishiwi, a fleet oiler that 
was scheduled to be sunk just off Dana Point Harbor, California. Fortunately, a re-
placement has been found in the same MARAD vessel source, Suisun Bay. USS Willam-
ette will be scuttled at the proposed site, while Kawishiwi will be placed in MARAD’s 
recycling program.
Major Examples of Naval Ships as Artificial Reefs
There are four primary disposal options for retired naval vessels: they can be placed 
in the “mothball fleet,” sold for alternate use, such as to a foreign navy or as a service 
vessel, recycled or scrapped, or used as artificial reefs. Reefing provides an economic 
benefit not only for the U.S. government but also for the state or foreign destination of 
the vessel. The examples below illustrate the potential benefits in terms of disposal costs 
to the government and tourism or recreational value.
The two most recent reefings of naval vessels illustrate the economic benefits. The Navy 
had estimated the cost of scrapping Oriskany at twenty-four million dollars, but it cost 
only nineteen million to scuttle the ship off Pensacola. A 2007 report from the Univer-
sity of West Florida states that the sinking of Oriskany generated nearly four million 
dollars for Pensacola and Escambia County, receiving over 4,200 visits that year. In 
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addition, a Florida State University study estimates that Oriskany, the world’s largest 
artificial reef at the time of its sinking, could generate up to ninety-two million dol-
lars annually from tourists, divers, and sportfishermen. Even if this attraction does not 
generate that much money, utilizing the ship as an artificial reef seems to make good 
financial sense. In the case of the destroyer Radford, the net savings to the Navy were 
several million dollars, aside from immediate profits to the tristate participants.
The following sections discuss the most significant naval vessels used for artificial reefs. 
USS Spiegel Grove was the first vessel of its size to be procured as an artificial reef by 
private industry. USNS General Hoyt S. Vandenberg was the first artificial reef to have 
the specific purpose of education. The Canadian destroyer HMCS Yukon established 
the largest artificial reef of its time, still the largest on the West Coast. USS Kittiwake 
was the first U.S. naval vessel donated to a foreign country for an artificial reef. USS 
Oriskany was the largest naval vessel sunk as an artificial reef and the second largest was 
USS Radford, sunk in 2011. These examples help illustrate the benefits of using retired 
naval vessels as artificial reefs.
USS Spiegel Grove (LSD 32)
The dock landing ship Spiegel Grove spent the greater part of its active service partici-
pating in amphibious exercises along the eastern seaboard and in the Caribbean. Spiegel 
Grove was deployed to the Sixth Fleet from January to June 1964; from 3 November 
1966 to 11 May 1967; and from 17 April to 9 October 1971. This ship was deployed as 
an artificial reef on 17 May 2002, on which occasion it unintentionally sank ahead 
of schedule, leaving a portion of its bow exposed above water. A month later, Spiegel 
Grove was rolled onto its side. It was opened to the public, for recreational divers, on 
26 June 2002.
Spiegel Grove had been proposed to Monroe County, Florida, as an artificial reef by 
local dive industry entrepreneurs, with the primary objective of determining whether 
scuba diving on adjacent natural reef sites could be reduced through the placement of an 
artificial reef. The secondary objective was to stimulate the local economy of Key Largo 
through increased diving-related tourism.24 It was the first proposal of this magnitude 
in size, cost, and potential impact. The proposal, after meeting the preliminary require-
ments of the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, the Army Corps of Engineers, 
and other agencies, was reviewed by Monroe County and submitted for approval con-
secutively with a request for funding.
This proposal lacked any empirical data to support its conclusions. Rather, it relied 
on the data of a 1998 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
study for validation. Several creative debt-recovery strategies were described in the 
navies and soft power  117
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_42 Elleman-Paine:_InDesign:NP_42 06 Ch6Williams.indd  June 17, 2015 4:21 PM
entrepreneurs’ business plan. The narrow scope of use limited the project’s scien-
tific potential; also, it was in need of a postdeployment data-collection strategy. The 
decision-making process appeared to be primarily political, with the intent to stimulate 
the economy of Key Largo and the Upper Keys. However, in the event, preliminary post-
deployment data seem to have supported the project’s hypothesis that the artificial reef 
would relieve use pressure on the surrounding natural reefs and stimulate new popula-
tions of reef fish.25
Given the perceived success of the project, Monroe County appears to have been content 
with its decision-making process. However, since the applicants for Spiegel Grove used 
a primarily volunteer deployment workforce, they encountered several significant 
problems, resulting in delays and miscalculations of revenue needs. The problems of the 
Spiegel Grove deployment were not lost on Monroe County later, when the Vandenberg 
proposal came up for review (see below).
The Reef Environmental Education Foundation (REEF) conducted a fish-monitoring 
study from April 2001 through August 2007, to evaluate the impact Spiegel Grove was 
having on fish populations.26 The overall objective of the study was to assess any changes 
in fish community structure over time—changes not just to the Spiegel Grove site but to 
the surrounding natural reef sites as well. A central biological question about the merits 
of artificial reef deployments is whether they add fish species, in terms of both numbers 
of fish (biomass) and numbers of fish species (biodiversity), to the artificial reef and the 
surrounding natural reef sites. Ultimately, resource managers and other stakeholders 
hope that artificial reefs not only add fish to the targeted site but seed surrounding reefs 
with the reproductive output from the resident fish population.
The scope of REEF’s monitoring study did not address all of these long-term impacts, 
but it is important to understand the concepts behind sinking ships as artificial reefs. 
The method of surveying used by REEF in its study involved the Roving Diver Tech-
nique (RDT), which is specifically designed to produce a list of the frequency and 
abundance of species found by divers swimming throughout the site. REEF conducted 
seventy-six RDT surveys on the Spiegel Grove site and 445 on seven surrounding refer-
ence sites. There were forty-six fish species documented on Spiegel Grove during the 
first month of surveying, April 2001, and by August the number of species had grown 
to sixty-six; the average number of species rose to seventy-six per monitoring event 
thereafter. During each of the monitoring periods individual REEF members added 138 
surveys to the scheduled number. Approximately three years after deployment, the per-
sistence in species composition at the Spiegel Grove site through time had increased to 
levels close to those of the surrounding reefs. A total of 191 species have been document-
ed at Spiegel Grove, of which forty-one were not documented during the monitoring but 
rather during individual survey efforts by volunteers.
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Another aspect of the use of naval vessels for artificial reefs is socioeconomic impact on 
a community. Although this was not addressed in REEF’s work, it is valuable to inquire 
how much extra tourist revenue is generated by the addition of such a destination 
feature as a naval vessel redeployed as an artificial reef. As demonstrated by the Spiegel 
Grove reef site, the biological and socioeconomic impacts can reach beyond those di-
rectly associated with the vessel and spread to indirect impacts, such as relief of pressure 
by scuba divers and other users on nearby sites, and the economic benefits to ancillary 
businesses in support of tourist uses from the artificial reef. Finding answers to these 
socioeconomic questions is critical for guiding future marine resource-management 
decisions on whether to deploy artificial reefs of this type.
USNS General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (T-AGM 10)
On 1 July 1964, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg was acquired by the Navy and designated as 
a missile range instrumentation ship. It was one of ten such ships transferred from the 
Commander, Air Force Eastern Test Range to participate in the Global Atmospheric Re-
search Experiment. Formerly named General Harry Taylor and used for a time as a U.S. 
Army Transport Service vessel, Vandenberg was refitted with extremely accurate and 
discriminating radar and telemetry equipment. On 27 May 2009, Vandenberg became 
the largest artificial reef in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and the second-
largest artificial reef in the world at that time.27
The Vandenberg sinking was proposed to Monroe County, Florida, by an entrepreneur 
interested in creating an artificial reef with a comprehensive list of uses—scientific, edu-
cational, recreational, and economic. This project offered Monroe County an expanded 
socioeconomic base that could involve colleges and universities, the scientific communi-
ty (such as Mote Laboratories, which has a field facility in the Lower Keys), and unique 
economic opportunities for the community. The 1998 NOAA study was used to validate 
the conclusions and projections of the project.
In addition, the Vandenberg team could refer to the success of the Spiegel Grove site in 
Key Largo for its proposal. The most significant difference in strategy for Vandenberg 
was the use of professionals in project development. From cleaning to sinking, the Van-
denberg directors proposed using experienced companies, so as to avoid the costly mis-
takes of the Spiegel Grove project. However, even though they submitted an improved 
project development plan, the backers could not shake off the negative experiences of 
the Spiegel Grove sinking. Monroe County refused to sponsor another artificial reef 
project until debt recovery and postdeployment data could be analyzed. Monroe County 
did agree to provide some badly needed funding for the project after the first year’s 
debt-recovery data demonstrated that the Spiegel Grove reef was ahead of projections.
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HMCS Yukon (DDE 263)
In 1996, the San Diego Oceans Foundation (SDOF) began a precedent-setting program 
to create a Master Plan for Habitat Enhancement (MPHE) for California state waters off 
San Diego County. The intent was to create a broad framework to fulfill the desires of 
fishermen, divers, and scientists for more places to explore, more fish to catch, and spe-
cific sites reserved for habitat enhancement research. The MPHE envisioned four types 
of zones, designed to serve different user needs: six Kelp Enhancement Zones, three 
Research Zones, three Deep Water Economic Zones, and one Shallow Water Economic 
Zone. The concept of an economic zone and underwater recreation area was developed 
to meet these goals for recreational diving, fishing, and scientific research.28
The destroyer HMCS Yukon of the Canadian Forces Maritime Command (today the 
Royal Canadian Navy), scuttled off San Diego during July 2000, is the largest ship ever 
sunk on the West Coast as an artificial reef. It is resting on its port side in a hundred 
feet of water just 1.85 miles west of Mission Beach. It is in a location accessible to divers 
and fishermen, which makes it a favorite recreational area. An estimated ten thousand 
recreational dives were made on it in the first year of its new life as an artificial reef. As 
a result, this facet of the tourism industry in San Diego has flourished since the sinking. 
Most of the divers visiting the Yukon reef are from out of town and spend money locally, 
and by doing so they have increased civic revenues.29
In the fall of 2002, the SDOF proposed a study to determine what effects the Yukon 
sinking had had on tourism in San Diego. It was earlier reported that Yukon had result-
ed in increased recreational use of the artificial reefs in the area known as “Shipwreck 
Alley” by 30 to 40 percent.30 But specific goals and objectives still must be evaluated to 
determine the level of success the project achieved.
The SDOF received in 2005 an ecological assessment from the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography, in the Integrative Oceanography Division of the University of Cali-
fornia, San Diego, in La Jolla.31 The assessment utilized a volunteer-based monitoring 
program to determine the colonization of marine life on the ship to gauge its ecological 
effects. The assessment covered four years, from 2000 to 2004. The data were found to 
be difficult to rely on, provided as they often were by volunteers with differing levels 
of experience in conducting fish counts, taking photographs, and collecting other data 
necessary for the assessment. The report established, however, that the initial coloniz-
ers of the ship were species that had moved from nearby artificial and natural habitats. 
Secondary colonization was ongoing, and consisted of fish that were residential else-
where and have migrated to the ship. These species are generally smaller than the initial 
colonizers, and abundances vary. The Yukon reef provides habitat for adult species of 
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commercial and sport fish, including sheepshead and bocaccio, and also provides nurs-
ery habitat for these species. The SDOF intends to continue the monitoring indefinitely.
Shipwreck Alley is a network of artificial reefs that appear to display “synergistic ben-
eficial effects by increasing forage area,” which gives mobile species the opportunity to 
go from one site to the next.32 However, this assessment indicated that compared with 
the natural habitat in waters off La Jolla, the Yukon fish populations were significantly 
less diverse. However, diversity was increasing and should continue to do so—at least in 
the short term. The stationary communities, such as anemones and filter feeders, were 
abundant but not mature. The algal community was not prolific, likely owing to the 
antifouling paint on the substrate of Yukon’s hull. The assessment did not have the re-
sources to address such bigger questions as whether artificial reefs increase the regional 
fish production or lead to more concentrated fish stocks. The assessment concluded that 
determining whether artificial reefs in Shipwreck Alley are beneficial or detrimental to 
natural habitats will require additional comprehensive studies of artificial reefs.
USS Kittiwake (ASR 13)
Kittiwake was a 1945-vintage submarine rescue ship. The 251-foot, 2,200-ton vessel 
was originally built to rescue sailors from damaged submarines. Kittiwake was the first 
vessel the U.S. Navy donated to a foreign country for an artificial reef. The ship, which 
assisted U.S. submarine operations around the globe for decades, had been anchored 
in recent years among the rusting vessels of the James River Reserve Fleet, commonly 
known as the “Ghost Fleet,” near Fort Eustis, Virginia.
Tourism authorities in the Cayman Islands noted the growth in popularity of scuba div-
ing on wrecks, especially those from World War II. Noticing the draw of wreck diving 
at Truk Lagoon (Micronesia) and Scapa Flow (Scotland), they desired to see whether the 
same economic benefit could make the Cayman Islands into a diving mecca. They re-
quested Kittiwake to join MV Captain Keith Tibbetts, a renamed Koni-class frigate built 
for Cuba by the Soviet Union in 1984 and sunk off Cayman Brac in 1996, now decorated 
with a thick coating of sponges and corals.
Kittiwake was decommissioned on 30 September 1994 and stricken from the Naval 
Vessel Register on the same day. Its title was transferred in November 2008 for an undis-
closed amount to the government of the Cayman Islands. Kittiwake was sunk on a sandy 
bottom off Grand Cayman’s Seven Mile Beach on 5 January 2011. The ship, forty-seven 
feet (fourteen meters) tall, is at a depth of sixty-two feet (nineteen meters), so the top 
deck is fairly close to the surface, easily accessible for snorkelers and divers.
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USS Oriskany (CV 34): “The Mighty O”
On 15 April 1976, with defense budget cuts looming and the aircraft carrier showing 
wear and tear, Oriskany was designated for mothball fleet; it was decommissioned on 
30 September of the same year. Towed to Bremerton, Washington, the aircraft carrier 
remained in reserve until stricken from the Navy list on 25 July 1989 for use as a mu-
seum ship or scrapping. Initially intended for possible sale to Japan as a museum ship, 
the vessel was eventually ordered scrapped and was towed to the Gulf of Mexico. Three 
dismantling contracts were canceled owing to high cost and environmental concerns.
In May 2003, Yukon and Spiegel Grove having been successfully reefed, competition for 
a reef site for Oriskany commenced. On 5 April 2004 Pensacola, in Escambia County, 
Florida, was chosen from among proposed locations that included sites in Florida, Mis-
sissippi, and Texas, and a joint proposal from Georgia / South Carolina. Several other 
destinations in Florida—including the Broward/Miami-Dade County area—also wanted 
the carrier, but because of its long-term naval-aviation heritage Pensacola seemed the 
appropriate choice.
Oriskany became the first U.S. warship deployed as an artificial reef under authority 
granted by the fiscal 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 108-136). 
The Navy announced on 5 April 2004 that it would transfer the former aircraft car-
rier to the state of Florida for use as an artificial reef. Ultimately, on 17 May 2006, after 
many years of planning and hazardous-material cleanup, the carrier was sunk as an 
artificial reef off Pensacola, Florida.
Some ecologists warned that the sinking of Oriskany would unnecessarily risk intro-
ducing PCBs into the food chain. The Navy worked with the Environmental Protection 
Agency to create special guidelines allowing the PCBs to stay. A study by the state of 
Florida is under way to determine whether chemicals are entering the environment. 
Meanwhile, the wreck is being dived on and fished nearly every day. The Oriskany 
reef has attracted at least thirty-eight species of fish, including goliath groupers, mako 
sharks, amberjacks, and red snappers.
USS Radford (DD 968)
The Spruance-class destroyer USS Radford was commissioned on 16 April 1977 and de-
commissioned on 18 March 2003, after serving twenty-six years. Radford was declared 
a candidate for reefing by the Navy in 2006 and was deeded to the state of Delaware. On 
10 August 2011 its hull was scuttled off the coast of Delaware to form part of an artificial 
reef, at a total cost of $945,000.
The Del-Jersey-Land Inshore Reef, about twenty-five miles out in the Atlantic Ocean 
equidistant from Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland, is a joint effort of the three 
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states. It is made up of subway cars, military tanks, and ships. Radford, the latest 
addition, is, at 563 feet long and seventy feet high, the largest vessel to become an 
artificial reef in the Atlantic Ocean. Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland divided the 
million-dollar cost of stripping toxic and recyclable materials from the ship and sinking 
it. Radford is the only multistate reefing project in the country.
Asserting the value of adding a prestigious naval vessel to the local economy, the gov-
ernor of Delaware, Jack Markell, declared in July 2011 that “the Navy destroyer turned 
artificial reef will provide a big boost to tourism—both for anglers and divers. And it 
will turn a sand-covered section of the ocean floor into a rich, new habitat for sea life 
from the bottom of the food chain to the top. He estimated that the reef site will be 400 
times richer in marine diversity than the natural bottom and that changes in the species 
diversity should take place there within days of the sinking.”33 There are already four-
teen artificial reef sites in Delaware Bay and just offshore in the Atlantic Ocean—some 
created from ballasted tires, others from concrete culverts, and still others from surplus 
vessels. Radford is considered the most ambitious reef project Delaware officials have 
undertaken to date.
The Artificial Reef Controversy
As soon as a significant interest is shown in a reefing proposal, many articles usually 
appear denouncing and opposing it. However, most criticism is less about public interest 
than about private gain or loss. There are a few exceptions that merit discussion. One 
controversy caused by the use of derelict vessels concerns whether these potential reefs 
pollute the environment. Opponents argue that the artificial reefs constructed from 
mothballed vessels leak oil and contain hazardous substances, such as asbestos. An ar-
tificial reef program requires that preparation for deployment include a comprehensive 
cleaning, followed by established measurement to ensure that no contaminants will be 
released. Certification that the vessel is “clean” is one of the many steps in the permit-
ting process.
Nevertheless, concern about contamination is justified. For example, the Georgia Strait 
Alliance and other environmental groups have warned that oil and other contaminants 
remain in inaccessible areas of ships, such as crankcases, fuel tanks, and day tanks 
(small tanks that directly supply individual machines). The groups have stated that 
ships sunk have also contained such hazardous materials as asbestos and paint made 
with tributyltin. Other groups, such as the Artificial Reef Society of British Columbia, 
have been more supportive, asserting that the sinking of decommissioned warships 
increases biodiversity and supports diving tourism. Environment Canada (equivalent to 
the EPA in the United States) found in a study conducted two years after sinking a ves-
sel that there were no elevations in the concentrations of any water-quality parameters 
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measured.34 This test has been repeated several times, with similar results. The accepted 
practices for preparing a vessel for use as an artificial reef are considered safe, and are 
monitored by the government agencies charged with environmental oversight.
Another issue is the view that artificial reefs are simply a disguise for ocean dumping. 
Opponents argue that the variety of materials being used in artificial reefs, such as tires 
and concrete blocks, which are heavily regulated by ocean-dumping agreements and 
statutes, are not being properly prepared for use as an artificial reef but simply dumped. 
Strict criteria are needed for creating artificial reefs, including cleaning and proper 
preparation of the material. The United States and the international community have 
promulgated regulatory measures designed to prevent the abuse of artificial reefing. 
These regulations are intended to ensure that fishery habitat enhancement will not 
be used as a pretext for disguised ocean dumping. The international agreements and 
accepted principles of international law, however, provide only discretionary protec-
tion. Guidance over artificial reefs in U.S. waters comprises international standards and 
domestic statutes, in conjunction with agency actions that are often seen as inconsistent, 
thereby creating increased opportunity for disguised ocean dumping.35
The benefits to the environment of artificial reefs are widely acknowledged. An example 
is the case of the Florida Keys. In 1998, the Australian Institute of Marine Science issued 
a report, Status of Coral Reefs of the World, of deteriorating quality in the waters of the 
Keys.36 A meeting of the NOAA Coral Reef Taskforce on 4 May 2006 placed two coral 
species on the Endangered Species List: Acropora palmate (elkhorn coral) and A. cervi-
cornis (staghorn coral).37 However, the NOAA report also noted that the use of artificial 
reefs had contributed to the improvement in conditions. Much of the literature specific 
to the Florida Keys addresses the tendency to “love reefs to death”; this study suggests 
that the use of artificial reefs has in fact significantly lessened the pressures associated 
with tourism on the natural reefs.
Many reports describe in positive terms the carrying capacity of the reef system, focus-
ing on the lessening of pressure on existing reefs and the establishment of artificial 
reefs. In addition, the increased number of corals and filter feeders has improved water 
quality and possibly increased juvenile fish of commercial and sport species, such as 
groupers, and other valuable reef species, such as lobsters. Artificial reefs provide addi-
tional habitats for the development of these and other species that feed the food chain.38
Conclusions
Artificial reefs provide one practical solution to the precipitous decline in marine 
resources. Man-made reefs date back to ancient times. Today, artificial reefs made 
from sunken Navy ships can play an important role in conservation and restoration of 
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natural reefs by relieving pressure of use and establishing habitats to increase ma-
rine life within these miniecosystems. The biological elements necessary to establish 
and sustain marine ecosystems are present in artificial reefs. With proper planning 
and employment strategies, artificial reefs can achieve their intended purposes while 
minimizing unintended consequences. The socioeconomic benefits of artificial reefing 
are paramount. Savings to the U.S. Navy and MARAD in maintaining vessels and the 
cost savings of reefing compared with the alternative disposal options make this option 
increasingly appealing.
In particular, artificial reefs provide an impetus for tourism by supplying alternatives 
to traditional venues, such as natural reefs. Providing variety helps maintain interest in 
an area for reef users.39 The presence of diverse marine life in these areas also provides 
entrepreneurial opportunities for businesses in such sectors as scuba diving, fishing, 
education, research, and ecotourism. These activities, furthermore, require ancillary 
commercial services, such as boat charters, lodging, and food services, all of which 
assist the primary users of artificial reefs, while generating increased revenues. With 
economic growth comes increased competition between businesses. As a result, the reef 
users may benefit from cheaper charter fees.40
Recently, there has been a sharp increase in the use of naval vessels as artificial reefs. 
The cost of scrapping, the low value of salvageable material, and the identified benefits 
of artificial reefing underlie a demand curve that has prompted MARAD and the U.S. 
Navy to expand their efforts to reef retired vessels. As the U.S. Navy actively seeks today 
to reduce the number of inactive ships, more former warships may soon be turned into 
artificial reefs.
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Naval Sonars, Strandings, and Responsible 
Stewardship of the Seas
DARLENE R .  KET TEN
In 1923 Thomas Edison founded what would become the Naval Research Laboratory 
in Washington, D.C. Today the laboratory has a broadly based program of research 
and development and satellite centers, aligned with the Navy’s systems commands. All 
these facilities operate under the Office of Naval Research, established in 1946 with the 
mission of fostering Navy-relevant scientific research. The Office of Naval Research 
allocates nearly two billion dollars in research funds annually to support a wide range 
of scientific programs. Many of these are based at civilian institutions and address basic 
research questions that have little to do directly with immediate mission needs but 
touch on current and future issues that may impact naval operations and effectiveness. 
They range from neuroscience and medicine to climate change and ecology.
Since 2000 there has been a dramatic global increase in U.S. Navy–funded research 
on underwater hearing in marine animals and on the potential for acoustic impacts on 
them. Although strandings of marine mammals have been reported for over two thou-
sand years, scientific and public attention has become focused by a string of stranding 
cases related to naval sonar exercises. In 1996, twelve Cuvier’s beaked whales beached 
on the same day, in rapid succession, on the coast of Kyparissiakos Gulf in western 
Greece. All died. Alliance, a NATO research vessel, had been conducting sonar exercises 
offshore using midfrequency (MFA) and low-frequency (LFA) sonars for several days 
prior to the beachings. Four years later, in March and May 2000, a mass stranding of 
beaked whales occurred, first in the Bahamas and then off Madeira, coincident with 
naval exercises using MFA sonars.1 Subsequent widely publicized events in the Canary 
Islands in 2002 and 2004, off Hawaii in 2004, and in Madagascar in 2008 fueled public 
concern that the use of midrange sonars may be a significant cause of marine mammal 
strandings.2
At present, there are no solid answers about what exactly triggered these whale strand-
ings. Was it the sounds per se, the movements of the ships, a peculiarity of the sound 
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profiles of those areas, a special sensitivity to some aspect of sonar signals in the species 
that stranded, or perhaps a “perfect storm” of some or all of these factors? During the 
past fifteen years there has been a major research effort, funded primarily by the U.S. 
Navy, to understand the mechanisms behind sonar-related strandings, with the ultimate 
goal of preventing future occurrences. The exact relationship between naval sonar and 
strandings remains in some ways perplexing, but there has been significant progress.
Historical Background of Strandings
Aristotle noted the phenomenon of marine strandings in his treatise on animals circa 
350 bc. In ad 1324, a law in England gave all rights over beached, entrapped, or fished 
cetaceans to the Crown.3 From the fifteenth century onward, there are illustrations of 
beached whales in Europe. Clearly, there are abundant natural causes for marine mam-
mals to strand, to die and wash ashore, or to find themselves alive on a beach or in water 
too shallow or with currents and tides too strong for them to return to deeper water, 
particularly if weakened by disease, age, or injury.
The term “stranding” technically refers to an event in which an animal is found alive or 
dead in an “inappropriate” location. Strandings take many forms. One or more animals 
may be beached, well up on the shore or simply near shore in water depths or areas that 
are atypical, such as the case of a normally pelagic (oceanic) species coming into a bay 
or estuary, or they may become entangled in lines or fishing gear at sea. Approximately 
four thousand animals strand annually along the U.S. coast and in American territorial 
waters. Strandings occur singly and in groups. The number of individuals and species 
involved vary widely both by region and by season.4 A “mass stranding” is defined as 
more than two animals, not mother-calf or mother-pup pairs, stranding simultaneously 
or synchronously in close proximity. Therefore, a mass stranding can involve as few 
as three animals or hundreds, and the animals may be, as is true for any stranding, on 
a beach (as in the Greek, Bahamian, and Canary Island cases) or, if normally pelagic, 
sighted in a bay or estuary (as occurred in Hawaii and Madagascar).5 A stranding inci-
dent may be declared an “unusual mortality event” on the basis of several factors: the 
rarity of the species, the number of individuals involved, the location of the species, and 
the numbers stranding and dying in comparison with common patterns for that species. 
These definitions are based on the practices of the Marine Mammal Health and Strand-
ing Response Program of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
National Marine Fisheries Service.6 But this terminology is fairly common in all strand-
ing response networks worldwide.
When a report of a stranding is received, local response network personnel are acti-
vated. They attempt to assist the animal if it is alive. If it is dead or must be euthanized, 
they collect the carcass and record “Level A Data”—observations on the animal’s 
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gender, size, and condition, reports of any known perimortem events, and documenta-
tion of the physical environment near the stranding. Most such reports do not provide 
conclusions on a likely cause of death. Rather, a systematic examination of the body, 
called a necropsy, is performed, on the beach or at an established facility, following an 
established protocol.7 The aim of the necropsy—often involving X-rays, histopathology, 
polymerase chain-reaction studies, and other tests, in addition to gross dissection—is to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the animal’s condition and obtain and assess any 
evidence potentially relating to the cause of death.
Because of the inevitable postmortem loss of tissue integrity; the practical limitations on 
examining large animals under, often, field conditions; and the limited number of per-
sonnel fully trained to perform necropsies, especially in remote areas, complete answers 
are not always possible for every animal. In the last decade, clear causes of death could 
be assigned only in 30–40 percent of all examined cases. Even for unusual mortality 
events, in which numerous experts are brought in to examine every case and the large 
numbers of individuals examined offers a better probability of finding cross correlates, 
causes of death were determined for only 53 percent of events in the past five years.
Any analysis needs to take into account potential biases from sampling error. Human 
population distributions impact reporting of strandings, as shown by comparing 
maps of report locations over time.8 An overwhelming majority occur in the Northern 
Hemisphere, although increasingly there are reports from South America and Oceania. 
As electronic capabilities spread globally, improvements will most likely occur in the 
spread and speed of reporting, as well as in on-site documentation by both the public 
and professionals. This will undoubtedly lead to a truer global picture of these events 
and their causes.
While marine mammals certainly succumb to disease, age, complications in calving, 
habitat disruption, food shortages, predators, and naturally occurring injuries and 
toxins, many are impacted by human activities, particularly through bycatch (animals 
inadvertently caught in nets in large fishing operations), entanglement in lines or 
debris, collision with ships, or occasionally direct attack, such as shootings. There are 
also more subtle but equally mortal human-derived risks, stressors that can be acute or 
cumulative, such as chemical pollutants and noise from boat traffic. Bycatch numbers, 
estimated to range as high as a hundred thousand annually worldwide, account for the 
majority of human-related stranding deaths.9 However, in recent years, as a result of 
better gear design and the use of acoustic warning devices on nets, estimates have 
been reduced to less than two thousand annually, on a par with those related to com-
mercial and scientific whaling. Traditional fisheries capture far fewer animals in hunts 
and drives.
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Noise, historically, is the most common method used to drive or herd marine mammals. 
Aristotle refers to using “a loud and alarming resonance . . . to induce [dolphins] to run 
in a shoal high and dry up on the beach and so to catch them while stupefied with the 
noise.” 10 Such methods continue today in the Taiji drive fisheries in Japan and tradi-
tional hunts in the Faeroe Islands. Depth and fish finders have also been used to bring 
whales to the surface.11 Clearly, multiple human activities have potentially significant 
impacts on whales; human-generated, or anthropogenic, sound is one we are just begin-
ning to appreciate.
Ocean Sound: Natural versus Anthropogenic
The ocean is not naturally silent. Indeed, a quiet ocean is a dead ocean. There are myri-
ads of natural sources of ocean noise, most notably geophysical events—such as earth-
quakes, seafloor spreading, and volcanic activity—most of which produce sounds in the 
seismic or infrasonic domain. Substantial noise is generated by wave action, bubbles, 
and cavitation or is transmitted into the water by ice movements and atmospheric 
events, notably lightning and storms. Some sources, like hydrothermal vents, particular-
ly the “black smokers” in the deep ocean, produce low-frequency “belches” at frequen-
cies of 5–250 hertz (Hz) that raise ambient sound levels by from 20 to 35 decibels (dB).12
By far the largest contributor to natural marine noise, however, is life itself. Marine 
fauna produce sounds ranging from infra- to ultrasonic frequencies at source levels 
higher than 200 dB. Most of these sources are concentrated in the continental shelf 
regions, where 95 percent of all ocean life lives, although there are pelagic and migratory 
species as well. Virtually all marine fauna produce and rely on sound for a broad range 
of critical cues and activities—for example, navigation, detection of prey and predators, 
communication, and mating. The classic Wenz curves provide an excellent summary 
of the relative contribution of biologic versus geophysical and atmospheric sources, as 
well as human sources. They demonstrate graphically how animals evolved to exploit 
less naturally noisy bands for their vocalization frequencies and how human sources are 
competing in some of those bands.13
Atop this background, or “natural ambient,” anthropogenic sources are adding to 
the total noise budget at an ever-increasing pace. According to the findings of a panel 
convened by the Ocean Studies Board under the auspices of the National Academy of 
Sciences, humans are adding significant new noise to the marine environment at a rate 
of 3 dB per decade, although recent data suggest that the rate is slowing as vessel hull 
designs and propulsive systems improve.14 Human contributions to the ocean sound-
scape include vessel noise, industrial operations, sonars (military, navigational, and 
fisheries), and technologies for research and oil and gas exploration that employ seismic, 
explosive, and impulse sources. There is no human activity in the ocean, whether in the 
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coastal or blue-water domain, that does not add noise, either intentionally or as a by-
product. Many of these activities, including defense and commercial shipping, are not 
just beneficial but critical for our modern lives.
Military sonars, which are primarily low- to midfrequency sources ranging 100 Hz to 
8 kilohertz with source levels over 200 dB, have received to date the greatest attention 
in the media, although they are estimated to contribute less than 5 percent to the ocean 
noise budget, according to the Ocean Studies Board.15 Seismic source technologies 
constitute the next-largest source. These are the mainstay of oil and gas exploration and 
include air-gun arrays, impulse sources with peak spectra below 100 Hz. Commercial 
sonar systems are next, in use as navigational aids and as depth sounders for trans-
port, fisheries, tourism, and recreational vessels. These range from low- to midsonic to 
ultrasonic. Source levels are difficult to determine, as exact noise specifications are not 
always provided by manufacturers, but they have been estimated to exceed 230 dB.
Commercial shipping is by far the dominant source of human-generated noise. Virtu-
ally all NATO navies have been reduced over the last two decades, by as much as half in 
all ship categories.16 At the same time, the global merchant marine fleet has increased 
exponentially. Shipping alone is estimated to have increased background noise by 15 
dB in the last fifty years and now accounts for over 50 percent of the total ocean noise 
budget in the Northern Hemisphere. The sounds we are adding may be infrequent or 
constant, narrow or broad spectrum, and they vary in intensity by place and time, rais-
ing the issue of how to evaluate not just immediate or acute effects but also long-term, 
cumulative impacts. In some ocean areas, particularly in fragile coastal habitats, we are 
effectively creating a noise environment akin to that of industrial workplaces.
Beaked Whales: An Aquatic Canary for Sound Impacts?
Most concerns for sonar impacts have focused on beaked whales, specifically on Cu-
vier’s beaked whales (Ziphius cavirostris), as this is the prevalent species in the major-
ity of beachings associated with naval exercises. Systematic analyses of beaked-whale 
strandings have determined that the overall number of whales beached in association 
with any naval activity is relatively low compared with those resulting from all other 
events but also that there is a striking pattern that should be investigated.17 From 1874, 
when international efforts to document beachings began, up to 2004, 136 events involv-
ing a total of 539 beaked whales were recorded. Of these, 126 cases, with 486 animals, or 
90 percent of all recorded beaked-whale strandings, occurred after 1950, implying a loss 
equivalent to approximately eight animals per year for the last sixty years.
Echo-ranging devices were first developed in the early twentieth century, and their de-
velopment gathered momentum to counter submarines in World War I.18 World War II 
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brought sonar to the fore and saw the introduction of hull-mounted systems. By 
the 1960s, surface-ship active scanning sonars with longer pings and greater detec-
tion ranges were common. This period also saw the development of systems that 
exploited bottom-bounce and convergence-path rather than direct-path algorithms, 
again increasing range, followed by systems of different frequencies, notably LFA and 
MFA sonars.
The first atypical Cuvier’s beaked-whale stranding occurred in 1963, near La Spezia, 
Italy, shortly after a new generation of MFA sonars became available. Several review 
panels noted increases in beaked-whale strandings following the initiation of NATO 
LFA sonar trials after 1981.19 Cuvier’s beaked whales were involved in all the cases in 
which sonars were implicated. Prior to 1950, this species had not commonly stranded, 
either singly or en masse.
Although the number of sonar-related beaked-whales beachings averages fewer than 
ten animals per year, it is not the raw number that is important but rather the fact that, 
as the data demonstrate, at least one species can be seriously impacted to the point of 
a mortal hazard by naval sonar exercises. Just as in the human workplace, the demon-
stration of noise hazard led to broader concern for noise in general and its potential for 
stress and physical damage, in this case not to workers but to threatened or endangered 
species, many of which rely nearly exclusively on hearing for survival.
While there is a demonstrable association in time and place between sonar activity and 
beaked-whale strandings, there is as yet no clear explanation of how direct or indirect 
effects of sonar lead to beached animals. One confounding element, one that argues 
against sound per se as the culprit, is the fact that these beachings are rare compared 
with the breadth and number of MFA sonars in use, not only by naval forces, but also 
as commercial devices. Further, no mass beaked-whale beachings have been reported 
near any major naval base, worldwide. Lastly, beaked-whale hearing is not known to be 
exceptionally sensitive at middle to low frequencies in comparison with that of other 
whales. Why then are other and more abundant dolphin and whale species in the areas 
of strandings not similarly impacted?
Until a mechanism explaining the beachings is determined, it is impossible to say 
definitively whether these events represent uniquely a beaked-whale phenomenon. It is 
reasonable to hypothesize that beaked whales are more susceptible to certain kinds of 
anthropogenic sound exposure than are other marine mammals, but there have been 
two other incidents, in Hawaii in 2004 and Madagascar in 2008, in which one other ce-
tacean species, the melon-headed whale (Peponocephala electra), appeared to have been 
impacted by sound. As with the Greek case, the absence of any other evident cause led 
the review panels to conclude that exposure to an intense sound source was the likeliest 
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explanation. However, it was later reported that a mass stranding of melon-headed 
whales had occurred simultaneously with the Hawaiian stranding but several thousand 
miles away, near Rota, in the Mariana Islands, suggesting some unappreciated trigger, 
such as prey movement or lunar cycles, had been the true underlying cause.20
The lack of clear answers for all cases has led to assertions in the press and in legal 
suits that the beaked-whale incidents are merely a harbinger of a serious problem of 
mortalities and broader impacts to a wide range of marine species, potentially at an 
ocean-wide scale. To date, however, there is no direct evidence of broad species or oth-
erwise broad-scale impacts. There is, however, the possibility of widespread undetected 
hearing loss among marine mammals from many anthropogenic sources, and that is a 
legitimate concern.
Noise-Induced Hearing Loss
Noise can cause damage to any ear. But “sound” and “noise” are not the same thing. 
Sound is a physical phenomenon that animals detect via their auditory systems, which 
in turn vary in acuity by species. Noise, by contrast, is defined as an aperiodic signal that 
interferes with sound perception and has a negative physiological or behavioral impact.21
In humans, noise-induced hearing loss (NIHL) is common but varies in onset and 
prevalence across individuals and cultures. Exposure at any age to excessive noise, espe-
cially over the long term, produces temporary or permanent hearing deficits in the form 
of increased threshold—the sound level below which a sound cannot be detected. Ap-
proximately 15 percent of people over twenty years old in the United States have high-
frequency NIHL. By age forty-five, 2 percent have substantial, broad-frequency NIHL, 
and by age seventy-five half have extensive, profound hearing loss from long-term noise 
exposure compounded by presbycusis, age-related auditory system degeneration.22
There is no standard method for predicting absolute hearing loss from excess noise 
exposures, only the probability, based on average hearing abilities. Current U.S. Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration and European regulations attempt to ame-
liorate the probability of NIHL by limiting continuous, eight-hour-workday exposures 
to an ambient sound pressure level (SPL) of 85 dB in air, with a mandatory halving of 
exposure time for each 3 dB increase in ambient SPL. The principal idea is to lessen the 
probability of a traumatic loss by avoiding SPLs that could exceed the dynamic range 
of inner-ear tissues. It is equally important to provide time for recovery from fatigue of 
critical inner-ear components, particularly membranes and cells.
Sounds change as they travel through air or water. The probability of damage depends 
on the characteristics of the sound not at its source but when it is received at the ear, 
including intensity, frequency, duration, whether the signal is impulsive or continuous, 
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and, above all, the subject’s sensitivity at that frequency. Collectively these elements 
result in a physical and physiological response in the middle and inner ear. NIHL is the 
result of damage to the inner ear’s sensory hair cells, which have small fibers that when 
bent by acoustic stimuli trigger a neural response. Hair-cell overstimulation results 
in temporary insensitivity (a temporary threshold shift, or TTS), primarily through 
metabolic exhaustion or tissue fatigue. Permanent hearing loss (permanent threshold 
shift, or PTS) occurs from irreparable structural cell damage in the inner-ear sensory 
cells and membranes, and it leads progressively to irreversible retrograde auditory-nerve 
degeneration. Such damage manifests itself in the inability to hear a given frequency at 
any sound level and can be seen, in postmortem microscopic examinations of the inner 
ear, as “dead zones” in the sensory cell array.
There are some commonalities to the basic mechanisms of NIHL across mammals, even 
though hearing abilities differ. Animals are generally more susceptible to damage at 
their most sensitive frequencies. At any frequency that they can hear, losses will occur 
in relation to, first, the power spectrum of the signal and, at some frequencies, one-third 
octave higher; second, intensity and duration, which can synergistically exacerbate 
losses; and third, impulse noise, which produces greater impacts than does continuous 
noise at equivalent levels.
In laboratory experiments with cats, monkeys, and rodents, threshold shifts as large 
as 50 dB have been produced that returned to normal sensitivity (i.e., TTS), although 
recovery sometimes required as much as thirty days. Exposures that induced shifts of 
over 50 dB typically resulted in PTS. To date there is no means of accurately predicting 
PTS from measures of TTS onsets, particularly for marine mammals, since responses 
to identical exposures vary widely by both species and individuals. Only in experiments 
with genetically identical strains of mice has a close response pattern been found across 
individuals. This suggests that there is a large genetic element for NIHL susceptibil-
ity that complicates conclusions when relatively few individuals are tested in any one 
species.
Hearing curves and TTS data are now available for twelve species of odontocetes 
(toothed whales) and pinnipeds (seals, sea lions).23 Although it is still unclear how 
robust or fragile marine mammal ears are and what their total range is, there is clear 
evidence that despite adaptations for diving and high-pressure environments, they are 
not impervious to permanent noise damage. In audiometric tests of captive animals 
permanent hearing losses have been documented that are consistent with hearing dam-
age from disease, aging, and NIHL. Experiments have also been conducted to determine 
exposure levels that induce small and fully recoverable TTS. Longitudinal studies on 
captive animals demonstrate progressive losses with age and, as in humans, steep losses, 
or “notches,” near the best sensitivities in several marine mammal species.24 Recent 
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postmortem studies of ears from some of these subjects have found evidence of exten-
sive neural losses consistent with long-term profound hearing deficits.25 Ears from some 
beachings also show NIHL and age-related changes, as well as other ear pathologies, 
including labyrinthitis ossificans (a condition in which infections produce bone growth 
that obliterates the inner ear), and evidence of parasitic infestations and chronic middle-
ear disease. All of these are natural hazards for a wild animal, but none are symptomatic 
of acute noise injury.26
Hearing is considered the most important sensory system for most marine species and 
particularly for marine mammals. Studies to date show that marine mammals, like 
other mammals, can be impacted temporarily or permanently by excess noise and that 
the effects may range from mild to profound impairment. Although individual animal 
health is a concern, the critical issue is biological significance, which means population-
level rather than isolated individual impairments. A finding of a single animal with a 
hearing impairment is not a reliable indicator of a population-level impact. However, 
a high incidence of NIHL across genders and ages in any one population would be of 
great concern, as that is not likely to occur through natural processes. Shifting the 
noise budget of the oceans can result in a significant population-level hazard not only 
to marine mammals but also to other species, particularly fishes, if the noise spectrum 
coincides with their best hearing sensitivities. Current data are insufficient to formulate 
population-level noise-hazard criteria. To achieve that level of understanding, broader 
species hearing baselines and monitoring systems need to be developed.
The fact that marine mammals sustain natural hearing loss makes demonstrating a 
direct cause from any anthropogenic source problematic, particularly if few animals 
are examined. To date there has been no demonstrable evidence of direct acute, trau-
matic, disruptive, or profound auditory damage in any marine mammal as the result of 
anthropogenic noise exposure, including to sonar.27 This does not negate concern that 
it could happen, but it does underscore the need for a better understanding of the many 
facets and consequences of sound use. What the examinations of the beached animals 
do show is that even in the absence of any demonstrable auditory trauma, nonauditory 
effects can range from behavioral disruption to incidental trauma or even death, and 
they are an equally important element to consider.
Controversial Theories about Sonar Impacts
The apparent susceptibility of beaked whales to sonar-related stranding triggered a 
search for mechanisms that could explain why they, of all the marine mammal species, 
are especially vulnerable. It is unclear whether sonar and ship movements played direct 
roles in the pathologies documented in the Bahamian, Greek, and Canary Island cases, 
as opposed to attendant stress and trauma from beaching or some other action the 
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exposures induced. Key questions remain about what to mitigate: direct sound expo-
sure, a behavioral response to sound exposure, a physiological process set in motion by 
sound exposure, the physical impacts of beaching, or some combination of the above.
Necropsies of beached beaked whales showed blood deposits within the inner ears, 
hemorrhaging in the subarachnoid space surrounding the brain, the presence of blood 
in the orbits and oral cavity, and hemorrhages in fatty tissues and in some cerebral ven-
tricles. Some animals in the 2002 Canary Islands incident were reported to have widely 
disseminated intravascular bubbles.28 This was also reported in a retrospective study 
of archived specimens of several species of stranded animals in the United Kingdom.29 
There is a substantial probability that some of these findings are artifacts of a suite of 
complicated processes including salvage, transport, and storage as well as variable pre- 
and postmortem environments.
One workshop summarized possible impacts as follows: a behavioral avoidance re-
sponse to sound leading directly to beaching; maladaptive dive responses (rapid ascent, 
staying at depth, remaining at the surface) leading to air emboli, hypoxia, hyperthermia, 
cardiac arrhythmia, hypertensive hemorrhage, or other trauma; and tissue damage or 
other physiological effects resulting directly from sound exposure (acoustically medi-
ated bubble formation and growth, vestibular responses, tissue resonances, bleeding 
diathesis, disseminated coagulopathy, or vascular fragility).30
At this stage, nothing should be ruled out without a careful, balanced assessment, 
but it is important to focus on mechanisms consistent with the greatest number of 
significant observations across cases. For example, there is considerable debate over 
the suggestion of lethal effects of emboli based on observations of bubbles postmor-
tem. Direct acoustic induction of bubble formation and the possibility of bubbles being 
related to a decompression-like, or “bends,” phenomenon in whales were assessed in a 
recent workshop of marine mammal and dive physiologists.31 Diagnosis of decompres-
sion sickness requires the presence of several features lacking in the animals examined.32 
The presence of bubbles per se and in isolation is not sufficient to give a diagnosis of 
decompression sickness.33 Intravascular air bubbles, or air emboli, in dived animals, 
including humans, are a common phenomenon and are not in themselves dangerous.34 
They have also been shown to form and increase with postmortem time in experiments 
with animals “dived” in hyperbaric chambers. Postdiving, air comes out of solution, 
forming small bubbles in the blood that travel to the lungs and are released via the respi-
ratory process. Bubbles in postmortem animals observed in necropsies are most likely 
related to the cessation by death of normal off-gassing processes by the lungs, resulting 
in bubbles that continue to grow in number and size throughout the body. A cascade 
of bubble formation could be set off in such cases by nicking a vessel, as is common 
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in a necropsy, introducing a small amount of air that sets off an avalanche of bubble 
formation.35 Other workshops found that tissue resonances at any sonar frequency are 
insufficient to produce trauma at even the level of the capillary bed, let alone to account 
for the hemorrhages reported.
These debates are good examples of how the process of hypothesis, scientific inquiry, 
and review can work effectively. A number of studies are now under way to monitor 
blood gases, lung collapse, structural variations in airways, and vasculature of marine 
mammals.36 Further, necropsy procedures are being standardized both to regularize re-
ports of presence of bubbles and to introduce procedures that will minimize artifacts.37 
It is not clear, however, when, if ever, the debates will be resolved to the satisfaction of 
all parties.
One important ongoing area study is on the behavioral effects of sound on beaked 
whales. The Behavioral Response Study research program is an international con-
sortium of acousticians, engineers, observers, and behaviorists engaged in a series of 
five-year projects involving field measurements of the response of tagged beaked whales 
to sonar and control sounds.38 The studies entail deployment of a vertical-array sound 
source for controlled sound exposures of tagged focal animals for up to several hours, 
during which they are subjected to different signals and source levels. Results to date 
have provided our first glimpse into the highly variable responses across species to the 
same stimulus under equivalent conditions. It is now clear that beaked whales have a 
characteristic avoidance response, but it is not specific to sonar—it occurs with any 
novel sound. By contrast, pilot whales gravitate toward novel stimuli.
Estimating Impacts in the Wild
At present, any activity that may impact marine mammals requires an environmental 
impact study and estimation of potential “Level A” and “Level B” incidental events, 
commonly referred to as harassments, or “takes.” Level A is defined as activity that has 
the potential to injure a marine mammal stock in the wild. Level B is the potential to 
disturb a marine mammal stock by causing disruption of behavioral patterns, including, 
but not limited to, migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering. Level 
B in particular is quite broad; it may represent anything from a simple shift of attention, 
equivalent to noting a car (or ship) passing by, to a substantial disruption of behavior 
that will endanger several animals. The first National Research Council (NRC) report 
on the subject, in 1994, commented that as “researchers develop more sophisticated 
methods for measuring the behavior and physiology of marine mammals . . . , it is likely 
that detectable reactions, however minor and brief, will be documented at lower and 
lower received levels of human-made sound.” A later NRC report, from 2000, concluded 
that it “does not make sense to regulate minor changes in behavior having no adverse 
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impact; rather, regulations must focus on significant disruption of behaviors critical to 
survival and reproduction.” The next NRC report concerned with ambient noise, pub-
lished in 2003, stated that the previous recommendations were still relevant.39
The consensus of the successive NRC committees is that the definition should raise the 
threshold of harassment from detectable individual responses to biologically signifi-
cant—that is, at the population level—events. One consequence of using gaugeless indi-
vidual responses as a metric is misinterpretation of the number of estimated potential 
“takes,” particularly in the popular press. A recent example of this is a series of articles 
appearing in the New York Times from October through December 2012 that seized 
on the maximal number of potential incidental takes in a Navy environmental impact 
study as an indication that millions of animals would be grievously harmed by proposed 
Navy activities.
One New York Times editorial asserted that a weapons training and testing program 
had a potential for thirty-three million “takes,” but it failed to explain that this number 
derives from a calculation of each possible perception by any single animal for any un-
derwater sound generated in excess of natural ambient levels by the proposed operation, 
regardless of the level received and absent any observable effect. Nor did the editorial 
consider that the permitting process rigorously evaluates potential “takes” according to 
severity, examining carefully the possibility of an animal’s being significantly disturbed 
or harmed, before any permit is issued. The reader is left with an impression of incalcu-
lable numbers of ruptured eardrums, extensive hearing loss, resultant ship strikes, and 
deaths from “sonic chaos.” 40
Popular-press articles like this bolster claims that marine mammal mortalities from 
sound are underestimated. Several lawsuits have asserted that whales are killed by 
sound and sink rapidly, disappearing without any indication of the event. This is a deni-
al of the physiology of death. Bodies initially sink, but they typically refloat within a few 
days. After days or weeks, as decomposition progresses, they expand, lose body-wall in-
tegrity, and finally sink again.41 The timeline varies depending on water temperature, as 
well as such other factors as gut content, amount of body fat, scavengers, and so on, but 
there is no reason to expect this process to be substantially different for a whale, which 
postmortem becomes a well-insulated, warm carcass that fosters bloat and refloating.
Several lawsuits brought against both the military and research institutions have as-
serted that they are not meeting the requirements of the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act (MMPA). One sought to halt LFA deployments on the basis of the Bahamian cases 
of beaked-whale beachings involving midrange sonars. To date there is no evidence 
of strandings related to use of LFA sonars in isolation. Nevertheless, this lawsuit was 
successful. Furthermore, much of the suit’s discussion centered on the potential for 
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excessive numbers of takes and inadequate appreciation of posited impacts, as well as 
failure to follow the normal procedures for submission and review of an impact assess-
ment under Endangered Species Act (ESA) and MMPA regulations and definitions.
While such suits are motivated by sincere concerns, their potential impacts are quite 
broad. The issue of restrictions on sound sources is not simply a military matter. Liabili-
ties and costs related to ESA and MMPA permitting are a common problem for every 
endeavor, whether currently regulated or not, that involves the use of sound in the seas, 
including research, exploration, resource development, and commercial shipping.
It is appropriate for any entity operating in the oceans to proceed with care. Sonar 
exercises have, as the public well appreciates, resulted in serious and regrettable distur-
bances that led to strandings and deaths of marine animals. High-profile events like 
the dramatic beachings in the Bahamas are being construed as global events, in terms 
of both species affected and numbers of harmful sound sources. One recent counter-
productive victory was a lawsuit by which an experiment to test the audibility of sonars 
intended to protect whales from ship strikes was halted, with the result that the project 
was subsequently abandoned.
Realistically, it is virtually impossible to eliminate all acoustic impacts from all endeav-
ors for all marine mammals. Therefore, the key issues that must be assessed are: What 
combination of frequencies and sound pressure levels are needed for each anthropogen-
ic acoustic task? What species are present in the area the device will ensonify at levels 
exceeding ambient? What is the probable severity of any potential impact to exposed 
marine mammals from the combined frequency-intensity-temporal characteristics of 
the source? Above all, are these factors likely to produce any biologically significant 
impact to any marine species?
In the most recent NRC report, published in 2005, a major recommendation was to 
structure future research on marine mammals to assist predictions of population-
level consequences.42 Individual effects are inputs to the database, but the true issue is 
biological significance, which implies a species- or population-level effect deriving from 
impacts that are capable of altering the viability of a significant portion of the popula-
tion. Just as with injury, biologically significant alterations are the appropriate determi-
nants for behavioral harassment criteria.
Conclusions
There is no denying that anthropogenic noise has the potential to harm marine life. The 
results from the last decade of intense research efforts on this issue show that anthropo-
genic noise, intentional or incidental, can be biologically significant, disrupting critical 
behaviors in ways like abandonment of feeding grounds, corruption of communication 
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signals, and alteration of migration routes, and in some rare cases, causing distress 
to marine mammals to the point of beaching. It is the responsibility of the media and 
scientists alike to report events fully and responsibly, to assist in educating the public 
about the foundations for and extent of legitimate concerns, and to prevent the “media-
fueled” rounds of hearings and litigation that were experienced in connection with 
acoustic testing off Heard Island near Antarctica, the Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean 
Climate experiments, and now military sonars.43 At this time, there is no clear demon-
stration of a population-level impact on any marine mammal species from any acoustic 
event; nevertheless, the sonar-related beaching cases have clearly raised valid concerns 
that warrant a full explanation. As the 2005 National Research Council report stated, 
“On the one hand, sound may represent only a second-order effect on the conservation 
of marine mammal populations; on the other hand, what we have observed so far may 
be only the first early warnings or ‘tip of the iceberg’ with respect to sound and marine 
mammals.” 44 The remaining uncertainties in these cases is the root cause of much of the 
fear of dire consequences of noise in the oceans.
Although many questions remain, the research to date has provided some clear answers, 
and equally important, it has shown how essential a strong, collaborative research pro-
gram on sound and its impacts is to protecting marine life and the health of our oceans. 
Thus far, the research on sonar impacts has been supported nearly entirely by funding 
from the Marine Mammal Program of the Office of Naval Research, the Energy and 
Environmental Readiness Division of the Chief of Naval Operations staff, and, recently, 
the U.S. Navy’s newly formed Living Marine Resources Program. Much of this research 
was directed at assisting the U.S. Navy to understand the core hazards to marine life 
associated with maritime operations and how to avoid or at the least mitigate those 
risks. However, the insights and technologies this work has fostered are providing our 
first clear glimpse of how whales operate at depth and over time. These Navy-funded 
research programs quickly expanded knowledge of marine mammal hearing and 
produced innovations in underwater acoustic propagation models, tags for monitoring 
animals at depth, and increasingly sophisticated operational aids for detecting and pre-
dicting movements of individual animals at sea. These innovations assist not only the 
Navy but also shipping, fisheries, and research to reduce bycatch and ship strikes and to 
monitor migration patterns, essential behaviors, and population trends. These programs 
determined critical sound exposure limits and supported development of technologies 
to test wild stranded animals on-site for hearing loss and injury. Remote sensors now 
allow us to monitor individual free-ranging animals for changes in dive patterns and 
physiology in response to sound.
Continuing such broad-based programs of basic and applied research is critical to 
understanding of not just sonar impacts but a far greater range of potential hazards to 
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ocean life. Parameterizing hazards is essential for the informed risk assessments that 
are part of this endeavor. There is an undeniable hazard to some marine mammals 
from any underwater noise at some level and in some location, but the focus must be 
shifted from the impossible goal of avoiding any possible individual impact to one with 
a greater perspective. Such a shift, backed by data and implemented with caution and 
judicious oversight, can prevent stagnation and provide a path forward on the basis of 
an understanding of what can be achieved without substantive harm and of clear and 
valid limits for responsible stewardship of the oceans.
Notes
1. D. L. Evans and G. R. England, Joint Interim 
Report Bahamas Marine Mammal Stranding 
Event of 15–16 March 2000 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration [NOAA], National Marine 
Fisheries Service, and U.S. Navy Dept., 2001); 
L. Freitas, “The Stranding of Three Cuvier’s 
Beaked Whales Ziphius cavirostris in Madeira 
Archipelago: May 2000,” ECS Newsletter 42 
(2004), pp. 28–32.
2. A. Frantzis, “Does Acoustic Testing Strand 
Whales?,” Nature 392 (1998), p. 29; A. 
D’Amico and W. Verboom, eds., “Report 
of the Bioacoustics Panel,” SACLANTCEN 
Bioacoustics Panel, La Spezia, Italy, 15–17 
June 1998; D. R. Ketten et al., “Cranial Trauma 
in Beaked Whales,” in Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Active Sonar and Cetaceans (n.p.: 
ECSN, 2003), pp. 21–27; A. D’Amico et al., 
“Beaked Whale Strandings and Naval Exer-
cises,” Aquatic Mammals 35, no. 4 (2009), pp. 
452–72; A. Fernández et al., “Last ‘Atypical’ 
Beaked Whales Mass Stranding in the Canary 
Islands (July, 2004),” Journal of Marine Science 
Research & Development 2 (2012), p. 107. See 
also D. R. Ketten, Beaked Whale Necropsy 
Findings for Strandings in the Bahamas, Puerto 
Rico, and Madeira, 1999–2002, Technical 
Publication WHOI-2005-09 (Woods Hole, 
Mass.: Woods Hole Oceanographic Institu-
tion, 2005).
3. Natural History Museum, Out of the Blue: 
The UK Whale & Dolphin Stranding Scheme 
(London: Dept. of Zoology, 2005), available at 
www.nhm.ac.uk/.
4. “National Marine Mammal Stranding Pro-
gram,” Marine Mammal Health and Stranding 
Response Program, mmhsrp.nmfs.noaa.gov/.
5. For Madagascar, “Independent Review of a 
2008 Mass Stranding in Madagascar,” Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, [2008], iwc 
.int/. For Hawaii, “July 2004 Mass Stranding 
of Melon-Headed Whales in Hawai‘i,” NOAA 
Fisheries Office of Protected Resources, 2004, 
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/.
6. “Strandings,” NOAA Fisheries Feature, www 
.nmfs.noaa.gov/.
7. N. Young, ed., Odontocete Salvage, Necropsy, 
Ear Extraction, and Imaging Protocols (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Office of Naval Research and 
NOAA Fisheries, 2007), available at csi.whoi 
.edu/.
8. D’Amico et al., “Beaked Whale Strandings and 
Naval Exercises.”
9. A. Read, P. Drinker, and S. Northridge, By-
catches of Marine Mammals in US Fisheries 
and a First Attempt to Estimate the Magnitude 
of Global Marine Mammal By-catch (Woking, 
Surrey, U.K.: WWF-UK, 2006); A. Read, “The 
Looming Crisis: Interactions between Marine 
Mammals and Fisheries,” Journal of Mammal-
ogy 89, no. 3 (2008), pp. 541–48.
10. Aristotle, The History of Animals, trans. 
D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson (Oxford, U.K.: 
Clarendon, 1910), p. 231.
11. Roger Payne, Among Whales (New York: 
Scribner’s, 1995), p. 431.
12. Decibels are a measure of sound pressure 
and intensity. Pressure and intensity are both 
calculated with respect to a reference pres-
sure. The reference pressures used in these 
measures differ in air and water. For airborne 
sound, the reference is twenty micropascals, 
written “re 20 µPa.” For underwater sound, the 
reference pressure is re 1 µPa. Consequently, 
142  the newport papers
a sound in air and in water that has the same 
intensity (acoustic power per unit area) has 
decibel values that differ by 61.5 dB—that is, 
a sound measured in air at 100 dB re 20 µPa 
would have a decibel value of 162 dB re 1 µPa 
in water.
13. G. M. Wenz, “Acoustic Ambient Noise in 
the Ocean: Spectra and Sources,” Journal of 
the Acoustical Society of America 34, no. 12 
(1962), pp. 1936–56.
14. National Research Council [hereafter NRC], 
Ocean Noise and Marine Mammals (Washing-
ton, D.C.: National Academies, 2003).
15. Ibid.
16. Bryan McGrath, Nato at Sea: Trends in Allied 
Naval Power (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute, 18 September 2013), 
available at www.aei.org/.
17. D’Amico et al., “Beaked Whale Strandings and 
Naval Exercises.”
18. A. D’Amico and D. Pittenger, “A Brief History 
of Active Sonar,” Aquatic Mammals 35, no. 4 
(2009), pp. 426–34.
19. NRC, Low-Frequency Sound and Marine 
Mammals: Current Knowledge and Research 
Needs (Washington, D.C.: National Academy, 
1994); NRC, Marine Mammals and Low-
Frequency Sound: Progress since 1994 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000); 
NRC, Ocean Noise and Marine Mammals; T. 
M. Cox et al., “Understanding the Impacts of 
Anthropogenic Sound on Beaked Whales,” 
Journal of Cetacean Research and Management 
(2005).
20. T. Jefferson et al., “An Unusual Encounter with 
a Mixed School of Melon-Headed Whales 
(Peponocephala electra) and Rough-Toothed 
Dolphins (Steno bredanensis) at Rota, North-
ern Mariana Islands,” Micronesica 38 (2006), 
pp. 239–44.
21. K. D. Kryter, Handbook of Hearing and the Ef-
fects of Noise (New York: Academic, 1996); N. 
Slepecky, “Overview of Mechanical Damage 
to the Inner Ear: Noise as a Tool to Probe Co-
chlear Function,” Hearing Research 22 (1986), 
pp. 307–21.
22. “Quick Statistics,” National Institutes of Health: 
National Institute on Deafness and Other Com-
munication Disorders (NIDCD), www.nidcd 
.nih.gov/.
23. B. L. Southall et al., “Marine Mammal 
Noise Exposure Criteria: Initial Scientific 
Recommendations,” Aquatic Mammals 33, no. 
4 (2007).
24. S. H. Ridgway and D. A. Carder, “Hearing 
Deficits Measured in Some Tursiops truncatus 
and the Discovery of a Deaf/Mute Dolphin,” 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 
101 (1997), pp. 590–94; R. J. Schusterman, 
B. L. Southall, D. Kastak, and C. Reichmuth, 
“Age-Related Hearing Loss in Sea Lions and 
Their Scientists,” Journal of the Acoustical Soci-
ety of America 111 (2002), pp. 2342–43.
25. D. R. Ketten, “Marine Mammal Auditory Sys-
tem Noise Impacts: Evidence and Incidence,” 
in “The Effects of Noise on Aquatic Life,” ed. 
A. Popper and A. Hawkins, special issue, Ad-
vances in Experimental Medicine and Biology 
730 (2012), pp. 207–12.
26. Ketten et al., “Cranial Trauma in Beaked 
Whales,” pp. 21–27.
27. D’Amico et al., “Beaked Whale Strandings 
and Naval Exercises,” pp. 453–72; Ketten et 
al., “Cranial Trauma in Beaked Whales,” pp. 
21–27.
28. A. Fernández, “Pathological Findings in 
Stranded Beaked Whales during the Naval 
Military Manoeuvres near the Canary 
Islands,” in “Proceedings of the Workshop 
on Active Sonar and Cetaceans,” ed. P. G. H. 
Evans and L. A. Miller, special issue, European 
Cetacean Society Newsletter, no. 42 (2004), pp. 
37–40.
29. P. D. Jepson et al., “Gas-Bubble Lesions in 
Stranded Cetaceans,” Nature 425, no. 6958 
(2003), pp. 575–76; P. D. Jepson et al., “Acute 
and Chronic Gas Bubble Lesions in Cetaceans 
Stranded in the United Kingdom,” Veterinary 
Pathology 42 (2005), pp. 291–305.
30. Cox et al., “Understanding the Impacts of 
Anthropogenic Sound on Beaked Whales.”
31. S. K. Hooker et al., “Deadly Diving? 
Physiological and Behavioural Management 
of Decompression Stress in Diving Mammals,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B (2012).
32. A. Brubakk and T. Neuman, Bennett and El-
liotts’ Physiology and Medicine of Diving, 5th 
ed. (New York: Elsevier, 2002); C. Edmonds 
et al., Diving and Subaquatic Medicine, 4th ed. 
(London: Arnold, 2002), p. 719.
33. C. A. Piantadosi and E. D. Thalmann, “Pathol-
ogy: Whales, Sonar and Decompression Sick-
ness,” Nature 428, no. 6984 (15 April 2004), 
p. 716ff.
navies and soft power  143
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_42 Elleman-Paine:_InDesign:NP_42 07 Ch7Ketten.indd  June 25, 2015 12:54 PM
34. Z.-L. Jiang et al., “Flow Velocity in Carotid 
Artery in Humans during Immersions and 
Underwater Swimming,” Undersea and Hyper-
baric Medicine 21, no. 2 (1994), pp. 159–67; 
Edmonds et al., Diving and Subaquatic 
Medicine; M. Ferrigno, “Breath-Hold Diving,” 
in Bove and Davis’ Diving Medicine, ed. A. A. 
Bove (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 2004), pp. 
77–93.
35. There are a great many other postmortem 
processes, such as bacterial activity, that 
produce bubbling and froth. See W. U. Spitz, 
ed., Spitz and Fisher’s Medicolegal Investiga-
tion of Death: Guidelines for the Application 
of Pathology to Crime Investigation, 3rd ed. 
(Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1993), 
p. 829; R. S. Cotran, V. Kumar, and T. Collins, 
Robbins Pathologic Basis of Disease, 6th ed. 
(Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1999), p. 1425.
36. G. L. Kooyman, P. Ponganis, and R. Howard, 
“Diving Animals,” in The Lung at Depth, ed. 
C. Lundgren and J. Miller (New York: Marcel 
Dekker, 1999), pp. 587–620.
37. Young, Odontocete Salvage, Necropsy, Ear 
Extraction, and Imaging Protocols.
38. B. Southall et al., “Marine Mammal Behavioral 
Response Studies in Southern California,” 
Advances in Technology and Experimental 
Methods, Marine Technology Society Journal 
46, no. 4 (2012), pp. 48–59.
39. NRC, Ocean Noise and Marine Mammals.
40. “Marine Mammals and the Navy’s 5-Year 
Plan,” New York Times, 12 October 2012.
41. Spitz, Medicolegal Investigation of Death.
42. NRC, Marine Mammal Populations and Ocean 
Noise: Determining When Noise Causes Bio-
logically Significant Effects (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academies, 2005), p. 15.
43. W. Munk et al., “The Heard Island Feasibil-
ity Test,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of 
America 96 (1994), pp. 2330–42; J. R. Potter, 
“ATOC: Sound Policy or Enviro-vandalism? 
Aspects of a Modern Media-Fueled Policy Is-
sue,” Journal of Environment and Development 
3 (1994), pp. 47–76.
44. NRC, Marine Mammal Populations and Ocean 
Noise, p. 15.

U.S. Coast Guard Response to the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill
REAR ADM. MARY L ANDRY,  U.S .  C OAST GUARD (RETIRED)
Navies and coast guards can respond in nonmilitary ways to natural, and especially 
man-made, disasters. On 20 April 2010, the BP (formerly British Petroleum) Deepwater 
Horizon offshore oil rig caught fire in the Gulf of Mexico, about 250 miles to the south 
and east of Houston, Texas. The fire could be seen thirty-five miles away. Eleven of the 
126 crew members on board the oil rig perished. From 20 April through 19 September 
2010, when the wellhead was finally sealed, an estimated 4.2 million barrels of oil 
leaked out of the five-thousand-foot-deep well, creating the largest offshore oil spill in 
U.S. history.
The exact cause of the blowout is still being investigated. One study of the accident was 
initiated by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Minerals Management Service on 22 
April 2010, only two days after the accident and the same day the Deepwater Horizon rig 
collapsed into the water and sank to the bottom of the Gulf.1 It appears, on the basis of 
this study and other scientific reports, that human error was to blame—technicians on 
the surface misread the fluid pressure data from the oil well below. Once the accident 
occurred, the rig’s “blowout preventer” refused to close properly, which meant that leak-
ing oil could not be contained. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling report, released on 5 January 2011, blamed the accident 
on human error, specifically risky decisions based on a desire to save time and money.2
USCG ships and personnel were among the first responders to the explosion and 
oil spill. Not only did the Coast Guard help ensure the safety of the remaining crew 
members as they evacuated the rig, but it initiated a maritime search for those who 
were missing. Most important, it became the first point of contact for coordinating 
disaster-response efforts. Rear Adm. Mary Landry, commander of the Eighth Coast 
Guard District, headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, was the top Coast Guard of-
ficial coordinating a field response that at its height involved over forty-seven thousand 
people from federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector agencies and the international 
C
H
A
PT
ER
 E
IG
H
T
146  the newport papers
community in what she has described as the largest fully integrated response this coun-
try has undertaken using the incident command system. After setting the scene of the 
accident, this chapter will examine the national response to Deepwater Horizon, mainly 
from Rear Admiral Landry’s perspective.
The Blowout, Fire, and Oil Spill on Deepwater Horizon
On 2 April 2010, just eighteen days before the Deepwater Horizon accident, President 
Barack Obama stated in a North Carolina speech that offshore oil drilling was “techno-
logically very advanced” and that “oil rigs today generally don’t cause spills.” 3 While, as 
noted, the exact circumstances that led to Deepwater Horizon’s blowout, fire, and subse-
quent oil spill are still under dispute—legal wrangling could continue for years, perhaps 
even decades, to fix responsibility for the accident and to determine appropriate fines 
and compensation—it is quite clear in hindsight that President Obama was too optimis-
tic, as were the federal regulators overseeing offshore drilling and the companies that 
were pushing the technological edge in drilling ever farther offshore and at ever deeper 
depths. The nation had seen fewer spills and vastly improved response actions as a 
result of Exxon Valdez and the subsequent Oil Pollution Act of 1990. But it had become 
complacent; also, certainly, no containment system had been developed, tested, and 
proven to secure a blowout taking place a mile below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Before turning to a description of the cleanup effort and the impact of the oil spill on 
the environment, it will be useful to describe the drilling site, the equipment being used, 
and the likely causes of the accident. These details are relevant for understanding why 
the U.S. Coast Guard made many of its later decisions on how best to respond to the oil 
spill. The Deepwater Horizon oil rig was a fifth-generation, deepwater, semisubmersible, 
mobile, offshore drilling unit. It was designed to drill subsea wells to explore for new 
oil fields in waters up to eight thousand feet deep; it was one of only a handful of oil rigs 
in the world capable of drilling at depths of over five thousand feet. Deepwater Horizon 
had been built for R&B Falcon, Inc. (a firm that provides marine drilling-rig services), 
by Hyundai Heavy Industries in Ulsan, South Korea. Construction began in December 
1998, the keel was laid on 21 March 2000, and the platform was delivered on 23 Febru-
ary 2001, soon after the acquisition of R&B Falcon by Transocean Ltd. Transocean then 
leased the oil rig to BP on a three-year contract for deployment in the Gulf of Mexico; 
the contract was renewed a number of times, ultimately through 2013. BP paid a daily 
fee of over $500,000 for the use of this platform.4 
Deepwater Horizon worked on wells in several oil fields before moving to the Macondo 
Prospect in February 2010, soon after BP acquired drilling rights there in 2009. This 
field begins about forty-one miles off the southeast coast of Louisiana and lies under 
approximately five thousand feet of water. By 20 April, drilling of an exploratory well at 
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this location had been technically “concluded”; engineers were in the final stages of seal-
ing the wellhead when the accident took place.5
At 9:45 pm central time on 20 April 2010, a geyser of seawater erupted approximately 
240 feet into the air. Such an event is called a “blowout.” This one appears to have been 
caused by human error—engineers, thinking the methane gas pressure in the well was 
significantly lower than it really was, began to replace the heavier drilling fluid with 
lighter seawater, which proved insufficiently dense to contain the release of methane. 
When the blowout occurred, a mixture of water, mud, and methane gas was ejected. 
After the methane ignited, this caused a series of explosions and then an enormous 
fireball. Engineers on the rig attempted to activate the blowout preventer, which would 
normally have cut off the gas flow, but the device failed. The preventer had apparently 
sustained damage in the initial event—it is not known for sure.
One of the many contractors that had employees working on the rig was Halliburton. 
One of the main jobs of the Halliburton workers was to seal the wellhead with concrete. 
Drilling had fallen six weeks behind schedule, however, and when it came time to fin-
ish the wellhead the “steps required to form a cement seal in the well were shortened 
or skipped, and the usual test on the cement was eliminated.” 6 In addition, software 
modeling by a Houston-based Halliburton engineer named Jesse Gagliano showed that 
twenty-one centralizers needed to be used, and there were only six on board Deepwater 
Horizon: “Installing the extra centralizers would take up to ten hours, considerable time 
on a rig that was costing BP a million dollars a day to lease and operate.”7 To save time, 
the extra centralizers were not added. Arguably, it was the combination of these short-
cuts that resulted in the blowout.
At the time of the explosion there were 126 crew on board: seven were employees of BP, 
seventy-nine of Transocean, and many others working for contractors like Hallibur-
ton, Anadarko, and M-I SWACO. Eleven workers went missing and “were never found 
despite a three-day Coast Guard (USCG) search and rescue operation” and so were 
presumed dead.8 The eleven who died were two mud engineers, Gordon Jones and Keith 
Blair Manuel; a driller, Dewey Revette; a toolpusher, Jason Anderson; a crane operator, 
Aaron Dale Burkeen; two assistant drillers, Donald Clark and Stephen Ray Curtis; three 
floor hands, Karl Kleppinger, Jr., Shane Roshto, and Adam Weise; and a derrick hand, 
Roy Wyatt Kemp. Most were young, in their twenties and thirties; Keith Manuel was the 
oldest, at fifty-six, driller Dewey Revette next, at forty-eight.9 
The oil rig was immediately evacuated, and numerous injured workers were airlifted 
to medical facilities. Seventeen of the survivors suffered serious injuries. Investigations 
into the causes of the accident revealed that senior Transocean officials had authorized 
safety alarms on Deepwater Horizon to be “inhibited,” since “they did not want people 
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woken up at three o’clock in the morning due to false alarms.” The long-term impact of 
this decision was that on the day of the accident “visual and sound alarms which should 
have gone off when sensors detected fire or combustible or toxic gases did not warn 
workers of impending danger.”10 
After burning for approximately thirty-six hours, Deepwater Horizon sank on 22 April 
2010, which, coincidentally, was Earth Day. Wreckage from the rig was found resting on 
the seafloor about 1,300 feet, or about a quarter of a mile, to the north and west. Mean-
while, oil continued to seep out of the wellhead. Several efforts to cap the well failed. 
The oil spill lasted for eighty-seven days before it was finally capped on 15 July 2010. 
Relief wells were then drilled so as to seal the well permanently. The well was declared 
“effectively dead” on 19 September 2010. Although estimates differ, the total spill size 
was about five million barrels (210 million U.S. gallons), making Deepwater Horizon the 
largest accidental marine oil spill in U.S. history.
Creating the Incident Command System 
Rear Admiral Landry responded to this accident by using the Incident Command Sys-
tem (ICS), which had been the doctrine for response in the Coast Guard since the mid-
1990s. This system was created to help align federal agencies and enhance coordination 
with states, local communities, Native American tribes, the private sector, and nongov-
ernmental organizations, so as to improve the nation’s ability to respond to crisis. The 
ICS is based on the premise that the most economical and efficient way to respond to 
crises of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon accident is to integrate Department 
of Defense (DoD) capabilities within the existing domestic response structure. This not 
only makes fiscal sense but also maintains respect for the governance structures and 
legal authorities that exist at the local, state, and federal levels. By the time this incident 
occurred, the expectation for oil spill crisis response was that federal, state, and local 
authorities and the private sector (in this case, BP, as the responsible party) would oper-
ate with unity of effort under the Incident Command System.
Since the nineteenth century the U.S. military has been limited in what tasks it can un-
dertake within the country’s borders, under the insurrection statute and posse comita-
tus.11 But there have been instances where the National Guard, under state authority, has 
responded to natural disasters as well as human-made events, such as the Los Angeles 
riots in 1992. The military’s support for civil authorities has evolved over time. For 
example, Public Law (PL) 91-606, commonly known as the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, 
heavily influenced the modern approach to the military support to civil authorities.12 
This act expanded disaster relief and increased the required coordination of federal 
relief programs. Up to this time, disaster relief had been provided by numerous agencies 
in an uncoordinated fashion, making it difficult for individuals, businesses, and state 
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and local governments to obtain assistance being offered. In particular, the Disaster Re-
lief Act encouraged states to develop comprehensive relief plans to prepare for disaster 
relief operations. The Secretary of the Army was given the lead for all military support 
in disaster response, and his leadership shaped how the military provided this capability 
in domestic situations. 
The next significant piece of legislation that influenced DoD’s support to civil authori-
ties (DSCA) came with the enactment of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, PL 100-707, signed into law on 23 November 1988. While 
expanding the federal government’s ability to provide disaster relief to state and local 
governments after major natural disasters, the Stafford Act also specifically authorized 
local military forces to provide an immediate response to save lives, prevent human 
suffering, and mitigate property damage without prior approval from the Secretary of 
Defense. The act authorized these missions to last up to ten days without specific fund-
ing approval, although the local commander was required to request a mission assign-
ment as soon as possible. 
During this time the DoD continued to publish military directives and guidance on 
how to support civil authorities.13 In the same way that federal law improved coordina-
tion among federal agencies, DoD consolidated its guidance for the DSCA mission. In 
1992 the federal government published the Federal Response Plan, which focused on 
federal roles and responsibilities during a disaster.14 In 1993, DoD republished its mili-
tary directive, DoDD 3025.1, consolidating all the policies and procedures into one sys-
tem to provide military support to civilian authorities. A 1997 directive (DoDD 3025.15) 
clarified the policy’s intent on how state and local authorities could request assistance 
directly from the military. 
While both the federal law and DoD legal authorities and policies had been updated to 
meet the changing times over the years, the events of 9/11 catapulted this work to a new 
level as the nation reacted to the first act of war on American soil since World War II. 
Progress in improving incident management quickened; reforms were implemented, 
and the new funding and added attention from Congress after the terrorist attacks 
brought fundamental changes. In 2003, President George W. Bush signed Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” to enhance the 
ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single and 
comprehensive national incident-management system. The Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA) was given responsibility to administer the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). There was also a concerted effort to have states adopt 
the Incident Command System, by making NIMS participation a condition of federal 
preparedness-grant funding. The NIMS can be applied to incident management of 
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everything from terrorist attacks to natural disasters, and it has become the basis for 
preparedness and response. 
In the wake of 9/11, DSCA has rapidly evolved to meet the threat against the homeland. 
It continues to be refined in the context of providing capabilities to meet “all hazards,” 
including natural and man-made disasters. The policy and planning work at the federal 
level has made an important leap from scenario-based planning for each potential type 
of event (which resulted in reams of planning documents to reflect particular scenarios 
from pandemic to terrorism), to capabilities-based planning (where capabilities are 
examined and refined to deliver what is needed under any circumstance). 
During 2004, the federal government updated the Federal Response Plan, renaming it 
the National Response Plan, which was itself updated in 2006; finally in January 2008 it 
was renamed again as the National Response Framework (NRF).15 The NRF was released 
as a national guide to conduct all-hazards response. It was built on flexible coordinating 
structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the country, linking all levels of 
government (including federal, state, and local), nongovernmental organizations, and 
the private sector. Meanwhile, the DoD has continued to update policy regarding the 
DSCA mission, publishing DoDD 3025.18 on 29 December 2010 and change 1 to that 
directive on 21 September 2012.16
Finally, Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8, National Preparedness, published on 30 
March 2011 is intended to strengthen the security and resilience of the nation through 
systematic preparation for all hazards. Most importantly, it incorporates the concept 
of an integrated, capabilities-based approach to preparedness, an approach involving 
everyone from the local citizen to the largest federal agencies and businesses. It should 
allow for better tracking of the nation’s ability to build and improve the capabilities 
necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover 
from threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the country. Rather than em-
phasizing preparedness and response to specific types of incidents, like earthquakes or 
hurricanes, PPD 8, National Preparedness, treats domestic incident response as a system 
with mutually complementary phases and as one that is as a whole one of the building 
blocks of a more capable and resilient nation ready to deal with all hazards through an 
“all of nation” response.
The USCG and the NIMS
The U.S. Coast Guard was particularly well positioned to take charge in a crisis. As 
far back as 1915, Capt. Ellsworth Price Bertholf, Commandant of the Revenue Cutter 
Service when it merged with the Life-Saving Service to become today’s Coast Guard, 
stated, “The Coast Guard occupies a peculiar position among other branches of the 
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Government, and necessarily so from the dual character of its work which is both civil 
and military. Its organization, therefore, must be such as will best adapt it to the perfor-
mance of both classes of duties.” 17 The U.S. Coast Guard had begun investing in NIMS 
in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill and continued to improve it as the nation 
expanded its incident management capabilities. 
The Coast Guard, as the fifth armed service, is unique in that it is the only service with 
federal regulatory and law-enforcement authorities. It has operated as a military service 
in every war and conflict in our nation’s history, even while serving locally in the ports 
and waterways throughout the nation. When the Coast Guard moved into the newly 
formed Department of Homeland Security in 2003, it continued to focus on incident 
management and in that connection often worked side by side with Department of 
Defense colleagues in making the adjustments necessary to integrate NIMS successfully 
into domestic crisis response. 
Simultaneously with the Coast Guard’s work, the other branches of the armed forces 
were examining better ways to integrate their capabilities into the federal response 
structure. The Department of Defense assigned permanent Defense Coordinating Ele-
ments (DCEs) into the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions across the 
country. Led by Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs), the DCEs have tremendously 
improved the ability of DoD to meet the DSCA mission requirements. 
Rather than NIMS, the military uses the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System (JOPES). It emphasizes the chain of command and a very clear command-and-
control hierarchy, while NIMS places emphasis on unity of effort and coordination with 
and among federal, state, and local entities, all of which retain their own authorities and 
jurisdictions. The DCOs and their teams act as the interpreters of the two “languages” 
of NIMS and JOPES, thereby ensuring that military capabilities can be integrated as 
needed in a crisis, with clear lines of authority and chains of command for the military 
coordination with civil authorities. Synchronization between the military and civil 
response structures continues to improve among the DCEs, in exercise programs, and 
in actual responses to major events. It often appears seamless to people both working 
in and observing from outside the disaster response. That being said, there are always 
novel aspects to crisis response that challenge unity of effort and coordination. The Gulf 
oil spill was no exception.
Reacting to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Rear Admiral Landry assumed command of the Eighth Coast Guard District, head-
quartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, during June 2009. This timing was deliberate, 
meant to allow her to get in place and oriented to the region prior to the peak of the 
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hurricane season. She gave a high priority to traveling to meet each of the Gulf Coast 
governors and other key leaders, visit state emergency operations centers, and inspect 
key Department of Defense commands. The list included the governors of Louisiana, 
Florida, and Mississippi, and the homeland security leaders and heads of the emergency 
operations centers of these three states, as well as Texas and Alabama. 
Rear Admiral Landry also visited the Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley 
Division, with headquarters in Vicksburg, Mississippi, under the command of Maj. Gen. 
Mike Walsh. The Army Corps of Engineers was a key component, providing critical 
waterway management of locks and dams throughout the district and heavily involved 
in building the $14.5 billion hurricane barrier and flood-control project authorized by 
Congress in the wake of Katrina to protect New Orleans from another flooding crisis.
The 2009 hurricane season passed relatively quietly, but it was merely the calm before 
the real storm—on 20 April 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon accident occurred. 
The government reaction to this accident was the largest fully integrated response the 
United States has ever undertaken using the Incident Command System. At its height, 
tens of thousands of responders were being coordinated from federal, state, local, tribal, 
and private-sector entities. There were also representatives included from academia, 
national laboratories, nongovernmental institutions, and the international community. 
The response was organized under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollu-
tion Contingency Plan (NCP), the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), and the Coast 
Guard’s Spill of National Significance (SONS) protocol.18 The NCP had been published 
in 1968 in the wake of a massive oil spill from the tanker Torrey Canyon off the coast of 
England, and it outlined a process for a comprehensive and coordinated spill response. 
The NCP continued to be updated to reflect best practices and lessons learned from 
various worldwide incident responses; the latest update was completed in 1994 after the 
passing of OPA 90 legislation following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. The SONS 
protocol was the Coast Guard’s published policy doctrine, continuously exercised. 
Legislation and doctrine clearly outlined the structure of the response under the 
Incident Command System and laid out a unified command construct wherein the 
federal and state agencies and responsible party would work together to minimize 
the environmental impact from the spill. But it soon became clear that the scale and 
scope of the Deepwater Horizon incident would eclipse what had been envisioned in 
the OPA 90 legislation and would test the doctrine and practices of all involved. Every 
tanker, every barge, every coastal marine oil terminal that transferred oil from the 
waterway to shore, and every mobile offshore drilling unit, such as Deepwater Horizon 
itself, had to have a plan to respond to a worst-case discharge of oil. In other words, 
the responsible party had to provide its own resources on the basis of what it identified 
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as the worst-case-scenario discharge. The oil companies, in turn, relied on contracts 
with companies called “oil-spill-response organizations,” which had both locally based 
resources and access to resources around the world. 
In terms of natural resources, the Eighth Coast Guard District is one of the richest in 
the United States, by virtue of its extensive shipping, fishing, and offshore drilling. 
Rear Admiral Landry clearly outlined the “worst case scenario parameters” during the 
first hours of the response. As she repeatedly stated in her first news conferences to the 
Today Show, “The potential scale and scope of this spill was going to be immense and 
require the full capacity of response companies, federal agencies, states, local communi-
ties, and even the Department of Defense.” 
It is hard to describe the sense of urgency everyone felt after the accident—it was like be-
ing in a vortex where everyone was totally consumed by the task at hand and what drew 
us all together was a full sense of what was at risk. The intensity can be compared to that 
of the Coast Guard work in port security post-9/11. Just as 9/11 required us to protect 
our nation and way of life from terrorism, the responders to Deepwater Horizon were 
focused on saving an ecosystem and a way of life along the Gulf Coast. 
Immediate Decisions after the Accident 
The role of the Department of Defense under its DSCA mission was enormous. Dur-
ing the first week of the incident an important meeting and conference call was held 
that would set the tone and direction for the response by federal agencies, including 
the Department of Defense. As District Commander, the author assumed the role of 
Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC), which meant field coordination of the overall 
response. The goal for the FOSC was to direct the response, working to gain consensus 
among all parties with equities in the response: the Gulf Coast states and local com-
munities, the federal agencies such as the Department of Commerce for federal fisheries 
and the Department of the Interior for federal trust territories and the offshore energy 
sector, and others.
Rear Admiral Landry directed the responsible party, in this case BP, to meet its legal 
obligation under OPA 90, which required the responsible party to be ready to respond 
to the worst-case scenario. In the initial days she was in constant contact up the chain 
of command, all the way to the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Adm. Thad 
Allen, who was briefing senior cabinet officials and President Obama, along with senior 
officials of the White House team. Admiral Landry was also in contact with governors 
of the Gulf Coast states, with Louisiana senators Mary Landrieu and David Vitter, and 
with other senior congressional leaders from the Gulf Coast states. Within that first 
week several cabinet secretaries and congressional leaders saw the site of the incident by 
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air and arrived in Robert, Louisiana, for a tour of the command post, a briefing, and a 
press conference. The group included the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napoli-
tano; the Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar; the administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Lisa Jackson; and the White House Energy and Climate Coordina-
tor, Carol Browner. The governor of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal, accompanied the group 
and spoke at the press conference.
After this event the cabinet secretaries convened in a room to conduct a conference call 
with other key leaders in Washington, D.C. The importance of this call should not be 
underestimated, in that it included the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the White House National Security Staff lead for domestic response 
(Richard Reid). Several of these senior leaders were answering to President Obama 
and keeping him informed on a regular basis. The Coast Guard and FEMA are both 
under the Department of Homeland Security, and Secretary Napolitano had options for 
how best to execute the response to the crisis. The author vividly recalls that Secretary 
Napolitano agreed that the response was best handled under OPA 90 legislation, leaving 
the responsible party funding the response, as opposed to declaring a disaster using the 
Stafford Act, which would require federal funding.
A second important point of this phone call came when the Secretary of Defense offered 
anything that might be needed as part of the response under the DSCA rubric. He also 
suggested that the response team bring in the National Guard to support the governors 
but have DoD pay the National Guardsmen under federal orders so individual states 
would not be burdened and would not have to struggle with reimbursement. The fact 
that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs both participated 
so early in the event demonstrated to everyone that this would be a comprehensive 
response and that we would be supported by the full capacity of the nation. 
As the days, weeks, and months unfolded, active-duty service members, reservists, and 
National Guardsmen all served in the response in various capacities, and DoD equip-
ment was used for everything from logistics to oil skimming. Rear Admiral Landry 
repeatedly stated, “There is a sense of urgency, and there has been since day one. We 
have not backed off on this since day one.” 19 Reflecting this urgency, Governor Jindal 
declared a state of emergency for Louisiana on 29 April. The loss of tourist dollars 
quickly impacted almost all the Gulf states; estimates of lost revenue climbed into the 
billions of dollars. 
At the start of Deepwater Horizon cleanup, a Tyndall Air Force Base unit agreed to pro-
vide airspace management. The Gulf of Mexico is like a small city; over thirty thousand 
people work offshore every day. Helicopters fly people and logistical supplies back and 
forth to and from the oil rigs. At first the goal was to keep the footprint light and not 
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interfere with routine practices of airspace activity, but over time and after a few near 
midair collisions, the government put in flight restrictions and ramped up its airspace-
management capacity. 
Because this was a domestic situation, the Air Force took a supporting and advisory role 
from the very beginning, thus allowing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to 
exercise its statutory jurisdiction over management of airspace. There were later accusa-
tions that press access to the scene of the accident was too restricted. Local and federal 
authorities were challenged for denying access to members of the press attempting to 
document the spill from the air, from boats, and on the ground, by blocking access to 
areas supposedly open to the public. There was one report that the U.S. Coast Guard 
stopped Jean-Michel Cousteau’s boat and another that a CBS News crew was denied ac-
cess to oil-covered beaches. The Coast Guard readily admitted that the communication 
of restrictions was not as clear as it could have been and that this had led to misunder-
standings. The Coast Guard public-affairs team, turning to DoD public-affairs special-
ists for additional capacity, worked through the problems of managing the balance 
between transparency and safety and environmental protection during this massive 
response. The latter issues included what were labeled “the boom wars.” Booms (floating 
barriers meant to contain oil on the surface and to block sensitive areas) were a scarce 
commodity. There were incidents of booms being stolen, of people cutting through 
booms, and of journalists and civilians tramping through oiled areas, further damaging 
marshes. These were some of the reasons the Coast Guard put restrictions in place. 
A suspicious public and media, however, believed the motive behind the restrictions was 
to deny access. Members of Congress criticized the restrictions placed on journalists’ 
access. The FAA, for its part, argued that all media access had to be arranged through 
the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, supported by DoD, worked hard to overcome the 
misunderstanding, allowing as many as four hundred journalists to embed themselves 
on board boats and aircraft, in this way giving access while maintaining safety and 
environmental protection.
Oil Spill Response
Another example of Department of Defense capability was the Navy’s oil spill response 
equipment. The primary components of the strategy for addressing the spill were con-
tainment, dispersal, and removal. Oil began seeping out of the underwater well almost 
immediately after the accident. An early estimate by BP authorities suggested a rate of 
a thousand barrels per day, but on 28 April 2010, Rear Admiral Landry stated that it 
could be closer to five thousand barrels per day, which soon became the official esti-
mate.20 Later estimates were as much as ten times higher, at between 52,700 and 62,200 
barrels per day. Total estimates of leaked oil were approximately 4.9 million barrels 
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(210,000,000 U.S. gallons), plus or minus 10 percent. BP challenged these higher figures, 
saying that not only had the government overestimated the total volume but these 
higher estimates did not reflect over 810,000 barrels (thirty-four million U.S. gallons) of 
oil collected or burned before entering the Gulf waters. Notwithstanding, and although 
the total volume is still in dispute, the amount was significant enough to require the full 
response capacity of the private sector and government.
The Navy has its own oil-recovery equipment, which it uses on naval installations. BP, 
trying to mobilize everything that was commercially available in the region, found it 
necessary to contract the Navy equipment for additional capacity. The National Guard 
proved especially resourceful, building land berms to protect marsh areas and inlets. 
The berms absorbed the oil before it entered these sensitive areas, wetlands already at 
risk from loss of land and coastal erosion. Booms stretching altogether over 4,200,000 
feet were eventually deployed, either to corral the oil or to serve as barriers. The booms 
extended an average of eighteen to forty-eight inches above and below the water surface 
and were especially effective in relatively calm and slow-moving waters. Adding one-
time-use sorbent booms, a total of 13,300,000 feet of booms were deployed.
A good example of DoD logistics capability was demonstrated in the midst of the “boom 
wars.” By the early weeks of the response BP had bought virtually the entire global 
inventory of ocean booms, but governors of the Gulf Coast states were insisting they 
be provided with enough booms to outline their coastlines and inlets. BP called every 
ocean-boom manufacturer in the world trying to satisfy the demands of a particular 
governor who insisted that deliveries were not coming fast enough. BP found that one 
of the oil-spill response organizations had extra ocean booms in storage in Alaska 
and authorized a million dollars to have the military fly the booms to the Gulf Coast 
overnight.
According to satellite images, despite the use of booms to stop the spread of oil, the spill 
directly impacted sixty-eight thousand square miles of ocean, an area about the size 
of Oklahoma. This was frustrating for Rear Admiral Landry, who noticed during one 
aerial inspection that many boats and much cleanup equipment appeared to be sitting 
idle just beyond the edges of the oil slick. To put pressure on BP, she announced that the 
Coast Guard would double its manpower in the Gulf: “There is really no excuse for not 
having constant activity. . . . Our frustration with BP is there should be no delays at all” 
in making use of emergency equipment.21
By early June 2010, after several early failures by BP to stem the flow from the wellhead, 
oil had washed up onto about 125 miles of Louisiana’s coastline. Thad Allen, who had 
retired as Coast Guard Commandant in May but was still the national incident com-
mander in the Gulf, compared the spill to a war: “And this is a war, it’s an insidious 
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war . . . because it’s attacking, you know, four states one at a time, and it comes from 
different directions depending on the weather.” 22 At about this same time, the barrier 
islands in Mississippi, Alabama, and the panhandle of Florida began to be impacted. By 
July, tar balls had appeared along the shores of Lake Pontchartrain. By September, a new 
wave of oil unexpectedly hit sixteen miles of Louisiana coastline and marshes west of 
the Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish. By October the oil spill even reached Texas. 
By some estimates, a total of 1,074 miles of coastline was damaged by oil in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. 
On 15 July 2010, after many delays and failed attempts, the wellhead was finally capped. 
One industry expert noted that however frustrated the federal, state, and public stake-
holders had been with the time it took, industry had designed and built in three months 
a solution that would under normal research and development standards have taken two 
to three years. Everyone now agrees that the optimal situation would have been to have 
the cap on standby during the drilling process, and that is now a Department of the 
Interior response requirement for deepwater drilling. 
Before the wellhead was capped significant amounts of oil were diverted to contain-
ment ships, but most of it escaped into the surrounding waters. There were three basic 
approaches for removing the oil from the water: combustion, offshore filtration, and 
collection for later processing. Rear Admiral Landry announced a decision to use 
“controlled burns” miles from shore, which it was hoped “could reduce the amount of 
oil collected within fireproof booms by more than half, though she acknowledged that 
the downside was that a plume of soot and possibly toxic air pollutants would be spewed 
into the atmosphere.” 23 From the end of April to mid-July 2010, 411 controlled in-situ 
fires destroyed approximately 265,000 barrels (11,100,000 U.S. gallons) of oil, or about 
5 percent of the amount leaked. As for filtering contaminated water, in mid-June BP 
ordered thirty-two machines that could separate oil and water, each capable of extract-
ing up to two thousand barrels (320 cubic meters) of oil per day. After a week of testing, 
BP began to use this equipment and by 28 June had removed 890,000 barrels of oil. The 
USCG later calculated that 33,000,000 U.S. gallons of tainted water had been recovered 
by filtration, extracting five million U.S. gallons of oil (about 2 percent of the leaked oil). 
Finally, about 3 percent of the oil was skimmed from the surface of the water. In total 
2,063 skimmers were used, about sixty of them open-water skimmers. 
Within about two weeks of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, most of the surface oil 
appeared to have dissipated. Much of it washed up on shore. By summer 2010, approxi-
mately forty-seven thousand people and seven thousand vessels were involved in the 
cleanup project, which soon became one of the largest on record. Sandy beaches and 
marshlands were the two main challenges. For beaches, the main techniques included 
sifting sand, removing tar balls, and digging out tar mats by hand or with mechanical 
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devices. For marshlands, techniques such as vacuuming and pumping, low-pressure 
flushing, vegetation cutting, and bioremediation were used. As of January 2013, the oil 
cleanup alone had cost BP over fourteen billion dollars. 
Although the majority of visible oil deposits were ultimately collected, an unknown 
amount of subsurface oil remained unaccounted for. In 2010, the Department of the 
Interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration stated that “75% 
[of the spilled oil] has been cleaned up by Man or Mother Nature.” However, since only 
about 25 percent of the released oil was collected or removed by BP, this meant that 
about 75 percent of the oil remained in the environment in one form or another.24 In 
2013, at a meeting of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill and Ecosystem Science Conference, 
some experts suggested that as much as a third of the oil may have mixed with deep 
ocean sediments, where it could continue to harm ecosystems and commercial fisheries.
The methods used to clean up the spill oil were also notable for the sheer volume of an 
oil dispersant called Corexit they used. It was estimated that 1,840,000 U.S. gallons were 
dispersed. Some of the application methods were considered “purely experimental,” and 
“BP’s use of chemical dispersant underwater, for example, was the first time this method 
was attempted.”25 Almost half the total amount of dispersants, or some 771,000 U.S. 
gallons, was released at the wellhead. In addition, over four hundred airplane sorties to 
disperse Corexit were flown.
There were many unanswered questions about the use of dispersants, especially in 
such large quantities. Rear Admiral Landry acknowledged these concerns but pointed 
out that federal scientists had approved their use: “That threshold we crossed was not 
done lightly. . . . It was done in cooperation with all the federal agencies. . . . It’s all a 
series of trade-offs. We are really trying to minimize the environmental impact of all 
these methods being done.”26 On 2 August 2010 the Environmental Protection Agency 
determined that dispersants had stopped a large amount of oil from reaching the coast 
by breaking it down. However, outside experts continued to voice concerns about this 
approach. Two years after the spill, one study found that Corexit had increased the 
toxicity of the oil by up to fifty-two times.27
The Department of Defense was instrumental in support of the overall crisis response, 
as were many other federal, state, local, nongovernmental, and academic institutions. 
An employee from BP remarked in conversation with the author months after the event 
that had someone asked him whether BP would need the federal government’s help in a 
scenario such as Deepwater Horizon he would have said no but that this response would 
have proved him wrong; he now readily admitted that it needed the help. 
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Conclusions
The Deepwater Horizon accident was later blamed on excessive risk-taking by the rig’s 
crew: “On the platform the day of the blowout, tests and sensors showed dangerous 
pressure levels rising in the well, but the idea of a blowout was unthinkable to workers.”28 
Considering the unexpected size of the Deepwater Horizon accident and the enormous 
oil spill that it caused, the USCG did a remarkable job helping orchestrate a response 
that had to take into account all the many instruments of state power. Once the safety 
of the survivors among the crew was confirmed, top priorities included protecting 
beaches, marshlands, and estuaries from the spreading oil by utilizing controlled burns, 
skimmer ships, floating booms, and well over a million U.S. gallons of Corexit oil 
dispersant. However, adverse effects from the response and cleanup activities, extensive 
damage to marine and wildlife habitats and to the fishing and tourism industries, and 
human health problems continued to have a noticeable impact. For example, in July 
2013, more than three years after the spill, the discovery of a forty-thousand-pound tar 
mat near East Grand Terre, Louisiana, prompted the closure of the local waters to com-
mercial fishing. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 required the responsible party not only to 
pay for the response itself but to make restitution for the environmental impact, under 
a formal natural resource damage-assessment process. That process is still ongoing and 
could take years. Additionally, in a novel move, Congress passed in June 2012 the Re-
store Act, which stipulates that 85 percent of the civil penalties collected by the federal 
government from the responsible parties is to go directly to offsetting environmental 
and economic impacts to the Gulf states.29
This incident shows that oil spill response was inadequate, including how the DoD de-
ploys in support of civil authorities. During Deepwater Horizon it took a two-star Coast 
Guard admiral—Rear Adm. Jim Watson—several days working with the Department of 
Defense just to get the accounting straight for the military interdepartmental purchase 
request required to allocate troops and capabilities to the crisis. Something is wrong 
with a system that tied up that much manpower to figure out the paperwork in the 
critical first days of the response.30 Additionally, some units in DoD deploy to domestic 
situations with the same complements they use going overseas. But when deploying 
domestically they need to go in lighter, to have more adaptive packages, so as to ensure 
that the most efficient and effective resources are applied to the situation. DoD re-
sources do not come cheap, but they can be indispensable. The key is to strike the right 
balance between what is needed for domestic crisis response and what the Department 
of Defense is uniquely able to provide.
The legal disputes caused by the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill are not 
over. Numerous investigations to determine responsibility for the accident have been 
conducted. Notably, a U.S. government report on the disaster in September 2011 
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determined that defective cement on the wellhead was mainly to blame, for which it 
faulted BP, Transocean, and Halliburton. Earlier in 2011 a White House commission 
had likewise criticized BP and its partners for a series of cost-cutting decisions and 
an insufficient safety system. It concluded that the spill resulted from “systemic” root 
causes and that “absent significant reform in both industry practices and government 
policies, might well recur.” 31 In November 2012 BP and the Department of Justice settled 
outstanding federal criminal charges, and BP agreed to four years of government moni-
toring of its safety practices and ethics. In January 2013, Transocean agreed to pay $1.4 
billion for violations of the Clean Water Act, and two months earlier BP and the Depart-
ment of Justice agreed to a record-setting $4.525 billion in fines. As of February 2013, 
however, BP had paid a stunning $42.2 billion in criminal and civil settlements, as well 
as payments to a recovery trust fund—altogether the largest payout of its kind in history.
Notes
Tragically, eleven souls were lost in the initial 
explosion of Deepwater Horizon, there was damage 
to the environment, and many people’s lives were 
altered. But the healing continues, and the Gulf 
Coast was saved.
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those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy De-
partment, or the Naval War College.
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Deep Blue Diplomacy
Soft Power and China’s Antipiracy Operations
ANDREW S .  ERICKSON AND AUSTIN M.  STR ANGE
For the first time in its modern history China has deployed naval forces operationally 
beyond its immediate maritime periphery for extended durations, to protect merchant 
vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Over a six-year span beginning in December 
2008, China has contributed over ten thousand navy personnel in nearly twenty task 
forces and has escorted over six thousand Chinese and foreign commercial vessels 
in the process. While it is uncertain how many task forces will be deployed and for 
how long, China will likely remain in the Gulf of Aden through 2015, and perhaps 
longer if the United Nations further extends its mandate for navies to fight piracy off 
Somalia.1 China’s naval antipiracy mission represents an unprecedented instance of 
conduct by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of sustained long-
distance operations. It provides a rare window by which outside observers can see how 
the naval component of China’s “going out” strategy cuts across economic, political, 
and strategic dimensions. While many of China’s other maritime activities damage 
its international image, antipiracy operations in the far seas project soft power and a 
positive image.
The Chinese navy’s antipiracy missions provide much-needed security for Chinese 
overseas interests. But the PLAN has also crafted its antipiracy missions to portray 
blue-water operations positively abroad. Increasingly, the PLAN’s antipiracy mandate is 
oriented toward broader international security objectives. Commercial escort statistics 
exemplify this trend: initially China’s navy was only allowed to escort Chinese-flagged 
ships through the Gulf of Aden, but now in some cases over 70 percent of ships in given 
Chinese escort flotillas have been foreign flagged. Similarly, to secure the maritime 
commons Chinese commanding officers and sailors serving off Somalia have worked 
increasingly in the framework of bilateral exchanges with other navies as well as in 
multistakeholder settings.
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This chapter explores the soft-power dimension of China’s far-seas antipiracy opera-
tions. It addresses the extent to which Gulf of Aden deployments might increase the 
PLAN’s prospects for cooperation with other navies and also the impact of these mis-
sions on the role the navy plays within China’s larger diplomacy. Finally, it assesses how 
these deployments might relate to future Chinese naval development.
Historical Background
A sharp increase in piracy attacks off Somalia threatened to interfere with China’s 
foreign trade. Several well-publicized pirate attacks prior to the PLAN’s antipiracy 
deployment in 2008 demonstrated Chinese vulnerability. Tianyu 8, a fishing boat with 
twenty-four crewmen, the Chinese tanker Zhenhua 4, and the Sinotrans-owned cargo 
ship Dajian, as well as two Hong Kong–registered ships, Stolt Valor and Delight, were all 
pirated prior to the PLAN’s deployment.2 Over 1,200 Chinese merchant vessels transited 
the Gulf of Aden during the first eleven months of 2008, and of this number eighty-
three were attacked by pirate groups. Direct threats to China’s economic interests and 
citizens abroad were thus important drivers of the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment.
As the PLAN’s initial deployment prepared to set sail in December 2008, Senior Col.
Huang Xueping, Ministry of National Defense secondary spokesman and deputy 
director of the ministry’s Information Office, convened a news conference in which he 
clarified the points that, first, the mission’s primary objective was to protect Chinese 
shipping interests, and that, second, it did not represent a change in Chinese foreign 
policy or a desire to project greater blue-water naval capabilities.3 Idealistic and realistic 
interpretations of China’s antipiracy operations differ greatly. The former focuses on 
China’s desire to contribute meaningfully to regional and international security, while 
the latter includes a “desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and 
to provide opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN’s capabilities 
in military operations other than war.” 4
In line with the realists, economic interests in the Gulf of Aden had perhaps the great-
est impact on pragmatic Chinese policy makers. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu 
Jianchao explains, “Piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on 
the seas. . . . That’s why we decided to send naval ships to crack down.” 5 China’s overseas 
maritime trade is highly dependent on vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 
such as the Bab el Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, Strait of 
Singapore, and South China Sea. China currently relies on just five SLOCs for roughly 
90 percent of its overseas trade. In particular, approximately 60 percent of all commer-
cial vessels that transit through the Strait of Malacca are Chinese flagged.6
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For China, therefore, the economic benefits of protecting its international trade are 
abundantly clear. China’s leadership continues to emphasize the PLAN’s imperative to 
secure Chinese overseas maritime interests. Specifically, energy supplies transported 
via international SLOCs will constitute a larger percentage of China’s aggregate energy 
consumption. Having become a net oil importer in 1993, for example, China now relies 
on seaborne oil imports for over 40 percent of its oil consumption.7 China’s oil import 
dependence will rise substantially between now and 2030, by some estimates to as high 
as 80 percent.8
Oil and other energy imports constitute just one of many sectors in China that face 
growing dependence on the sea. China Daily reported that as early as 2006, maritime 
industries accounted for $270 billion in economic output, nearly 10 percent of China’s 
gross domestic product.9 In 2009, over 260 companies, across various industries, report-
edly engaged in international maritime shipping.10 In 2010 it was reported that each 
year over two thousand Chinese commercial vessels were transiting the Gulf of Aden.11 
In 2011, more than two years after the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment, a professor 
at China’s National Defense University observed, “From the current situation, ocean 
lifelines have already become a soft rib in China’s strategic security.” 12
China’s growth as a sea power has been rapid. It currently has more seafarers, deep-sea 
fleets, and ocean fishing vessels than any other nation. It has become, in the words of 
Ju Chengzhi, of the Ministry of Transport, a “maritime shipping power” (海运大国). 
In 2009 China’s merchant maritime fleet reportedly consisted of over 3,300 vessels and 
forty thousand crewmen.13 People’s Daily reported in 2011 that China surpassed South 
Korea as the world’s largest shipbuilder in terms of capacity and new orders.14
China’s maritime responsibilities are huge, since it has thirty-two thousand kilometers 
of coastline and claims over three million square kilometers of offshore waters.15 Public 
awareness of the importance of maritime issues is increasing. Two Chinese media out-
lets have reported separate public surveys in which 86 percent and 91 percent of Chinese 
citizens polled supported the PLAN’s antipiracy deployment.16 Simultaneously, many 
Chinese “netizens” (frequent Internet users) have criticized their government for its in-
ability to ensure Chinese sailors’ safety.17
Domestically, in the period before deployments began Beijing faced strong political in-
centives to intervene decisively to protect its shipping. These political concerns at home 
paralleled international expectations. Such deployments, it was predicted, would en-
hance China’s image as a “responsible stakeholder” in international society, particularly 
in the domain of maritime security.18 In the years since, China’s antipiracy operations 
have already aided the PLAN substantially in developing its blue-water capacity.
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Military Development and Blue-Water Aspirations
Beijing’s deployment of PLAN antipiracy forces appears to be spurring on Chinese 
military development. As the Chinese newspaper Global Times puts it, over five years 
of deployments to the Gulf of Aden have transformed PLAN antipiracy forces from 
“maritime rookies to confident sea dogs.” 19 Since China has not fought an actual war 
since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, this experience of maintaining multiyear, distant 
deployments of warships is extremely valuable. In 2011, a PLAN senior captain effec-
tively summarized the multidimensional benefits of distant sea antipiracy operations: 
“The experience definitely would be unprecedented not only for officers and sailors, but 
also for the durability and function of the ships.” 20
Furthermore, antipiracy operations have positioned the PLAN as China’s most active 
service. By proving its effectiveness against threats to Chinese overseas interests, the 
PLAN has ensured that it will continue to procure some of the military’s newest and 
best technology.21 More broadly, the persistent threat of piracy in international waters 
has enabled China to expand its far-seas security operations under the umbrella of 
benign international cooperation.22
Close analysis of PLAN antipiracy activities reveals four primary conduits for projecting 
soft power: the escort of commercial ships and other direct operational aspects of PLAN 
antipiracy missions; navy-to-navy meetings, combined training, and other exchanges 
and instances of cooperation with foreign navies; participation in multistakeholder 
dialogues on land and at sea related to international antipiracy operations; and, perhaps 
most significantly, a growing number of port visits conducted by PLAN warships for 
replenishment and diplomatic purposes before, during, and after service in the Gulf of 
Aden. Exploiting these channels has positioned the PLAN as an important and highly 
visible player in China’s comprehensive quest for international soft power.
Antipiracy services provided by the PLAN to commercial ships have primarily included 
area patrols, escorts, and on-ship protection.23 Wang Yongxiang, deputy commander 
of the tenth escort task force, explains that specific tactics depend on multiple idiosyn-
cratic factors: “the schedules of the merchant vessels to be escorted, their characteristics, 
and how well our warships have rested. We want to not only ensure the safety of our 
charges, but also improve the efficiency of escort protection.” 24 Area patrol—monitoring 
certain maritime zones in and around the Gulf of Aden—is the approach least employed 
by the PLAN. When China’s navy does engage in area patrols, it typically maintains two 
base points 550–600 nautical miles apart—for example, one a hundred nautical miles 
north of Yemen’s Socotra Island and the other seventy-five nautical miles southwest of 
Aden Harbor.25 On a normal mission PLAN vessels travel between these points, typi-
cally taking two to three days to do so.26
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Of all the services provided by China’s antipiracy forces, the escort of civilian ships is 
the most common; it has become a daily practice for PLAN task forces in the Gulf of 
Aden. Task forces consist of two warships—usually a combination of destroyers and 
frigates—and a replenishment or landing ship. However, since the first task force, two 
or more warships concurrently stationed in the Gulf of Aden have led separate flotillas 
of merchant ships, sometimes in opposite directions, through an area west of longitude 
fifty-seven east and south of latitude fifteen north.27
PLAN escort efficiency has improved significantly since 2008. As a 2010 Liberation 
Army Daily article states, “From the first escort to the escort of the 1,000th ship the 
Chinese naval task force used over 300 days, from the 1,000th to the 2,000th ship used 
over 220 days, and from the 2,000th to the 3,000th ship only used over 180 days’ time.” 28 
As early as 2011, approximately 70 percent of ships escorted by China’s navy at any 
given time were foreign.29 In terms of aggregate escorts over the first four years, roughly 
50 percent of PLAN-escorted commercial vessels were foreign flagged.30 People’s Navy 
reported in mid-2011 that China had provided escort services to ships from over fifty 
foreign countries, and this figure has likely increased over the past four years.31 People’s 
Daily emphasizes that escort services are provided gratis for Chinese and foreign com-
mercial ships.32 That is, PLAN escort services are being provided as a complimentary 
public good to the international community.
Foreign civilian ships can apply online to join a PLAN escort convoy via the China 
Shipowners’ Association website. Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China 
Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has asserted, “China shoulders respon-
sibility for foreign vessels based on growing national strength and a friendly policy”; 
many other states do not send escort forces, because of limited interest and the enor-
mous costs. In Zhai’s opinion, “such international cooperation and exchanges also help 
the rest of the world to know more about China and accept it.”33 
Given the international context in which China’s antipiracy operations take place, 
the PLAN has taken steps to professionalize its services. For example, the use of the 
English language is important while conducting international operations; the twelfth 
task force had an on-duty translator on board the frigate Yiyang to liaise with for-
eign naval and merchant counterparts.34 Each PLAN task-force member receives four 
“pocket books” covering the psychological aspects of deployment, security, interna-
tional law, and the application of international law to military operations. Also, naval 
officers specializing in international law provide full-time legal support to officers 
and crews in meetings with ships of other nations.35 These efforts have assisted China’s 
internavy exchanges.
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Internavy Exchanges and Dialogues at Sea
Chinese and international commentators greatly value the unprecedented exposure of 
PLAN vessels and crews to foreign navies.36 Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), 
articulates the historical significance of the PLAN’s deployments in this way: “In terms 
of international engagement, the first de cade of the 21st century should be divided 
into a pre–anti-piracy operations period and a post-anti-piracy period, because once 
the PLAN began to conduct anti-piracy operations, the entire nature of its approach to 
international naval engagement changed appreciably.” 37
The missions have had an undeniable impact on Chinese naval diplomacy; interac-
tion with foreign navies that was novel in 2008 is now routine in the Gulf of Aden and 
adjacent waterways. In 2011, Han Xiaohu, commander of China’s eighth escort task 
force, visited in March the flagship, a frigate, of NATO’s Operation Open Shield; in 
May, hosted the Singapore navy’s Rear Adm. Harris Chan, then commander of U.S.-led 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, on a PLAN warship; and in June hosted the European 
Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) commander on board the frigate Wenzhou.38 The 
PLAN and Singapore navy conducted bilateral exchanges in September 2010 in the 
Gulf of Aden, sending personnel on board each other’s ships.39 China’s navy conducted 
more exchanges with CTF-151 in July 2012 and with NATO in April and July 2012.40 An 
article in People’s Daily stated in 2012 that Chinese naval escort task forces continue to 
inform the outside world about the “activities of suspicious ships through network mail-
box and radio station every day and shared information resources with 50-odd warships 
of 20-plus countries and organizations.” 41
China’s naval diplomacy in the region goes well beyond shipboard interactions with 
Western antipiracy forces. For example, PLAN task forces off the Horn of Africa 
have also been active in a variety of bilateral exchanges. The PLAN and the Russian 
navy executed joint antipiracy escorts for the first time in October 2009, during the 
Peace Blue Shield 2009 (平蓝盾—2009) exercise.42 Similarly, China’s navy held 
extensive joint exercises with Russian navy Blue Shield units in May 2011 and 
conducted similar antipiracy joint exercises in both 2012 and 2013.43 Amid compre-
hensive Sino-Russian joint maritime exercises in 2012, Chinese and Russian naval 
forces performed extensive piracy-deterrence and rescue joint training off the coast 
of Qingdao.44
The Chinese navy is not interacting only with large navies. During November 2009, 
PLAN military officials met with Dutch counterparts to perform on-ship inspections 
and exchanges, and during 2010 PLAN forces collaborated with South Korean naval 
units in antipiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden.45 In 2012, China and South Korea 
conducted joint antipiracy exercises in which helicopters of the two sides landed on 
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each other’s warships for the first time.46 In April 2011, China’s eighth escort task force 
sent Wenzhou and Qiandaohu to conduct joint antipiracy exercises with the Pakistani 
guided-missile destroyer Khyber.47 These combined drills followed the Pakistani-hosted 
Peace 11 multinational maritime exercises, which included naval ships from, among 
other states, China, the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Pakistan. China sent 
guided-missile frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan, two helicopters, and seventy special 
forces commandos.48 More recently the PLAN conducted joint antipiracy training with 
the Ukrainian navy in the Gulf of Aden. All of these efforts support China’s growing 
naval diplomacy.
Chinese Naval Diplomacy
At-sea engagements with other navies are crucial for establishing a positive image of 
China’s growing global maritime presence. These engagements are complemented by 
a growing focus by the PLAN on establishing effective relationships with littoral states 
in and adjacent to the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, since 2008 the nature and scope 
of Chinese naval port visits have expanded continuously. Growing port calls bolster 
China’s far-seas soft-power projection by facilitating interaction and dialogue between 
China and the many countries whose ports and geographic locations heighten the stra-
tegic value of these relationships.
The PLAN is increasing port visits (see the table) as its far-seas antipiracy presence 
matures. A small sample reveals the dynamism with which the PLAN is engaging the 
navies, governments, and citizens of littoral states in connection with its antipiracy 
missions. For example, during September 2012, Yiyang of the twelfth escort task force 
arrived in Karachi for a second cycle of rest and replenishment, during which it held 
seminars and other exchanges with Pakistani naval counterparts.49 Later that year Rear 
Adm. Zhou Xuming and members from the twelfth escort task force met with Commo. 
Jonathan Mead, acting commander of the Australian Fleet, in Sydney on an official 
visit. The Australian chief of navy, Vice Adm. Ray Griggs, remarked, “I welcome the 
continued opportunity for our navies to share their experiences today as we exchange 
lessons learned in the conduct of counter-piracy operations.” 50 More recently, in late 
2013 the fifteenth escort task force, in addition to holding friendly exchanges with fleets 
from the EU, United States, and NATO, docked for friendly visits in Tanzania, Kenya, 
and Sri Lanka.51
Clearly, uninterrupted operations in the Gulf of Aden have helped to facilitate PLAN 
maritime engagement with other countries in the vicinity as well as those strategically 
situated on the route from China to Somali waters. China has effectively increased the 
role of naval diplomacy as a component of its antipiracy deployments in a number of 
world regions. People’s Daily reports that “since the 2nd Chinese naval escort task force, 
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the Chinese navy has established a new mechanism of organizing escort warships to 
pay friendly visits to foreign countries, and the Chinese naval escort task forces have 
successfully paid friendly visits to more than 20 countries, such as India, Pakistan, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Singapore.” 52
ALGERIA
Algiers
• 2–5 April 2013, friendly visit
AUSTRALIA
Sydney
• 18–22 December 2012, friendly visit
BAHRAIN
Manama
• 9–13 December 2010, friendly visit
BULGARIA
Varna
• 6–10 August 2012, friendly visit
BURMA
Rangoon
• 29 August–2 September 2010, friendly visit
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
• 24 January 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 3 May 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 13 September 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 22 September 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 24 December 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 21 February 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 5 October 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 24–29 March 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 14 May 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 13–18 August 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 1–6 December 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 6–8 June 2013, replenish/overhaul
• 28 July 2013, replenish/overhaul
• 7–9 October 2013, replenish/overhaul
• 22–26 February 2014, replenish/overhaul
• 1–5 April 2014, replenish/overhaul and  
friendly visit
EGYPT
Alexandria
• 26–30 July 2010, friendly visit
FRANCE
Toulon
• 23–27 April 2013, friendly visit
GREECE
Crete
• 7 March 2011, replenish/overhaul
Piraeus
• 9–13 August 2013, friendly visit
INDIA
Cochin
• 8 August 2009, friendly visit
ISRAEL
Haifa
• 14–17 August 2012, friendly visit
ITALY
Taranto
• 2–7 August 2010, joint drills and friendly visit
KENYA
Mombasa
• 2–5 January 2014, friendly visit
KUWAIT
Shuwaikh
• 27 November–1 December 2011, friendly visit
MALAYSIA
Port Kelang
• 6 December 2009, friendly visit
MALTA
• 26–30 March 2013, friendly visit
MOROCCO
Casablanca
• 9–13 April 2013, friendly visit
MOZAMBIQUE
Maputo
• 29 March–2 April 2012, friendly visit
OMAN
Masqat
• 1–8 December 2011, friendly visit
Salalah
• 21 June–1 July 2009, replenish/overhaul
• 14 August 2009, replenish/overhaul
• 2 January 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 1 April 2010, replenish/overhaul
Selected Port Visits by PLAN Antipiracy Forces
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• 8 June 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 10 August 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 8 January 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 19 January 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 10 April 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 8–11 June 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 23 June 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 7–10 November 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 21–24 February 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 1–3 July 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 9 July 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 28–29 March 2013, replenish/overhaul
PAKISTAN
Karachi
• 5–8 August 2009, joint drills and friendly visit
• 7–13 March 2010, joint drills and friendly visit
• 13 March 2011, joint drills
• 8 September 2012, replenish/overhaul
PHILIPPINES
Manila
• 13–17 April 2010, friendly visit
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
• 15–19 April 2013, friendly visit
QATAR
Doha
• 2–7 August 2011, friendly visit
ROMANIA
Constanţa
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly visit
SAUDI ARABIA
Jidda
• 27 November–1 December 2010, friendly visit
• 3 September 2011, replenish/overhaul
• 17 June 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 1–6 January 2013, replenish/overhaul
• 5–28 April 2013, replenish/overhaul
• 14–18 September 2013, replenish/overhaul
• 2–6 November 2013, replenish/overhaul
SEYCHELLES
Port Victoria
• 14 April 2011, friendly visit
• 16–20 June 2013, friendly visit
SINGAPORE
Changi
• 5–7 September 2010, replenish/overhaul and  
joint drills
• 18–20 December 2011, replenish/overhaul and 
friendly visit
• 5–10 September 2013, friendly visit
SOUTH AFRICA
Durban
• 4–8 April 2011, friendly visit
SRI LANKA
Colombo
• 5–7 January 2010, friendly visit
• 7–12 December 2010, friendly visit
Trincomalee
• 13–15 January 2014, friendly visit
TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam
• 26–30 March 2011, joint drills and friendly visit
• 29 December 2013–1 January 2014, friendly visit
THAILAND
Sattahip
• 16–21 August 2011, joint drills and friendly visit
• 21–25 April 2012, friendly visit
• 12–16 September 2013, friendly visit
TURKEY
Istanbul
• 5–8 August 2012, friendly visit
UKRAINE
Sevastopol
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly visit
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Abu Dhabi
• 24–28 March 2010, friendly visit
VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh City
• 13 January 2013, friendly visit
YEMEN
Aden
• 21 February 2009, replenish/overhaul
• 25 April 2009, replenish/overhaul
• 23 July 2009, replenish/overhaul
• 28 September 2009, replenish/overhaul
• 5 February 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 16 May 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 26 July 2010, replenish/overhaul
• 1 October 2010, replenish/overhaul
Selected Port Visits by PLAN Antipiracy Forces, continued
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Whereas in all of 2009 PLAN task forces berthed in foreign ports in just five states, 
Chinese antipiracy flotillas have, among them, stopped in over ten countries every year 
since 2010. Moreover, the nature of port calls has evolved dramatically during the past 
six years. In 2009 and 2010 most Chinese port calls were conducted for replenishment, 
rest, and relaxation. But by 2012 Chinese antipiracy escort task forces had made eight 
port calls for friendly visits (i.e., for primarily diplomatic reasons), and this trend has 
continued over the last two years. This demonstrates a growing share of Chinese naval 
resources devoted to diplomacy. More importantly, it illustrates the efficiency with 
which the PLAN is deriving soft-power capital from its contributions to international 
maritime nontraditional security.
China has also bolstered international exchanges by hosting foreign navies at Chinese 
ports and cities. In mid-May 2011 China invited twenty representatives from eight 
African nations, including Algeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, to participate in a twenty-
day maritime law enforcement program in Zhejiang Province.53 At the first Interna-
tional Symposium on Counter-Piracy and Escort Cooperation, in February 2012 at the 
PLAN Command College in Nanjing, Navy Military Studies Research Institute senior 
researcher Cai Weidong stated, “The Chinese navy hopes to build up a platform for in-
ternational cooperation that will allow naval forces of different countries to familiarize 
themselves with each other. I hope the platform well serves our antipiracy goals.” 54
As these examples illustrate, China has derived incrementally greater soft-power bene-
fits from its antipiracy operations by boosting the number of both midmission port calls 
and diplomatic and friendly visits en route home. Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou has 
called for a higher degree of “creative involvement,” a foreign policy concept that identi-
fies and adapts creative and flexible modes of foreign engagement on a case-by-case 
basis.55 The PLAN seems to be applying Wang’s concept in the far seas, perhaps most 
notably through its antipiracy operations, without changing their fundamental form. 
Adding more stops before and after antipiracy service in the Gulf of Aden has allowed 
the PLAN to accumulate larger soft-power gains. This practice reflects the PLAN’s 
greatest lesson from far-seas antipiracy missions: there is no substitute for experience, 
and six years of continuous operations have allowed China gradually to become more 
effective in securing its comprehensive interests through the deployment of antipiracy 
task forces.
Arguably even more than foreign port calls, other nontraditional maritime security 
operations facilitated by Beijing’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy presence contribute to China’s 
“deep blue diplomacy.” Escort of foreign vessels carrying Syrian chemical weapons 
through the Mediterranean and active participation in search and rescue operations 
during the frantic search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 in early 2014 are just two 
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examples of how the PLAN has leveraged antipiracy resources to contribute to interna-
tional security.56
Some commentators are less sanguine about China’s attempts to expand its maritime 
relations; it is important to note that there are objections to the notion that China’s 
antipiracy missions are benign. In that view, self-interested economic and security cal-
culations are arguably the largest drivers of the PLAN’s deployment of warships to the 
Gulf of Aden, and viewing port visits as diplomatic exchanges risks oversimplification, 
since many states may view them as harbingers of creeping Chinese power projection.57 
For example, the tiny island-state Seychelles is one of several coastal and island African 
states in which China has actively sought to enhance its soft power.58 China could be 
using antipiracy operations to support an aggressive naval development policy, as well 
as to pursue a more active grand strategy that involves overseas access facilities and a 
long-term trend toward a greater overall global presence.
Chinese Naval Development
The PLAN is just one of several “independent” providers of antipiracy assets in the Gulf 
of Aden. While the majority of naval antipiracy forces fight pirates under the aegis of 
multilateral commands, several states—including China, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, 
and Russia—have primarily operated on a unilateral basis rather than under the com-
mand of multinational antipiracy forces such as CTF-151, NATO’s Operation Open 
Shield, or EU NAVFOR. This posture suggests that China is probably trying to learn 
as much as it can from other navies without revealing much about its own operations, 
while also, clearly, maintaining ideological independence in foreign policy.
China’s preference to abstain from combined operations is driven by several factors. 
First, greater independence allows the PLAN to conduct its preferred method of anti-
piracy operations—relatively low-risk escort operations aimed at deterring, rather than 
actively searching for, pirates. It also offers China an individual identity as a provider of 
maritime public goods, rather than as just another state operating within Western-led 
security mechanisms. Moreover, if China joined the existing security structure, poten-
tial frictions might arise that could preclude meaningful integration, such as sensitivi-
ties related to information sharing and technology theft. Some Chinese defense experts 
opposed acceptance of the U.S. Navy’s invitation to participate in the 2014 RIMPAC 
exercises and other joint maritime cooperation activities for such reasons.59
These concerns notwithstanding, China’s antipiracy operations over the past several 
years have made meaningful contributions to Gulf of Aden security. In addition, they 
have achieved unprecedented coordination between China and other antipiracy mari-
time forces in the region, such as those of the United States. While suspicions abound 
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regarding China’s motives, antipiracy cooperation may contribute to more positive 
outside perceptions of China and its international status. China has been “ready to 
exchange information and cooperate with the warships of other countries in fight-
ing Somalian pirates” since its inaugural deployment in 2008.60 One PLAN antipiracy 
task force commander, Adm. Du Jingcheng, has recalled that he was eager to “facilitate 
exchanges of information with escort naval vessels from other countries.” 61
In the nearly six-year period beginning December 2008, the PLAN has coordinated 
information with over twenty nations, including the United States.62 Li Faxin, associate 
professor (and lieutenant commander) at the Naval Marine Academy, states that PLAN 
antipiracy forces have established “high-trust partner relations” (高度信任的伙伴关系) 
with many nations operating in the Gulf of Aden.63
Positive results have also been facilitated by Shared Awareness and Deconfliction 
(SHADE), a voluntary multistate antipiracy information-sharing mechanism. SHADE 
meetings occur quarterly in Bahrain and regularly host naval and industry leaders from 
various states. Willingness on the part of independent navies, China’s in particular, to 
synchronize their antipiracy operations with those of Western forces within the SHADE 
mechanism is a historic achievement for twenty-first-century maritime commons 
governance.
China was denied SHADE chairmanship in 2009 but, notwithstanding, coordinates 
its antipiracy escorts with those of other SHADE members. For example, China has 
participated in SHADE’s Convoy Coordination Working Group and coordinates its 
monthly escort schedules with other navies providing independent escorts. China, 
India, and Japan reportedly began coordinating their antipiracy operations as early as 
2011.64 They mutually arranged escort schedules twenty-nine times between January 
and March 2012, with China acting as the coordinator for ten escorts, India for ten, and 
Japan for nine.65
Conclusions
For six years the PLAN’s antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have symbolized 
China’s burgeoning out-of-area naval activity. They also showcase Beijing’s grow-
ing ability to achieve soft-power objectives while concurrently promoting its overseas 
interests and military development. Important components of these missions include 
escort of commercial ships, navy-to-navy meetings, participation in multistakeholder 
dialogues on antipiracy operations, and, most significantly, the growing number of port 
visits undertaken by PLAN warships. These position the PLAN as an important and 
highly visible player in China’s recent soft-power diplomacy.
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China’s ongoing antipiracy operations in its far seas have generated many positive 
assessments. In contrast to its contentious near seas, where Beijing is consistently 
embroiled in sovereignty disputes that show no signs of abating, antipiracy missions 
represent the most significant positive component of China’s naval engagement to date, 
particularly with regard to the degree to which Chinese vessels and sailors are interact-
ing with the outside world. This interaction not only enhances China’s maritime image 
in the eyes of its antipiracy partners but may help alleviate fears that China’s naval rise 
might one day threaten twenty-first-century maritime prosperity in regions beyond the 
near seas. The United States and China reportedly planned over forty visits, exchanges, 
and other engagements for 2013, double the number in the previous year, and success-
fully carried out joint antipiracy exercises in 2012 and 2013.66 In 2014, China partici-
pated in RIMPAC for the first time, the U.S.-hosted forum that is currently the largest 
naval exercise in the world.
The PLAN’s experience fighting piracy in distant seas is a benchmark that can be used 
by Beijing to cement its positive image in the international arena. Antipiracy operations 
prove that the PLAN can be a provider—not merely a consumer or, worse, a disrupter—
of maritime commons security. International society largely perceives Chinese naval 
contributions to fighting piracy as positive developments, perceptions that stand in 
sharp contrast to China’s hard-power naval approaches in the East and South China 
Seas. The nature and perceived efficacy of China’s soft power are constantly being 
scrutinized by scholars.67 While it is too early to speculate exactly how Beijing’s con-
tributions to antipiracy today will bolster its future soft-power influence, the results 
should be at least moderately positive. More generally, the Gulf of Aden case suggests 
that China will continue to reap international political benefits commensurate with its 
contributions to international maritime security.
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Conclusions
Breaking the Mold
BRUCE A.  ELLEMAN AND S .  C .  M.  PAINE
Navies are most commonly thought of in terms of warfare, when the primary naval 
objective is closing the commons to the enemy while keeping it open to friends. In 
peacetime, the main objective is keeping the commons open to lawful use by everyone. 
Nonmilitary missions tend to occur in peacetime, and many indirectly concern the 
protection of the maritime commons through the enforcement of “good order at sea.” 1 
Such missions include halting the movement of banned cargoes, preventing interference 
with the movement of legal traffic, and protecting the environment. Many navies and 
coast guards cooperate with those of other countries to conduct these missions because 
all nations share a common interest in safe transit and healthy fisheries.
After the end of the Cold War, many military missions no longer fit the standard 
war-fighting paradigm. A new term, “military operations other than war,” or MOOTW, 
was coined to describe them. Many officers did not like this shift, since it seemed to 
diminish the military’s role. Gen. John Shalikashvili characterized this widely held (and 
in his mind erroneous) sentiment as the attitude that “real men don’t do mootw.” 2 But of 
course, while the term might be new, the missions are not. A RAND study identified no 
fewer than 846 military operations other than war between 1916 and 1996 in which just 
the U.S. Air Force, or its Army predecessor, played a role.3
As the nine historical case studies in this volume have shown, for well over a century 
and a half the U.S. Navy has engaged in many nonmilitary missions, dating back to the 
antislavery patrols of the 1840s. Navies can play a major role in diplomacy, economics, 
fisheries, humanitarian relief, scientific research, and disaster relief, to name just a few 
fields. During these historical missions the Navy did not necessarily focus on aiding 
American citizens but often on assisting allies or simply those in need. These missions 
affected numerous audiences, ranging from individuals through interest groups to 
entire nations. Thus, it is important to consider both the targets of these missions and 
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the wide range of audiences observing from the sidelines and to consider how direct and 
indirect effects impact all stakeholders.
Targets of Nonmilitary Operations
Whereas during wartime the target of a naval force is typically either an enemy or an 
ally of the enemy, in nonmilitary operations the “target” is quite often one’s own citizens 
or friends; also the goal is rarely destruction, more often being assistance (see table 1). 
Examples of such missions include freeing slaves, feeding noncombatants in war-
time, shutting down one’s own commerce by embargo, protecting marine life through 
research and pollutant containment, and defending shipping from piracy. If these 
activities occurred on land, they would be considered matters of law enforcement, not 
military action, but on the high seas professional navies are often tasked to carry them 
out; in littoral waters coast guards generally assume these responsibilities.
Counterintuitively, the indirect, secondary target is often more important than the 
direct target—for example, domestic voters, who can determine whether politicians 
remain in office, and the press, which often interprets news items and influences vot-
ers. Thus, voters and the press are often the indirect targets of operations to protect the 
TABLE 1
Targets of Nonmilitary Operations (in order of importance)
 CASE 
 STUDY
 DIRECT 
 TARGET
INDIRECT 
TARGET
COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE
Slave Trade slaves (cargo) abolitionist voters,   
slave owners,  
international press
Venezuela
Deterrence
no target—only 
audiences
Starvation
Blockade
noncombatants in 
occupied territory
U.S. voters,  
Entente voters
ê collateral damage of 
blockade
Oil 
Embargo
commerce Japanese decision  
makers
ê U.S. commerce
Vietnamese 
Refugees
refugees North Vietnamese 
government and navy
Artificial 
Reefs
ship disposal sportfishing, tourism, 
scuba diving
Sonar and 
Whales
whales environmentalists, 
voters
 
Gulf 
Oil Spill
BP workers, oil 
cleanup
press, voters, 
shoreline, fisheries, 
tourists
 
PLAN 
Antipiracy
pirates image building at 
home and abroad, 
naval training,  
naval espionage 
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environment and help refugees. After an oil spill, the initial environmental cleanup is 
the direct target, but press and voter perceptions of the cleanup are often secondary 
targets. In the case of Britain’s “starvation blockade” against Germany in World War I, 
the strategy might have become unsustainable if it had alienated American and British 
voters by causing the mass starvation of innocent noncombatants in Belgium and oc-
cupied France. Herbert Hoover’s humanitarian mission to provide food to those caught 
in the midst of war avoided this dilemma.
Likewise, if the U.S. Navy can show—by conducting research on sonar and whales—that 
its activities do not damage marine life, or better yet, if it can improve marine life—by 
building artificial reefs—voters might view the Navy in an ever more positive light. Al-
though the immediate target of Coast Guard operations following the BP Gulf of Mexico 
oil spill was the rescue of workers and pressing BP to cap the well, the secondary target of 
preventing the infiltration of oil into marshlands, which would have outraged conser-
vationists, the fishing industry, and tourists, was even more important for the recovery 
of the ecosystem. In the case of the Chinese navy’s recent antipiracy efforts, the primary 
target might be the pirates, but the maritime proficiency and intelligence it is gaining, 
in combination with the pride that Chinese citizens derive from these new power-
projection capabilities, are arguably far more important to the Chinese government.
In contrast to these successful operations, it is possible to reach the intended target but 
in unanticipated and undesired ways. American attempts to pressure Japan to withdraw 
from China in the 1930s failed; Washington’s public ultimatums hardened rather than 
softened Japanese attitudes. When the United States attempted to deter Japan from fur-
ther escalation in China, it imposed a succession of sanctions, with great fanfare in the 
press. Sanctions broadly targeted the Japanese government and people, on the assump-
tion that finance was a central consideration of Tokyo’s decision making. Apparently the 
sanctions did in fact convince Japan’s finance minister that war with the United States 
was untenable; he, at least, received the intended message loud and clear. But Japan’s 
naval and, particularly, army leaders did not wish to accept such a conclusion. They be-
came desperate instead to deter the United States and concluded that attacks across the 
Pacific constituted their best, albeit remote, hope. So the American strategy backfired 
with regard to Japan’s military leaders and delivered an outcome opposite to what was 
intended. In this case, the U.S. government correctly gauged Japan’s civilian leaders but 
failed to anticipate the adverse reaction of its military.
Primary targets are often individuals in distress. As various chapters have shown, non-
military operations can assist victims of slavery or disaster survivors or help refugees 
flee a war zone. The number of individuals included can be small or in the tens of thou-
sands, if not more. For example, the Navy’s Operation Frequent Wind helped thirty 
thousand refugees flee Vietnam for the Philippines, and melded later into Operation 
184  the newport papers
New Life, which moved them to Guam for processing before permanent resettlement 
in the United States and other nations. An important secondary target was the victori-
ous North Vietnamese government, which was denied the ships of the South Vietnam-
ese navy, as well as its officers and their families. Sometimes the secondary targets are 
audiences—people who witness events and whose subsequent actions may be influenced 
by the nonmilitary operation.
Audiences of Nonmilitary Operations
In a world connected by instantaneous mass communication, onlookers are far more 
numerous than participants. Observers can be subdivided into specific audiences with 
differentiating interests and agendas (see table 2). In the past, the professional press 
provided the lens through which viewers interpreted events; now, with bloggers and the 
social media, isolated individuals can unexpectedly attract mass followings. Audiences 
include voters and political parties at home and in allied and enemy nations, the press at 
home and abroad, nonstate actors, foreign governments or foreign militaries or foreign 
intelligence agencies, and also a range of foreign and domestic nongovernmental inter-
est groups, such as environmentalists. In fact, audiences can include any group that has 
an interest in maritime affairs. The problem for naval strategists becomes reaching the 
targeted audience without alienating other, unintended audiences.
Publicity is not necessarily an effective method of exerting pressure, particularly in 
societies concerned with preserving “face,” so a navy’s ability to stay out of the headlines 
is valuable. Because naval forces operate far out to sea, their actions generally remain 
invisible and become public only when a government decides to make them public. The 
ability to limit the number of audiences is one of the greatest strengths of this “secret 
service.” As Adm. Joseph Prueher, Jr., U.S. ambassador in China during the 2001 EP-3 
negotiations, later explained in connection with the success of his efforts to get the 
aircraft’s crew home, negotiating with China often requires building “ladders for the 
Chinese to climb down” from untenable diplomatic positions.4 Naval deployments in 
proximity to the shore but far enough away to be out of the public eye can provide lever-
age during diplomatic talks without subjecting leaders to public humiliation, let alone to 
the domestic backlash that such humiliation would entail.
During the Venezuelan crisis, President Theodore Roosevelt’s fleet-in-being had no im-
mediate target; rather, its primary audience comprised the highest levels of the German 
and British governments, whom Roosevelt sought to deter from naval action against 
Venezuela. A secondary but critical audience was that of South American leaders, 
whom Roosevelt did not wish to alienate lest they seek outside assistance to counterbal-
ance the United States. In 1906, after forcing Germany to back down, Roosevelt sent 
Secretary of State Elihu Root on a “goodwill tour” to South America to make it clear that 
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the United States desired only to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the 
Latin American republics.5
But there were other audiences, audiences that Roosevelt wanted to keep in ignorance. 
He did not wish American voters or the Democratic Party to stir up an anti-British or 
anti-German crusade that might have strengthened British and German determination 
to send military forces to the Caribbean. A fourth potential audience was the inter-
national press. The mobilization of the entire U.S. fleet was secret to everyone but the 
American, British, and German governments; it never reached the attention of the press. 
In the absence of an evident crisis, the American and European press never became an 
important audience, a fact that avoided unwanted public pressure. Thus, secrecy allowed 
Roosevelt to reach just the intended audiences without setting off the others.
Even nonhumans can be the targets of naval operations and navy-funded research, 
with humans the intended audience. In particular, environmentalists are a major, and 
quickly growing, audience for such issues as marine mammals subjected to intense 
sound from naval sonar. Navy-sponsored research programs have greatly expanded 
fundamental knowledge about marine-mammal hearing and have produced innova-
tions in underwater acoustic propagation models, tags for monitoring animals at depth, 
and increasingly sophisticated operational aids for detecting and predicting movements 
of individual animals at sea. Such information assists not only the Navy but also a wide 
range of other audiences in the fields of shipping, fisheries, marine biology, and research 
to reduce bycatch and ship strikes and to monitor migration patterns, essential behav-
iors, and population trends.
There is a wide array of audiences associated with environmental disasters. The U.S. 
Coast Guard, for instance, acted quickly after the Deepwater Horizon explosion. The 
initial target was the rescue of the missing crew members on the oil rig. But the more 
important audiences of this operation were American voters and Congress, the former 
wishing to assess the damage and determine which political party to praise or blame, 
and the latter, in combination with U.S. courts, determining appropriate punishment 
for BP, with extensive follow-on effects for oil exploration and exploitation in U.S. ter-
ritorial waters. Restoration of fisheries and coastal economies depended on the efficacy 
of the environmental cleanup, which affected a number of other audiences, including 
fishermen, sportsmen, and tourists, to name just a few. Indeed, in the long term, these 
tertiary audiences may well be the most important politically and restoration of the 
coastal environment the most important issue economically.
Not all audiences are sympathetic to naval missions conducted during peacetime. For 
example, most Secretaries of the Navy who served during the antislavery squadron’s ex-
istence hailed from southern states. Because a primary unintended audience comprised 
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southern plantation owners, who depended on the slave economy, the secretaries were 
not inclined to suppress the trade. For virtually the entire history of the squadron, 
the Secretary of the Navy instructed commanders to prioritize the protection of legal 
American commerce over the suppression of the slave trade. Only when a northerner, 
Isaac Toucey (1857–61), assumed the post did the primary audience shift to northern 
abolitionists and the patrols start aggressively targeting the slave trade.
Positive and Negative Objectives and Their Direct and Indirect Effects
The objectives of naval missions can be positive or negative (see table 3). Positive objec-
tives make something happen and so are usually obvious to everyone. These can include 
facilitating the movement of people or cargo, convoying ships through pirate-infested 
waters, or promoting research and development to study specific problems. Early in the 
history of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Naval Observatory was tasked to become the world’s 
timekeeper and principal authority for navigational astronomical data—a useful, posi-
tive objective. A nonmilitary humanitarian-aid mission, such as the Belgian relief effort 
in aid of noncombatants during World War I, can also contribute to a military operation, 
in such ways as strengthening the impact of a starvation blockade against the enemy.
CASE STUDY POSITIVE OBJECTIVES NEGATIVE OBJECTIVES
Slave Trade free slaves (means);  
catch slave traders (means); 
halt slave trade (ends)
deter further slave trade (means);  
prevent movement of banned cargo 
(ends)
Venezuela 
Deterrence
deter UK and German intervention 
in Americas (ends)
Starvation 
Blockade
feed starving (ends/means);  
make blockade palatable to voters 
(ends/means)
prevent collateral damage from 
blockade (means)
Oil 
Embargo
force Japan to de-escalate (ends) prevent cargo movement (means); 
deter Japan from further escalation 
(ends)
Vietnamese 
Refugees
save refugees (means) prevent NV from taking SV navy 
(ends)
Artificial 
Reefs
create new reefs (means);  
dispose of ships economically (ends)
Sonar and 
Whales
research on sonar and whales 
(means)
avoid hurting whales (ends);
avoid alienating environmentalists 
(ends)
Gulf 
Oil Spill
rescue BP workers (ends);  
plug well (ends/means); 
clean up oil (ends)
prevent spread of oil (means)
PLAN 
Antipiracy
convoy ships (means);  
catch pirates (ends)
deter piracy (ends)
NV: North Vietnam 
SV: South Vietnamese
TABLE 3
Positive and Negative Objectives
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While positive objectives are usually easy to document, negative objectives are more 
difficult to discern, because they seek to prevent undesired actions or situations. Who 
can prove that anything was prevented or that any attempt was even made? Such “non-
events” are virtually impossible to measure and so are often difficult to notice, let alone 
document. President Roosevelt’s “whisper diplomacy,” which deterred German and 
British military intervention in Venezuela, is a rare, well-documented instance of the 
achievement of a negative objective. His fleet-in-being had a direct effect of deterring 
European military intervention in the Americas—a very high-value national security 
objective for the United States.
An equally important indirect effect in that case was the British prime minister’s 
reaction to the crisis (see table 4). Afterward, he chose to cultivate close ties with 
Washington, an approach that promoted the creation of the Anglo-American “special 
relationship.” While this indirect result was not necessarily sought by Roosevelt at the 
outset of the crisis, it helped set up the framework of the Anglo-American cooperation 
that coalesced in World War I, continued through World War II and the Cold War, 
and arguably remains at the center of American and British foreign policies to this 
day. Therefore, counterintuitively, indirect effects of negative objectives can be just as 
CASE STUDY DIRECT INDIRECT
Slave Trade slaves; slave owners press; southern and northern voters
Venezuela 
Deterrence
British and German governments British desire to create “special 
relationship”
Starvation 
Blockade
hungry noncombatants;  
UK and German blockade force
U.S., Entente, and Central Powers 
press and voters; make starvation 
blockade politically feasible
Oil 
Embargo
Japanese economy; 
Japanese people;  
U.S. businesses
U.S. press and voters;
Japanese military
Vietnamese 
Refugees
refugees; North Vietnam’s loss of 
South Vietnamese navy
morale of U.S. Navy, participants; 
U.S.-Philippine relations
Artificial 
Reefs
economical ship disposal; reef 
creation
environmentalists; recreationists; 
voters
Sonar and 
Whales
whales; sonar improvement environmentalists; voters; pure 
research
Gulf 
Oil Spill
rescue BP personnel; oil removal;  
save fisheries and shoreline
data for lawsuit vs. BP; improvement 
in U.S. interagency coordination
PLAN 
Antipiracy
reduce piracy reduce insurance rates; improve 
PLAN proficiency; enhance 
international cooperation
Note: Indirect effects include all audiences influenced.
TABLE 4
Direct and Indirect Effects 
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important as, if not more important in the long run than, the direct effects from the 
positive objectives that catch people’s attention.
Antipiracy missions too concern the negative objective of deterrence. Faced with a grow-
ing piracy threat off the coast of Somalia, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
began to conduct convoys to achieve the negative objective of deterring Somali pirates 
from attack. While the primary audience was the commercial shipping, which was di-
rectly affected by the success of the convoys, an indirect audience—especially once non-
Chinese-flagged ships joined the convoys—was the rest of the world. The international 
press praised Chinese naval contributions to fighting piracy and China’s international 
image benefited. Increasingly, the PLAN’s antipiracy mandate has focused on broad 
international security objectives to maximize this indirect effect (see table 5).
Deterrence is not always feasible, however. In the early 1940s, an American oil embargo 
backed up by a fleet-in-being based at Pearl Harbor did not, as had been intended, result 
in a Japanese withdrawal from China. Rather, it prompted a massive escalation on 7 De-
cember 1941—Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor—along with attacks on British and Dutch 
interests throughout the Pacific. As one scholar reflects, “It is interesting to speculate 
whether continuing the oil shipments would have kept Japan out of the war long enough 
for the deterrent force in the Philippines and in the British Far Eastern Fleet to become 
completely effective, or whether Japan would have reacted regardless of the oil policy.” 6
Securing the Maritime Commons
One of the Navy’s primary missions entails the negative objective of preventing disrup-
tion of the global economic order by stopping interference with oceanic transportation. 
Given that 90 percent of world trade travels by sea, this mission underlies economic 
prosperity globally. The global commons is often kept open to legal traffic by such non-
military missions as elimination of piracy, interdiction of human trafficking, seizure of 
DIRECT EFFECTS INDIRECT EFFECTS
Positive 
Objective
deliver food to Belgians;   
rescue refugees (Vietnam);  
rescue workers, cap well (oil spill); 
convoy to aid cargo movement  
(antipiracy); fund R&D (whales)
attract voters (humanitarian or 
environmental relief); cultivate allies  
(UK in Belgian relief)
Negative 
Objective
prevent cargo movement (sanctions);         
prevent North Vietnam from taking 
South Vietnamese navy; prevent 
pollution spread (oil spill)
UK wants “special relationship” with 
U.S. (Venezuela); prevent environmental 
damage (oil spill); prevent piracy
R&D: research and development
TABLE 5
Correlation of Positive/Negative Objectives with Direct/Indirect Effects
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banned cargoes, prevention of dumping or leaking of pollutants, and research on the 
maritime environment and other issues.
Focusing on global problems is not new; for the U.S. Navy it dates back to the early 
nineteenth century. Initiatives by Matthew Fontaine Maury, appointed in 1842 the first 
superintendent of the Naval Observatory, transformed that institution from a repository 
for navigational gear and charts to a center for astronomical and oceanographic ob-
servation and for data mining of charts and logbooks on currents, winds, and climate. 
Much of the U.S. Navy’s early research, in such areas as hull design, navigational aids, 
and weaponry, was specific to its missions, but modern-day research and development 
encompass communications, climate, modeling, deep-sea mapping, visualization of 
battle spaces, creation of virtual training environments, and physical and cyberspace 
probes. Many of these research projects provide advantages well beyond war fighting, 
indeed well beyond the maritime world writ large, to benefit the civilian economy.
Oil spills of the magnitude of Deepwater Horizon threaten, if not contained expedi-
tiously, negative environmental effects for decades to come. According to the World 
Health Organization, dependence on marine resources doubled in a period of about 
forty years in the twentieth century: “The average apparent per capita fish consumption 
increased from about 9 kg per year in the early 1960s to 16 kg in 1997.”7 With the oceans 
already under pressure from overfishing and overuse, the maritime environment may 
be already damaged beyond repair by permanent ecological changes. Therefore, the 
protection of the seas from further pollution is not a trivial mission.
The sinking of Navy ships provides for recreational diving an alternative to natural reefs, 
which diving can damage. Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Base Action 
Network are concerned, however, that the use of the ships for artificial reefs might injure 
the ecosystem by introducing pollutants and spurring the migration of fish from natural 
to artificial reefs. But surveys conducted on Spiegel Grove off Key Largo, Florida, and anec-
dotal information from such longer-established artificial reefs as the ex–Coast Guard cutters 
Duane and Bibb off Key Largo indicate that the vessels have not diminished marine life on 
existing reef systems. In fact, artificial reefs can relieve the pressure on the surrounding 
natural reefs from recreational use and stimulate new populations of reef fish.8
In the waters off Somalia, Chinese commanding officers and sailors have worked closely 
with other navies to secure the maritime commons, through frequent bilateral exchanges 
as well as multi-stakeholder settings. The PLAN has carefully crafted its antipiracy mis-
sions to portray abroad its blue-water operations positively. Initially, China’s navy es-
corted only Chinese-flagged ships through the Gulf of Aden, but recently approximately 
70 percent of ships in a given Chinese escort flotilla have been foreign flagged. PLAN 
antipiracy task forces have called in dozens of foreign ports for a variety of purposes, 
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from core needs, such as replenishment, to diplomatic and friendly initiatives ranging 
from military parades in Seychelles to the opening of warships for public visits in Malta. 
Thus, nonmilitary missions can become win-win scenarios for all parties involved.
Win-Win, Lose-Lose, and Mixed-Outcome Operations
Most of the nonmilitary missions discussed in this collection benefited not only the 
particular nations carrying them out but also many other stakeholders supporting the 
peaceful use of the global maritime commons. Thus, they were win-win operations for 
all parties adhering to international law (see table 6). Humanitarian relief, fundamental 
research, and antipiracy missions all fall into this category.
One of the most important humanitarian missions conducted by the U.S. Navy was the 
post-tsunami Operation Unified Assistance in Southeast Asia of 2004–2005, in 
which over thirteen thousand service members on twenty-five U.S. Navy ships deliv-
ered essential food, water, and medicine to tens of thousands of desperate survivors.9 
On a much smaller scale, in June 2013 the PLAN deployed hospital ship Peace Ark 
from Zhe jiang Province’s Zhoushan Port on Harmonious Mission 2013, in which 
the vessel visited Brunei, Maldives, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, 
and Cambodia over four months. This ship also participated in a combined medical 
tour with naval ships from Indonesia and Singapore in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia, on 12 
September 2013.10
Marine research is another win-win. To date, the Navy’s Office of Naval Research has 
supported research for fifty-nine Nobel Prize winners, spanning the fields of chemis-
try, economics, medicine, and physics (see table 7). Among the first winners were Felix 
Bloch (physics, 1952), for measurement of magnetic resonance imaging and atomic 
nuclei, and Georg von Békésy (medicine, 1961), for the biomechanics of hearing, studies 
CASE STUDY PROTAGONIST OPPONENT GLOBAL  AUDIENCE
Slave Trade win lose win
Venezuela Deterrence win lose N/A
Starvation Blockade win covert lose win
Oil Embargo lose lose lose
Vietnamese Refugees win lose win
Artificial Reefs win win win
Sonar and Whales win win win
Gulf Oil Spill win win win
PLAN Antipiracy win lose win
TABLE 6
Win-Win, Win-Lose, and Mixed-Outcome Operations
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seminal to unraveling underwater sound impacts. The Office of Naval Research assisted 
the Trieste deep-sea dives and the development of the deep-diving submersible Alvin and 
experimental underwater habitat Sea Lab, and it funded the remotely operated seafloor 
vehicle Jason and the hunt for Titanic. Finally, it has a growing program in unmanned 
undersea and aerial vehicles deployed for basic research, as well as military uses.
TABLE 7
Office of Naval Research–Supported Nobel Prize Winners, 1952–2010
Felix Bloch Physics 1952 magnetic measurement in atomic nuclei
Linus Pauling Chemistry 1954 chemical bond’s application to the 
elucidation of the structure of complex 
substances
Severo Ochoa Medicine 1959 synthesis of ribonucleic acid
Donald Glaser Physics 1960 invention of the bubble chamber
Georg von Békésy Medicine 1961 explanation of the physical events that 
take place within the human ear during 
hearing
Melvin Calvin Chemistry 1961 explanation of the second stage of 
photosynthesis
Robert Hofstadter Physics 1961 electron scattering in atomic nuclei 
Charles H. Townes Physics 1964 invention of the maser and the laser
George Wald Medicine 1967 identification of visual pigments and their 
chemical precursors
Haldan Hartline Medicine 1967 impulse coding in the visual receptors
Hans Bethe Physics 1967 nuclear reactions, especially energy 
production in stars
Har Gobind Khorana Medicine 1968 synthesis of well-defined nucleic acids
Christian Anfinsen Chemistry 1972 ribonuclease, connection between the 
amino acid sequence and the biologically 
active conformation
Robert Schrieffer
Leon Cooper
Physics 1972 theory of superconductivity
Gerald Edelman Medicine 1972 chemical structure of antibodies
Kenneth Arrow Economics 1972 general economic equilibrium theory and 
welfare theory
Paul J. Flory Chemistry 1974 physical chemistry of macromolecules
William Lipscomb Chemistry 1976 structure of boranes
Herbert Simon Economics 1978 decision-making process within economic 
organizations
Peter Mitchell Chemistry 1978 biological energy transfer through the 
formulation of the chemiosmotic theory
Herbert C. Brown Chemistry 1979 use of boron-containing compounds in 
the organic synthesis
David H. Hubel Medicine 1981 discoveries concerning the “visual 
system”
Roald Hoffmann Chemistry 1981 course of chemical reactions
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Nicolaas Bloembergen
Arthur Schawlow
Physics 1981 development of laser spectroscopy
Kenneth Wilson Physics 1982 critical phenomena in connection with 
phase transitions
William A. Fowler Physics 1983 nuclear reactions in the formation of the 
chemical elements in the universe
Herbert A. Hauptman
Jerome Karle
Chemistry 1985 direct methods for the determination of 
crystal structures
John C. Polanyi
Yuan T. Lee
Dudley Herschbach
Chemistry 1986 dynamics of chemical elementary 
processes
Norman F. Ramsey Physics 1989 atomic precision spectroscopy
Hans Dehmelt Physics 1989 development of atomic precision 
spectroscopy
Rudolph A. Marcus Chemistry 1992 theory of electron transfer reactions in 
chemical systems
George Olah Chemistry 1994 carbocation chemistry
Richard E. Smalley Chemistry 1996 carbon atoms bound in the form of a ball
William D. Phillips Physics 1997 cooling and trapping of atoms with laser 
light
Daniel C. Tsui
Horst L. Störmer
Physics 1998 quantum fluid with fractionally charged 
excitations
Walter Kohn Chemistry 1998 density-functional theory
Ahmed Zewail Chemistry 1999 transition states of chemical reactions 
using femtosecond spectroscopy
Eric Kandel Medicine 2000 signal transduction in the nervous system
Hideki Shirakawa
Alan G. MacDiarmid
Alan J. Heeger
Chemistry 2000 discovery and development of conductive 
polymers 
Herbert Kroemer Physics 2000 heterostructures in high-speed electronics 
and optoelectronics
Wolfgang Ketterle
Carl Wieman
Eric Cornell
Physics 2001 Bose-Einstein condensation in dilute gases 
of alkali atoms
John Fenn Chemistry 2002 identification/structure analyses of 
biological macromolecules
Paul Lauterbur Medicine 2003 magnetic resonance imaging
John L. Hall
Theodor W. Hänsch
Physics 2005 laser-based precision spectroscopy
Robert H. Grubbs
Richard R. Schrock
Chemistry 2005 metathesis method in organic synthesis
Andre Geim
Konstantin Novoselov
Physics 2010 two-dimensional material graphene
Source: Darlene R. Ketten, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts.
TABLE 7
Office of Naval Research–Supported Nobel Prize Winners, 1952–2010, continued
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Antipiracy patrols are a win-win both for those conducting the mission and for shipping 
companies globally—although they are, of course, a “lose” for the pirates. The Libera-
tion Army Daily, the PLA’s mouthpiece, has described the PLAN as having created by 
cooperation in the Gulf of Aden an “effective information network with over 50 war-
ships from more than 20 countries and organizations through information resource 
sharing in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast.”11 There are both realist 
and idealist reasons behind China’s antipiracy operations. The former include the “de-
sire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and to provide opportunities 
for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN’s capabilities in military operations 
other than war.” But the latter involve China’s desire to contribute meaningfully to 
regional security.12
Economic win-win scenarios include using naval vessels to create reefs, thereby dispos-
ing of old ships cheaply while promoting marine life and recreation. There can be socio-
economic benefits from tourism for communities that host artificial reefs. For example, 
with the Vandenberg and the Spiegel Grove sinkings, the U.S. Navy, the Maritime Ad-
ministration, state and local governments, local business organizations (e.g., chambers 
of commerce and tourism boards), and advocacy groups were all involved. The Spiegel 
Grove project has recovered most of its costs significantly ahead of schedule, owing in 
large part to increased tourism from the new diving destination.
Not all win-win scenarios are perceived as such at the time, particularly if there are 
competing audiences. For example, during the early nineteenth century the U.S. Navy 
and Royal Navy shared the goal of eliminating the oceanic transport of slaves. The Royal 
Navy had an active and well-established West Africa Squadron. But the U.S. govern-
ment, because of political sensitivities from British searches in the lead-up to the War of 
1812, would not allow the British to search American-flagged vessels. Commo. William 
Edmonstone of the Royal Navy West African Squadron noted, “As vessels engaged in 
the Slave Trade almost invariably fly the American flag, and our cruisers are prohibited 
from in any way interfering with them, of course we are to a very serious extent power-
less in putting a check on the trade.” 13 Thus, American political sensitivity about ship 
searches undermined what would otherwise have been a clear win for both countries.
Some operations produce public win-win scenarios that are in fact, behind the scenes, 
win-lose in nature. Herbert Hoover used the fact that his humanitarian relief efforts 
covertly assisted the blockade of the Central Powers to leverage British support for his 
efforts, including the free use of British shipping. He also convinced the Germans that 
if they did not let him feed the noncombatants, Germany would be required by interna-
tional law to do so itself. Thus, Hoover presented the humanitarian aid for Belgium and 
northern France as a win for both parties. However, his private papers show quite clearly 
that the humanitarian aid allowed Britain to fine-tune its blockade against the Central 
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Powers so as to affect just their populations, without starving the civilians of occupied 
countries. The so-called starvation blockade by the Royal Navy proved highly effective: 
“By the end of World War I there is no question that the German and Austrian popula-
tions were suffering as a result of the blockade.” 14 In reality, the Belgian relief effort was 
really a win-lose scenario, in that it assisted the blockaders to defeat the Central Powers.
A win-lose scenario resulted from the rescue of refugees during the final days of the 
Vietnam War, when thirty-two South Vietnamese naval ships, some in barely seaworthy 
condition and carrying more than thirty thousand refugees, crossed the South China 
Sea to the Philippines. The naval escort not only saved the South Vietnamese naval 
officers and their families from possible persecution but prevented the remaining naval 
vessels from falling into the hands of the conquering North Vietnamese forces, a clear 
strategic win for the United States and loss for North Vietnam. For the Philippines 
it was a win as well: to obtain permission for the ships to land, Ambassador William 
Sullivan convinced a reluctant President Ferdinand Marcos to give the refugees safe 
haven in return for the transfer of many of the South Vietnamese naval ships to the 
Philippine navy.
There is only one lose-lose case study in this collection—the American oil embargo 
against Japan. Rather than de-escalate the war in China or deter war against the West, 
the embargo precipitated the escalation of regional wars in Europe and China into a 
global war. The costs were catastrophic for all sides and produced an outcome antitheti-
cal to both American and Japanese interests. By war’s end the Japanese had eviscerated 
the Nationalist forces in China, positioning the communists to win the long Chinese 
civil war. If there is a lesson to be learned concerning deterrent measures, it would be 
the requirement for a careful calculation of the value of the undesired behavior to the 
opponent. Rightly or wrongly, the Japanese government considered prosecution of the 
war in China to be a matter of regime survival and so felt that it was on “death ground” 
in late 1941.
Dual-Use Naval Equipment and Cost Efficiency
Given that navies can serve wartime and peacetime missions, the ability to do both pro-
motes cost efficiency (see table 8). The naval capabilities associated with embargo en-
forcement, reduction of collateral damage from blockades, mitigation of environmental 
disasters, and fleet-level deterrence enable cost-effective strategies for the United States. 
Beyond the economies associated with dual use with respect to wartime and peacetime 
missions, its war-fighting capabilities and nonmilitary missions allow the U.S. Navy 
to put a combined hard-power and soft-power squeeze on potential enemies, either to 
predispose to or to deter action.
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Naval ships are particularly well suited to nonmilitary operations by virtue of these 
dual-use capabilities. The same naval equipment that can support a war can also sup-
port humanitarian missions, patrol operations, or search and rescue. A proficient navy 
represents a spectrum of capabilities that can be applied in both war and peace. For 
instance, following the Deepwater Horizon disaster the shortage of booms to retain the 
drifting oil was so severe that military aircraft flew in extra booms from Alaska. In 
recent years, policy and planning work at the federal level has made an important leap 
from scenario-based planning for each potential type of event (resulting in reams of 
planning documents for particular scenarios ranging from pandemics to terrorism) to 
capabilities-based planning, wherein capabilities are examined and refined to deliver 
what is needed as circumstances arise. Capabilities-based planning has resulted in the 
more economical integration of much-needed Department of Defense capabilities into 
the existing domestic response structure, all the while observing the legal limitations on 
domestic use of the military.
Many nonmilitary missions involve saving lives and so are extremely time sensitive. 
Either people are reached in time and saved, or they perish. Such missions involve 
refugees at sea, people blown overboard from oil rigs, hungry noncombatants, and 
innocents threatened by pirates. Such problems are solved either quickly or not at all, 
so speed can be essential. The early-nineteenth-century antislavery patrols were such 
a mission; they constituted law enforcement, not war fighting, but warships conducted 
them quite effectively, especially as steam-driven units became available. Similarly, off 
the coast of Somalia today, Qingdao, a Type 052 Luhu-class destroyer commissioned in 
1996, served as the PLAN’s eleventh successive escort task force’s command ship.
High-tech vessels can be assigned relatively easily to nonmilitary missions, thus al-
lowing governments to get the most effective and efficient use out of modern navies. If 
TABLE 8
Soft- and Hard-Power Capabilities
 CASE STUDY  SOFT POWER  HARD POWER
Slave Trade humanitarian relief naval task force
Venezuela Deterrence fleet-in-being
Starvation Blockade humanitarian relief focused blockade effects
Oil Embargo economic sanction fleet-in-being
Vietnamese Refugees humanitarian relief naval escort
Artificial Reefs environmental protection
Sonar and Whales basic research
Gulf Oil Spill environmental protection;  
rescue of workers; disaster 
relief
use of military planes to fly in 
extra booms to contain oil spill
PLAN Antipiracy image building naval task force
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wartime is supposed to be the exception and peacetime the rule, nonmilitary uses of 
navies might actually be the most frequently called-for missions and therefore deserving 
of budgeting attention. Even more importantly, having overpowering naval force on call 
in times of state-to-state tension can provide sea powers enormous diplomatic leverage 
to de-escalate crises, even while remaining largely outside public view. Both of these 
points argue for retaining a large navy composed of many capable ships rather than 
downsizing or building ships with lesser capabilities. Given the cost of warfare, the abil-
ity to avoid war is worth an expensive military force structure. World War II made clear 
the false economy of failing to maintain military forces in Europe and Asia sufficient to 
deter expansionist ambitions.
The military use of navies remains their primary purpose, because of the horrendous 
stakes involved in wars, which one enters with the navy one has, not with the navy one 
wishes one had. As a former Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Gary Roughead, has 
made clear, “I am also a firm believer that the hard power can soften up, but the soft 
power normally cannot harden up.” 15 In wartime, naval coalitions will fail if they lack 
the naval capabilities to get soldiers and supplies into the theater, to protect overseas 
trade, or to shut down the commons for enemy use. In peacetime, these naval assets can 
inspect ships for contraband, act as fleets-in-being to dissuade attack, and conduct a 
wide range of humanitarian missions.
Many nonmilitary operations involving naval task forces or fleets-in-being can help 
keep ships in readiness for war. Even while performing useful missions of a nonmilitary 
nature, crews continue to train for duties essential to warfare. If these humanitarian 
missions can supplement training exercises, and in particular if some activities turn 
out to be even more useful than training exercises, they will be viewed in a different 
financial light—that is, as maximizing tax dollars by incorporating dual-use missions 
and training.
While the term “MOOTW” dates only to the 1990s, the U.S. Navy has a nearly two-
hundred-year history of sponsoring nonmilitary missions that affect many aspects of 
our lives. After the Cold War ended, the U.S. military developed the “3/1” strategy, in 
which a big circle called “major combat operations” encompassed several smaller inner 
circles—stability operations, the global war on terrorism, and homeland defense. This 
framework was an important first step in the creation of a new maritime strategy. These 
smaller circles also included counterterrorism, peacekeeping, antipiracy operations, and 
even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 16
The Navy’s March 2015 maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, provides for humanitarian missions: “Naval power projection capabilities also 
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facilitate other elements of ‘smart power’ missions in the form of humanitarian assis-
tance and disaster response. . . . Positioned to respond rapidly to disasters in key regions, 
forward naval forces working with allies and partners are ready to save lives, provide 
immediate relief, and set the conditions for effective civilian response without relying 
on damaged or inaccessible ports or airfields ashore. This function supports the naval 
missions of defending the homeland, responding to crises, deterring conflict, defeating 
aggression, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response.”17 Working 
with allies and coalition partners is key for success. As Ray Mabus, Secretary of the 
Navy, points out in his preface to the maritime strategy, one of the primary missions of 
America’s sea services is “supporting an ally with humanitarian assistance or disaster 
relief.”18 
Modern navies should be envisioned not as comprising either military or nonmilitary 
capabilities but rather as being extraordinarily flexible “hard power” platforms with an 
infinite array of “hard” and “soft” extension packages at their disposal. While in the 
past the U.S. Navy has taken the lead in many soft-power missions, in recent years other 
global navies, such as China’s, have performed a wide range of nonmilitary operations 
as well, such as patrolling sea-lanes against pirates, searching for missing airliners, or 
conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation in Yemen. These activities break the 
traditional mold of what most people think of as primary missions. In fact, navies can 
be important providers of soft-power solutions across a spectrum of natural and man-
made threat scenarios ranging from environmental disasters to the outbreak of war.
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